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B-H: Balkan Leaders' Desire for Peace Questioned

BR2202163096 Stockholm SVENSKA DAGBLADET in Swedish 21 Feb 96 p 4

["Focus" article by Richard Swartz: "Double Messages a Balkan Tactic"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The American peace in Bosnia will last for 12 months and more than two of them have already passed. The Americans will go home before Christmas—neither sooner, nor later—and with them probably also the Europeans. Thereafter peace in Bosnia must stand on its own feet. At present, it is based on a large number of signed documents and IFOR [Implementation Force] soldiers, and, as far as the latter are concerned, it is not known for sure what they should and should not do.

The Dayton peace agreement is not only voluminous but also relatively precise on details. Those who signed it must have had a clear picture of what was expected of them. The only problem could be that the whole thing is based on a disastrous contradiction: The more or less ethnically "clean" areas, which have been created on the battlefield, are accepted de facto at the same time that the agreement, with a flip-flop as commendable as it is perilous, wants to maintain the fiction of a multinational Bosnian state within the current borders.

Does Not Work

This does not work, not in the Balkans. The warring parties do not know who has really won and who has lost. They are confused. They are also frustrated and insulted; why, none of them have achieved their war objectives yet, and everyone is convinced that this would have been possible if Dayton had not come between. They have not therefore signed the agreement out of goodwill. They have done so because of outside coercion.

It is part of the Bosnian tragedy that the rest of the world has grossly overestimated the warring parties' genuine desire for peace. The civilian population does indeed want peace. But it does not count, either in Serbia, Bosnia, or Croatia. For civilians, there are the army and the police force. The truth is that these three states are democracies only in name. As states, they do not function as the superstructures of civilian societies but, rather, as military-criminal complexes, controlled with a heavy hand by a small political class.

In such a state, political opposition is simply a disruptive element that "abuses" democracy. Has not Slobodan Milosevic already once sent out tanks onto the streets of Belgrade against peaceful demonstrators? When the ruling party loses the elections in Zagreb, Franjo Tudjman refuses to approve the opposition's mayor, invoking reasons of state security. And when Silajdzic leaves the Sarajevo government, it is not just a question of the private ambitions of an egocentric. Many people in Bosnia, including the Americans, worry about the ruling party's growing autocracy and intolerance.

It is the war that has made it easier for this political class to hang on to power. The war has become an alibi. In hard times everybody must stick together. Political opposition is not only a question of abusing democracy and threatening the state; opposition in itself is also verging on treason.

The war has also made it possible for the political class and its clients to make themselves rich. This is not even a secret: Those who follow the few Serbian and Croatian newspapers that still dare to have an opinion of their own know about the documentary exactness with which they have been able to reveal how one politician or another "bought" his house, controls sections of foreign trade, imports arms or gasoline, obtains "credit" through the bank to buy hotels and companies without owners, or puts his family members into various key posts.

Only a few years ago the political class in Belgrade, Zagreb, and Sarajevo still reacted furiously to such accusations. Journalists were frightened into silence. Like insulted virgins, the accused politicians got to their feet and assured people that the whole thing was a lie. Nobody believed them, of course.

That Time Has Gone

Still, the political class felt compelled to stick to the rules of a society governed by law, at least as a ritual. But that time has gone. Today there are no attempts to deny even the most serious and well-founded accusations. The power and arrogance of the political class are such that it can afford total silence.

Thanks to the war, a kind of political-economic mafia has emerged that guarantees both power and money but, like all mafias, also creates complicated mutual dependencies. The very core of this dependency is the war itself. It produces power and money, which is why there must be very strong reasons for really wanting to end it.

But not even in times of peace would the political class's dependency on the war end. As we all know, peace presupposes the extradition of war criminals, individuals who in self-defense would be bound to telling a few unpleasant stories. The political class has good reason to worry about what would come to light and even more about the thing that is the death blow to any mafia-like community: the rebellion in the ranks that would break out when it emerges that the Godfather and those closest to him cannot protect their own.

So the idea now is that this political class will see to it that the American peace becomes a real peace in Bosnia. Its chief representatives have put their signatures to binding documents (how many times have they done this?) and, most recently in Rome, have given assurances (how many times have they done this?) that they really will do what they have promised in writing.

Waste Paper

Of course, those who negotiate with them, like Richard Holbrooke and Carl Bildt, know that all documents that they have solemnly signed over the past few years are already waste paper. But they probably believe that things are different now, that this agreement is so much better despite its inherent contradiction that I have already mentioned.

Perhaps the negotiators also know that the Balkan leaders work with double messages. They say one thing to the rest of the world while they almost daily—I read their newspapers, watch their television programs—say something completely different to their fellow countrymen.

To the negotiators they say that they will comply with the Dayton agreement to the letter. But to their fellow citizens they say the following: We will never give up our people's sacred right, never again permit a border to separate us from our brothers on the other side, and we will never again live together with our enemies. Nobody, absolutely nobody, should think that they can force us to do that!

Exactly the Opposite

So, on one and the same day, one can read a statement by Milosevic, Tudjman, or Izetbegovic in the international press that is contradicted by what the same person says in his own newspapers.

Perhaps Holbrooke and Bildt believe that the message that is directed toward them is the real one; the other is only tactical rhetoric for domestic consumption. For my own part, I believe that the reality is exactly the opposite. It is the domestic policy message that is the important thing.

The fate of the Balkan political class is not at stake in Dayton or Rome. It is decided at home in Serbia, Croatia, and Bosnia, and their message there to their own clients is that the course will remain unchanged, that the war is not over yet, and that everyone must expect it to break out again. This also applies to the opposition: Do not think there will be peace, do not think we intend to give in to international pressure or relinquish our power just because you happen to win an election.

This defiant attitude is both realistic and logical. The politicians in the former Yugoslavia have had time to learn that the United States and Europe have very limited interests in the Balkans. They are scarcely afraid of the stick anymore; it has been used once against the Bosnian Serbs. That it will be used one more time in Bosnia is no longer very likely.

And the carrot? Of course, neither Serbia nor Croatia—not even Bosnia—will ever get all those billions of dollars to reconstruct what they have destroyed themselves, dollars that politicians usually promise so carelessly until they discover that the money belongs to somebody else. By now the politicians in the Balkans have also sensed this. If they do not want to, neither stick nor carrot will be enough to secure a Balkan peace.

And all the beautiful words about belonging to Europe? All the Balkan assurances about wanting to become part of a larger European community? Often it is a question of the same decorative function as the signatures on all of the agreements. The fact is that, in both the Croatian and Serbian parliaments, nationalist politicians get to their feet and say that they do not need Europe. They speak disdainfully of Europe, especially when it makes demands, and say that they will not sell themselves for "a handful of rice and canned goods." They would rather turn their backs on Europe.

A Last Chance

But the question is whether Europe—and the United States—might not come to draw exactly the same conclusion. Dayton is probably the very last chance that will be offered before the rest of the world gets tired of the Balkans. How can you help those who do not seem to want to help themselves? Those who speak about peace but are not really interested in it?

Today the Balkans are not of any security policy interest unless the rest of the world makes it into one. But the United States and Europe do not want to, and Russia cannot. Nor will humanitarian reasons be enough to justify a comprehensive involvement beyond the American year of peace.

There are those who believe that this involvement has already prolonged the suffering and claimed more victims than if the war had been allowed to end on the battlefield.

Perhaps it is precisely this that will still happen in the end. And then the responsibility will not lie with the rest of the world.

Bulgaria: Montenegrin Minister on Economic Cooperation

LD2202203396 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1717 GMT 22 Feb 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Sofia, Feb 22 (TANJUG)—FRY Montenegro Trade Minister Dusko Lalicevic, said in Sofia Thursday that talks on economic cooperation were successful.

Lalicevic told TANJUG that during talks with his hosts Atanasov Paparizov, minister of trade and external economic relations; Etislav Halimanciev, deputy minister for economic development; and officials from the Bulgarian Chamber for Trade and Industry and, during meetings with officials from a number of business firms, an agreement was reached on concrete forms of cooperation.

According to Lalicevic, he agreed with the Bulgarian ministers regarding concrete forms of cooperation in their field of tourism.

Tourist organizations from FRY Montenegro, Bulgaria, and Greece will organize together and promote the so-called Balkans Tour and promote it in non-European countries—in the United States, Canada, and Japan.

Bulgaria: BSP Internal Opposition to Videnov Seen

AU2202174696 Sofia ZNAME in Bulgarian No. 7, 19-25 Feb 96 p 2

[Article by Stancho Yankov: "Zhan Videnov Roasts on Top of the Party's Live Coals"]

[FBIS Translated Text] While two quarrel, the third one wins—this ancient trampoline (in the party version) elevated Zhan Videnov to the peak of party and state power.

Following the 1989 "perestroyka-type" coup within the BCP/BSP [Bulgarian Communist Party/Bulgarian Socialist Party], two wings emerged: the wing of the orthodox Socialists, led by Aleksandur Lilov, and the advocates of merging the socialist cause with capital, led by Andrey Lukanov. Lilov defends the interests of thousands of rank-and-file supporters of the Red party. The strategist [Lilov's sobriquet, because he is head of the BSP Strategic Studies Center] warns: "When a political force disappoints the expectations of its social base and divorces itself from the interests of its electors, it will inevitably bear harsh consequences." On the other side, Lukanov defends the interests of the new Red capitalists. He campaigns for them to multiply and to be tolerated under the BSP's wing. Velislava Dureva, member of the OSD [Alliance for Social Democracy], sings an ode of praise to him: "Lukanov has created an economic class. Ideology's influence on politics is steadily decreasing. The real levers of political power are economic ones."

In their struggles for supremacy within the BSP, the Lilov and Lukanov groups reached a stalemate as long ago as in 1990, effectively neutralizing one another. This forced them to agree on Zhan Videnov as a compromise figure. They were probably counting on him being obedient and amenable to their wishes. However, the assiduous Komsomol leader discovered a thirst for power and developed a lust to form his own power center. Plamen Nikolov (formerly parliamentary secretary of the present government) was a witness: "Zhan Videnov is striving to form a system of personal power in which a very small number of people will play a part. He is striving to rid himself of every potential competitor in the power game." The phantom journalist Viktor Velinov (it is assumed that he acts as Videnov's mouthpiece) hastened to publish the obituaries of Videnov's main opponents: "Whether they like it or not, Andrey Lukanov and Aleksandur Lilov are on their way out of the political scene."

The situation within the BSP has changed perceptibly. On the basis of the equally matched duel between the "ideologists" and "reformers," a triangle of conflict has developed between Lilov, Lukanov, and Videnov. The old party bosses certainly do not intend to surrender their places without a fight. At the moment the combatants are vying for position, exchanging warnings to each other. On 4 April 1995, Lilov fired his first red warning flare: "A party that is incapable of producing five cabinets during its term of office is not a strong party. There is nothing dramatic in carrying out cabinet shuffles—once, twice, or even three times—or in making even more far-reaching changes." As for Lukanov, he does not cease firing his own salvos: "So far, the executive has failed to prove that it is capable of fulfilling the main commitments that the BSP and its coalition partners have assumed. This is the main point. The mistake of the grain export affair is a specific example. We are all unhappy with the results achieved so far in the fight against crime, and relations with the national capital have not been clarified." (10 January 1996) This sounds like a argument put forward to demand the cabinet's resignation.

The blank rounds that Lukanov and Lilov have fired so far against Videnov's advance are not the only ones. Biting criticism of the government seems to be very much in fashion among the party elite. Professor Vladimir Topencharov has been quietly active. In connection with the local elections (which Videnov tried to turn into a triumph) he made a revealing admission. "We are in fact losing many votes. Imagine if we lose as many votes in the next elections. This will be a disaster....

When the power passes into the hands of the prime minister's advisers, it becomes dangerous and uncontrollable." (30 November 1995) In answer to a question from the journalist Veleva: "Do you consider that the mistakes committed by this government are dragging the party down?", Topencharov said: "Yes, they are, and to a serious extent!"

Although speaking in somewhat flowery terms, Yanaki Stoilov, deputy chairman of the BSP Supreme Council, also does not exclude a possible exacerbation of the conflicts: "If a crisis appears, it will be dictated by two factors—a crisis in the government and a BSP identity crisis.... If the BSP allows itself to structure itself politically on the basis of narrow corporate interests, it may become an oligarchic organization." The aggression by the corporate interests is already an established fact. The return to an oligarchy is also under way....

For an expert view, one may quote part of the analysis published in the London journal EASTERN EUROPEAN NEWSLETTER: "For the first time since the start of the post-communist transition, the disagreements within the BSP have developed into implacable confrontations. Videnov's attempts to form his own lobby within the BSP, the state administration, and the economy have ended in failure. Most of the party apparatus has remained loyal to the hardline Socialist Aleksandur Lilov, while the economic structures—in both state and private sectors and in the black market—are controlled by Lukanov's faction.

"The current situation within the BSP is clearly extremely involved, and perhaps even charged with gunpowder. Prime Minister Videnov is like a fire dancer who is walking over the red-hot coals with Komsomol dedication. The main point is that the conflicts within the ranks of the Reds have already become chronic and are apparently forming metastases. It is now simply impossible to find easy and painless solutions for them. Moreover, the situation is further complicated by the invasion of extremely tempting material interests (valued in millions and billions, both in Bulgarian leva and in greenbacks).

"Against this almost catastrophic background, the forthcoming presidential elections acquire exceptional importance. A possible election victory of the democratic community will inevitably provoke a flareup of the crisis in the BSP and will certainly bring it to boiling point. From there, it is only one small step to reach the explosion point."

Bulgaria: General Views 'Destruction' of Security Organs

AU2302095996 Sofia DUMA in Bulgarian 20 Feb 96 p 3

[Interview with Major General Georgi Patrikov (Ret.), former deputy head of Military Counterintelligence, by Vasil Vasilev; place and date not given: "Security Services Were Destroyed in a Systematic and Cold-Blooded Manner"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] [Vasilev] General, in several recent interviews, former Defense Minister Dimitur Ludzhev accused almost all politicians and statesmen after 10 November 1989 of destroying the security organs. What is your opinion?

[Patrikov] In his typical style, Ludzhev is slandering the security organs, and most of all the Bulgarian Socialist Party, and again presenting himself as a hero who knows everything. As if the Bulgarian public is not aware of his great share in the destruction of the security organs during the 1991-92 period. He is responsible for the liquidation of the scientific-technical intelligence, which was very useful to Bulgaria and not the Bulgarian Communist Party, and for the destruction of the other security organs. Ludzhev is trying to manipulate public opinion and claims that he and Zhelyu Zhelev were the only ones who preserved the basic Bulgarian security organs.

[Vasilev] In the past, it used to be said that the Bulgarian security services were among the best in the world.

[Patrikov] This was not by accident. The major special services of the Western countries, including the CIA, always took into consideration the power and ability of our counterintelligence services whenever they discussed their interests in Bulgaria. There is no security service, except perhaps the British services, that has not been taught a lesson by us.

[Vasilev] Who was interested in destroying the Bulgarian security organs?

[Patrikov] The destruction of the services was in the interest of those who, for many years, could not develop their activity in Bulgaria. After 10 November 1989, everything became easy for them, especially in the field of economy. Is it not an act of treason to eliminate our foreign markets, especially those for our defense industry, which used to contribute about $2 billion to our budget every year? It was well-known that the United States and the CIA had a long-range program to discredit Bulgaria as a terrorist country and a state that exported weapons to terrorist regimes and groups. Their goal was to eliminate us from the markets where we had firm positions, but, until 1990-91, they had difficulty accomplishing this. Afterward, Filip Dimitrov [former prime minister from the Union of Democratic Forces] appeared on the stage with his notorious commitment to the United States to refrain from selling arms to Arab countries. He was surrounded by advisers such as Aleks Aleksiev, about whom we had long-standing information that he was connected with the CIA and the U.S. military-industrial complex, Konstantin Mishev, Georgi Bozduganov, and others.

[Vasilev] Do you think that they were responsible?

[Patrikov] Mr. Ludzhev and the people around him also implemented someone's order and were determined to destroy our security organs. They did it in a systematic and cold-blooded manner without thinking about Bulgaria's future. [passage omitted]

[Vasilev] How did things develop in the Military Counterintelligence?

[Patrikov] Ludzhev is disseminating a big lie, namely, that the Military Counterintelligence has been closed down at the end of 1989-beginning of 1990, by General Atanas Semerdzhiev, of all people. There was indeed an attempt to close down the Military Intelligence, but it was made not by Gen. Semerdzhiev, but precisely by Dimitur Ludzhev, when he was the defense minister in Filip Dimitrov's cabinet. At the end of 1989, when Gen. Semerdzhiev became the minister of internal affairs, by a decree of the State Council, the Military Intelligence was transferred from the Ministry of Internal Affairs to the Ministry of Defense, where it was subordinated to the General Staff and continued to implement its functions in the Army without any difficulties. Is Ludzhev's memory too short? Does he not remember that, as the minister of defense, he used to repeatedly summon the leadership of the Military Intelligence and demand a drastic reduction in personnel to a ridiculous number of employees? [passage omitted]

[Vasilev] Is there anything else that disturbs the work of our security organs?

[Patrikov] In the past, the principle of professionalism and the positive cooperation between the operational services and the other investigating and technical units facilitated the work of the services. I want to specifically point out the cooperation among the investigation, prosecution organs, and the courts, which was based on a legal basis. Today, there is no cooperation, and one even gets the impression that cooperation is deliberately destroyed and that corruption reigns. Cooperation among the organs engaged in the struggle against crime is a national issue that must be resolved as soon as possible.

Bulgaria: DPS' Dogan Said To Exploit Kurdzhali

AU2202181096 Sofia KONTINENT in Bulgarian 19 Feb 96 p 6

[Commentary by Rumyana Strugarova: "Kurdzhali Syndrome"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The only undisputed fact about the Kurdzhali protest rally was that Dogan used it to take a census of his electorate prior to inciting them against the government. Any other purpose of the Kurdzhali action, not to mention its outcome, only discredits the Rights and Freedoms Movement [DPS] as an ethnic party that endangers Bulgaria's social peace.

Dogan exploited the local problem in Kurdzhali in order to declare a line of aggressive nationalism and ethnic confrontation. His threat to press the cabinet by all means and to place it under domestic and international pressure would have been startling for any other political figure, but not for Ahmed Dogan. Furthermore, any people's representative who claims that the political forces that received an absolute parliamentary majority are a danger for Bulgaria would have been accused of political shortsightedness. However, Dogan's public outbursts ceased to amaze our public long ago, simply because they are not intended for it.

Flexing his muscles, playing the big hero, and making unfounded political statements obviously helps the DPS leader to attract his constituency. However, his instigation to civic disobedience, threats of a Bulgarian "Bosnia," and of igniting a fire in Kurdzhali are things that go beyond political and propaganda Narcissism. They cannot be underestimated. There is no doubt that no rule-of-law state would tolerate them.

Indeed, it was nothing more than his legal nihilism that made Dogan request that Chief Prosecutor Tatarchev prosecute the prime minister and the National Assembly chairman, despite the fact that in the past Tatarchev had twice initiated investigations into Dogan's nationalist extremism.

Bulgaria: Svishtov Opposes National Energy Strategy

AU2202133896 Sofia STANDART NEWS in Bulgarian 20 Feb 96 p 9

[Staff report: "Svishtov Rejects Energy Strategy Until 2020 Because of Belene Nuclear Power Plant"]

[FBIS Translated Text] On 19 February, it became clear that Svishtov City Council is categorically opposed to the national strategy on developing our power supply energy until 2020. The reason is the intention to complete the construction of the Belene Nuclear Power

Plant. According to the city council members, the concept presented for their opinion by the government does not defend in a sufficiently convincing manner the thesis that the construction of the second nuclear power plant is inevitable. They claim that the concept has been composed without relating it to the development of our economy. It does not take into consideration the fact that that oil and gas pipelines are already crossing our territory and that two new ones will be constructed.

Svishtov City Hall thinks that the city's population has been subjected to pressure. The people are supporting the proposal to turn the nuclear plant's construction site into a free economic zone.

For their part, experts from the National Electricity Company claim that Bulgaria already is amidst an energy crisis. The reason is the increased consumption of electric power by the country's industry and population. Last year, consumption increased by about 11 percent in comparison to 1994. Experts think that very soon the National Electricity Company will not be able to meet the constantly growing energy needs.

The Belene Nuclear Power Plant is one of our most reliable possibilities for overcoming the energy shortage. Furthermore, a large part of the plant's first reactor has already been constructed. More than $1 billion has been invested so far. Several studies conducted at the plant's construction site by major foreign companies and the International Atomic Energy Agency proved that the site corresponds to the requirements regarding the construction of a nuclear power plant. Therefore, the claim that the location has an increased seismic risk is purely speculative and pursues political goals, the experts say.

The last sociological study regarding the construction of the Belene Nuclear Power Plant has been conducted by experts of the National Statistics Institute and the University of National and World Economy. It showed that half of Bulgaria's population agrees to the construction of the Belene Nuclear Power Plant. Another 30 percent also expressed support, providing that the plant's safety is guaranteed. Sociologists stress that the opponents to the Belene Nuclear Plant construction amount to less than 20 percent of the population.

Czech Republic: Minister Belehradek Badly Hurt in Accident

LD2302124096 Prague Radiozurnal Radio Network in Czech 1100 GMT 23 Feb 96

[FBIS Translated Text] We have just received the following report: This morning Economic Competition Minister Stanislav Belehradek sustained probably serious or moderately serious injuries when his Tatra 613 official car collided with a Tatra 148 truck in Kurim, Brno rural district. This was confirmed by a South Moravian police spokeswoman.

The secretariat at the Brno accident hospital confirmed that the minister is hospitalized there.

Czech Republic: Support From Dublin for EU Membership

LD2202204596 Prague Radiozurnal Radio Network in Czech 1700 GMT 22 Feb 96

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Ireland supports the Czech application for membership in the European Union. Jaroslav Skalicky, special Czech Radio correspondent accompanying Prime Minister Vaclav Klaus, has more details:

[Skalicky] Irish Prime Minister John Bruton said this after he met Czech Prime Minister Vaclav Klaus today. According to him, the Czech Republic's admission to the union will bring the two countries significantly closer together. The first step will be Ireland's presidency of the European Union in the second half of this year.

Vaclav Klaus, too, expects that the Irish presidency will push the Czech Republic closer to entering the union also because small European countries like Ireland and the Czech Republic have much in common. For example, they are concerned not to lose their specific features in the community of stronger countries.

The two prime ministers also discussed the European Monetary Union and problems related to its implementation, as well as other issues. [passage omitted]

Slovakia: Press Views Vienna Court Verdict on Kovac Jr

AU2302131996

[FBIS Report] Slovak newspapers on 21 February publish reports on the decision of the Vienna Upper Provincial Court [Oberlandergericht] not to extradite Michal Kovac Jr., the Slovak president's son, to Germany, and on the court's justification of its verdict.

Bratislava SLOVENSKA REPUBLIKA in Slovak on 21 February on pages 1 and 2 carries a 1,000-word report by "SLOVENSKA REPUBLIKA and TASR" on the 20 February court hearing in Vienna entitled "Austrian Authorities Will Not Extradite Michal K. Jr. to Germany," which includes the following passage on the court's verdict: "The court ruled that Austrian judicial authorities will not extradite Michal K. Jr. to Germany and that he can therefore immediately return to Slovakia." In his justification of the verdict, Friedrich Novotny, chairman of the Tribunal of Judges, said that Michal K. Jr. had been abducted to Austria against his will, which violated his basic human rights. Had the Austrian court decided to extradite him to Germany, it would have violated international human rights conventions. "No state is authorized to act against international human rights conventions," Friedrich Novotny continued. What is startling about the whole case, according to his words, is the fact that Michal K. Jr. had been abducted to the territory of a foreign state by the state agencies (Slovak Information Service [BIS]—TASR note) of his own country and that, to this day, the Slovak Republic neither asked Austria for his extradition nor protested against this unlawful abduction, even though it knew about it.

"The verdict is legally valid, but it still requires final confirmation by Austrian Justice Minister Nikolaus Michalek."

Bratislava NARODNA OBRODA in Slovak on 21 February on page 6 carries a 600-word report by CTK and TASR entitled "Michal Kovac Jr. Will Ask for Protection in Slovakia," which states, among other things: "According to the Vienna court's Tribunal of Judges, the reason for turning down the Munich Prosecutor's Office's request for the extradition of Michal Kovac Jr. was the fact that he had been abducted to Austria, which violated his human rights. The court regards as conclusively proven the fact that Michal Kovac Jr. had been taken to Austria unlawfully and cannot therefore be extradited to Germany. 'Extradition must not violate human rights conventions and the foundations of a law-governed state,' Alois Ramoser, spokesman for the Upper Provincial Court, told the APA press agency in the Austrian capital yesterday. According to his words, Austria will not participate in human rights violations by extraditing a person who found himself on Austrian territory as a result of an act of violence. Even the search for a potential criminal is subject to certain limits, the spokesman stressed. Each defendant has basic rights, which must be respected even in the event of criminal prosecution. According to the words of Alois Ramoser, a state that is based on the rule of law cannot tolerate a violent kidnapping."

Slovakia: Diplomatic Note on Vienna Verdict on Kovac Jr

AU2302133196 Bratislava SME in Slovak 22 Feb 96 p 5

["Text" of diplomatic note handed by the Slovak Ministry of Foreign Affairs to the Austrian Embassy in Slovakia on 20 February]

[FBIS Translated Text] According to some news agency reports from Vienna, in justifying the verdict of the Vienna Higher Provincial Court regarding the case of M. Kovac Jr., the chairman of the Tribunal of Judges accused the Slovak Republic of the involvement of its state agencies in the abduction of M. Kovac Jr. and reproached the Slovak Republic for not having asked Austria for his extradition and for not having officially protested against this unlawful abduction even though it knew about it. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Slovak Republic considers these groundless accusations by the chairman of the Tribunal of Judges of the Higher Provincial Court to be a gross disparagement of a sovereign state, which sharply contradicts the elementary principles of international law, particularly the principle that the judicial authorities of any state cannot make any evaluations in relation to another sovereign state. It is regrettable that the judge, whose task is not only to enforce legal norms but also to respect them in practice, put forward such an evaluation without consulting the competent authorities of the Slovak Republic.

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Slovak Republic voices a sharp protest against these unfounded statements and asks the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Austria to provide an explanation of the Austrian judicial authorities' procedure and to take the appropriate remedial action. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Slovak Republic reiterates that the Slovak Republic is a democratic and law-governed state that honors respect for the Constitution and laws, as well as its international commitments arising from international conventions and, in spite of the above statements, expresses its firm conviction that the democratic legal system of Austria is unquestionable. The fact that this case is being dealt with in conformity with the law makes all the more startling the statements by a high-level representative of the Austrian judiciary quoted by news agency reports.

At the same time, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Slovak Republic expresses the hope that the agency reports are either imprecise or untrue and that the verdict was not justified in the aforementioned manner. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Slovak Republic takes this opportunity to once again assure the Embassy of the Republic of Austria of its profound respect.

Slovakia: Meciar Views Policy for Russian Magazine

AU2202154096 Bratislava PRAVDA in Slovak 15 Feb 96 p 11

[Report by "(ik)": "V. Meciar for the Russian V.I.P. Magazine: 'If It Is Different (From in the West) and Good—Is It, Perhaps, Bad?'"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The February issue of the exclusive Russian V.I.P. magazine "about leaders and for leaders" carried an interview with Slovak Prime Minister Vladimir Meciar. We have selected the following from the extensive interview:

[V.I.P.] The Slovak political scene has recently been abundant in tumultuous hard-to-predict events: the changing governments and privatization concepts, the unstable mutual relations between parties and individual politicians. Does this contradictory image also have a common denominator?

[Meciar] The point is principally that the country's political system has still not become established. The parties are just evolving and, even if they proclaim themselves to be right-wing or left-wing, they do not in fact at the moment rely on the support of the social classes on whose behalf they speak. Those who do not enjoy great influence at home are counting on support from abroad. This is our common problem.

The Slovak state is going through a formation process; it is looking for internal sources of development. And, a foam—as on beer—is always formed in the fermentation process. Quality has not yet developed fully. When this happens, many of today's people will be part of nostalgia. All the more so now that many of their recent predictions are not coming true. They had predicted that Slovakia would become a new Balkans, that it would run up against the Hungarian issue, and that it would be unable to cope with the management process. None of these predictions have come true.

When our independent state was established, many people—among others, in Prague and Budapest—warned that Slovakia would create a new problem for Europe. Even today, Europe still views us more critically than the other states of the former socialist camp. They even speak as if Slovakia were an ugly duckling. I am convinced, however, that it will turn into a beautiful swan.

[V.I.P.] What is the essence of V. Meciar's ideology and political principles? Why do certain circles who accuse you of "authoritarian" methods react to them so nervously?

[Meciar] I do not think I would be inclined toward authoritarianism. We simply have authority among the population. These are different things. Undoubtedly, there are certain circles in the West that are critically disposed toward me personally, toward our movement, and even toward the whole country. I think, however, that the root of this problem in fact lies elsewhere. Specifically, in the method of privatization that we have chosen. We did not adhere to the principle of "selling everything abroad," and we believe that a class of businessmen who will enter the market with their own interests should be established in Slovakia. As equal partners, not as subordinates.

In the political sphere, we have not begun to create the traditional structure of Western countries. Our movement was established not on ideological, but on pragmatic principles. During the transition period, it has demonstrated its ability to unite large groups of the population in support of the state and the government's program. This is not like Western parties. Not everyone is willing to agree with this, but parties in the West are also experiencing a crisis of their own. Just like ideology in general.(...)

We also differ in our understanding of social interests. The ethnic groups living on Slovakia's territory have their interests. The various economic structures have their interests. We have settled on the following perspective for the country: to expect as little as possible from outside and to utilize domestic resources. So, in 1994, we refused to accept credit from the International Monetary Fund because it required certain concessions from us in the social sphere. We relied on our own strengths, our own base, to seek, while depending on it, cooperation with the outside world. Not everyone understands this and not everyone likes it.

And, finally, one political problem is still manifesting itself. Many people have grown used to thinking in bloc categories. They propose reverting to the West or the East. I am opposed to such an approach. We have to think in European dimensions and build cooperation within them so that there are no "spheres of influence." We want to become a member of the EU and, at the same time, not forfeit any of the relationships that have been forged in the pan-continental system.

[V.I.P.] All of the countries of the former socialist camp are going through a period of transforming the social sphere. Where does the specific Slovak way lie?

[Meciar] In the social sphere, like the countries you mention, we are moving from state paternalism toward individual responsibility. During this process, we are adopting all of the useful things that there are in the West; however, we do not want to repeat its mistakes. It is necessary to find something new. Therefore, we are talking about social-market relations. If the rule of social tolerability is not taken into consideration, it is impossible to even talk about reforms.(...)

We are not looking for a "third way" but for a way for ourselves. Only those who think schematically are surprised: "Why is it different in your country than it is in ours, in the West?" Yes, it is different! But, if it is different and good, is it, perhaps, bad? We will be united only when we are divided.

[V.I.P.] Slavophiles in several East European countries are discussing the idea of forming a Slavic union to ward off Europe's Germanization. Do the ideas of Slavic mutuality have an influence on the policy of your cabinet, or do you repudiate them?

[Meciar] The relationship between Russia and Germany has historically always played a vital role for Europe. The influence of the unified Germany within the framework of the EU will now grow. And the influence of Russia within the Commonwealth of Independent States will also continue to grow.

To claim, however, that it is possible to create a grouping based exclusively on the principles of Slavophilism is extremely problematic. The dividing line runs according to different parameters here—economic and social. Cultural ties, language, and history are something else. Our people will not accept everything from Western culture; they have different roots. Therefore, I am convinced that rapprochement will continue in the cultural sphere. And, as far as economic, social, and global interests are concerned, the creation of a new community on Slavic principles is not realistic here.

Slovakia: MOS: Regime Guiding Nation Into Russian Sphere

AU2202154696 Bratislava SME in Slovak 16 Feb 96 p 3

[Article by "(rej)": "MOS: The Government Is Guiding the Slovak Republic [SR] Into Russia's Sphere of Influence"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Bratislava—Our fears that the state's present leadership is not orienting Slovakia toward the West but toward Russia's sphere of influence are being confirmed. This statement was made by Hungarian Civic Party [MOS] Deputy Chairman L. Gyurovszky in connection with an interview given by Prime Minister V. Meciar to the Russian V.I.P. magazine. Extracts from it were carried in yesterday's issue of PRAVDA. According to L. Gyurovszky, in this interview, V. Meciar factually announced Slovakia's endeavor to become a neutral state that is not striving for admission into NATO. "V. Meciar thus disowns the government's program, which talks about the Slovak Republic's admission into NATO," emphasized L. Gyurovszky. The current ruling coalition, according to him, has ascertained that the demands placed on the members of the West European structures are not acceptable to it. The most recent unfolding of events in the M. Kovac Jr. kidnapping case, according to him, strengthen his conviction that the Slovak Information Service [SIS] had a hand in the abduction abroad of the president's son. L. Gyurovszky expressed his concern that SIS and the system of power behind it will attempt to render impossible the pluralist system in Slovakia and to revoke the possibilities for criticizing the current government.

Slovakia: Fico, Fogas 'Hot Candidates' To Head SDL

AU2202174396 Bratislava PRAVDA in Slovak 19 Feb 96 pp 1-2

[Article by Martin Krno: "Hot Candidates—R. Fico and L. Fogas"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Zemplinska Sirava—The Party of the Democratic Left [SDL] Executive Committee labeled the return of the Law on the Illegality and Immorality of the Communist Regime to the National Council of the Slovak Republic [NRSR] as a victory for the arguments raised by SDL deputies during the parliamentary debate on this controversial legal norm.

In a statement adopted at a meeting in the Medvedia Hora recreational center near Michalovce on Saturday, 17 February, the SDL Executive Committee called on SDL representatives in parliament to exert maximum efforts to prevent the repeated passage of this politically and legally bad law.

At the same time, the SDL Executive Committee asked its deputies to seek the earliest possible discussion in parliament of a whole package of bills drafted by SDL experts. This concerns the bill on minimum wages; the bill on subjecting the National Property Fund to the control of the Supreme Inspection Office, whose inclusion in the agenda of the 13th NRSR meeting was prevented by votes of the government coalition; the bill on earlier redemption of bonds for old-age pensioners; the bill on the State Environmental Fund; as well as a legal norm that would prevent the privatization of VUB [General Credit Bank], IRB [Investment and Development Bank], Slovenska Sporitelna [Slovak Savings Bank], and Slovenska Poistovna [Slovak Insurance Company] by including them among strategic companies. Addressing a briefing, SDL Chairman Peter Weiss warned that the planned denationalization of these key financial institutions represents a very risky politically motivated step that would contribute to enormous polarization of the Slovak society in property and social terms.

Part and parcel of the weekend meeting of the SDL Executive Committee were an assessment of the SDL budget for this year and preparations for the Fourth SDL Congress, which will take place in Nitra on the last weekend in April. Peter Weiss said in this context that the final list of candidates for the post of party chairman and the posts of deputy chairmen would be known only one day before the congress. At the meeting, candidates for the post of SDL chairman presented their ideas on the party's further functioning and on the main tasks of its leading representatives. In a secret ballot, the largest numbers of votes were won by Robert Fico, chairman of the Common Choice Club of Deputies, who got 13 out of 36 possible votes, and Deputy Lubomir Fogas, who won 10 votes. The SDL Executive Committee will propose to the next meeting of the SDL Republic Board (to be held in Bratislava on 24 February) to recommend that the internal party discussion on personnel issues at annual members meetings and at the March district party conferences focus on these two candidates. In addition to Fico and Fogas, Pavol Kanis, Peter Magvasi, Brigita Schmognerova, and Jozef Migas have expressed interest in the post of SDL chief to date.

Regarding the much-discussed issue of the SDL's entry into the government, speculations about the SDL's joining the four political entities making up the present government coalition are superfluous, according to the party chairman. He stressed that no one has offered to the SDL participation in the reconstruction of the present government, even though, being a patriotic and state-forming [statotvorna] party, the SDL realizes the need to improve the Slovak Republic's image abroad. It is, first and foremost, up to the Movement for a Democratic Slovakia and the Association of Workers of Slovakia to reassess the methods of their execution of power and their policy.

Slovakia: Banned SDSS Faction Defies Expulsions

AU2202161196 Bratislava NARODNA OBRODA in Slovak 19 Feb 96 p 2

[Report by "TASR, fe": "Ivan Laluha Announced Continuation of Activity of the Revival of Social Democracy Faction"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Trencin/Povazska Bystrica—An expanded meeting of the Revival of Social Democracy Faction (FOSD) in Trencin on 17 February decided on the continuation of the faction's activity within the framework of the existing organizational structure of the Social Democratic Party of Slovakia [SDSS]. Under the decision made, the FOSD will operate as an opinion current. It was the faction's first meeting after the 27 January Bratislava meeting of the SDSS Central Council, which expelled three FOSD representatives—B. Zala, V. Hotar, and L. Kohut—from the SDSS's ranks. Four other members of the faction—V. Krajci, J. Janci, I. Laluha, and S. Petery—were given yet another chance in a secret ballot. According to the words of I. Laluha, one of the faction's representatives, members of the faction have accepted the fact that the institution of a faction is not embedded in the SDSS statutes, but at the same time they want to continue efforts at making social democratic ideas more attractive in Slovakia. FOSD members decided to convene their own congress on 30 March, the venue of which has not yet been determined. It will be attended also by those members of the faction whom the Central Council expelled from the SDSS. Expelled members of the faction will continue to take part in the FOSD's work because the faction does not accept the expulsions. This fact was confirmed to NARODNA OBRODA yesterday by B. Zala in a telephone interview. As Zala went on to say, some local organizations have offered to the expelled SDSS members readmission into the party. I. Laluha told TASR: "We are in favor of holding an extraordinary SDSS congress. However, it should be held at a time when it will have been responsibly prepared."

SDSS functionaries from Central Slovakia also met at a working conference on Saturday. After its conclusion, SDSS Deputy Chairman M. Spejl provided a statement to NARODNA OBRODA, which states, among other things, that the documents approved by the Fourth SDSS Congress, particularly the SDSS Implementation

Program, provide sufficient scope for developing the SDSS activity and for each party member's participation in internal party discussion. Therefore, he does not see any reason to call an extraordinary SDSS congress.

[Bratislava PRAVDA in Slovak on 19 February on page 2, under the headline "Three Currents in the SDSS?," carries a 150-word report by TASR on the FOSD meeting. The report includes the following passage: "As FOSD Chairman Lubos Kohut said after the meeting, an extraordinary party congress, which should still be held this year, could bring about a fundamental breakthrough in the SDSS's activities. He also reported on the existence of two other currents of opinion within the party, with which the FOSD intends to hold talks in the coming weeks, in the interest of overcoming the crisis in the SDSS as soon as possible."]

Slovakia: Daily Criticizes Meciar's Bank Privatization

AU2302094996 Bratislava SME in Slovak 21 Feb 96 p 4

[Commentary by Alena Gottweisova: "Perpetual Motion"]

[FBIS Translated Text] In the past, a popular pastime was to think about ways of constructing a perpetual motion device—equipment that would produce perpetual motion without being supplied with energy from any external source. These experiments continue to this day. The specific Slovak way of privatizing banks through economic entities can be seen as one of them. These economic entities will secure the restructuring of banks (that is, in fact, the elimination of their bad loans) from their own resources, will guarantee deposits in banks with their own property, and, at the same time, will guarantee that banks will remain in Slovak hands. A perpetual motion of money between banks and companies will set in. It is scientifically proven that it is impossible to construct a perpetual motion device. Even the Slovak one will not work. Let us take it from the end—no one can guarantee that the privatizer will not sell his shares in what will already be his bank to a foreign investor. The companies' property cannot serve as a guarantee of the banks' solvency because it is already collateral for payments to the National Property Fund (for the banks' privatization), as well as for credits that the companies acquired in the past. And ONLY HE [capitalization as received—reference to Prime Minister Meciar's election slogan "Only he can pull it off"] probably knows how the companies, which themselves need credits (the most potent potential privatizer, the East Slovak Ironworks, has just signed an agreement with foreign banks on the provision of a $100 million loan), could possibly secure the restructuring of banks.

It is not difficult to imagine the outcome of this operation, which is its actual goal—the privatizers will get advantageous credits. There is already one precedent: Slovenska Posta [Slovak Post Office] owns about one-third of Postovna Banka [Postal Bank] shares. According to its director, the bank will keep this fact in mind when extending credit to finance the relocation of Slovenska Posta headquarters [from Bratislava] to Banska Bystrica. As banks live from their profit (interest), it is obvious that this will be projected (negatively) into the terms under which other companies will acquire credits from the bank. Moreover, there is the threat of a vicious circle. If a company—that is, the bank's owner—crashes, the bank will be forced to support it even at the price of endangering itself and the savings deposited with it. Or can anyone imagine a bank that would send its owner-debtor into bankruptcy? The length of the chain of bankruptcies of companies and banks will depend on the size of the company (privatizer) that will go bankrupt first. He who proclaims that he is able to construct a perpetual motion device risks being sneered at. The risks inherent in the Slovak experiment involving the privatization of banks by companies are much bigger. Keep smiling, please!

Slovakia: Coalition Seen Divided on Bank Privatization

AU2302092096 Bratislava PRAVDA in Slovak 19 Feb 96 p 4

[Commentary by Ivan Podstupka: "Privatization of Banks—Strike While the Iron Is Hot"]

[FBIS Translated Text] A series of conflicting statements on the issue of privatization of commercial banks came from the ranks of the government coalition last week. This testifies to the coalition partners' divergent interests or, possibly, to their confusion. Stefan Gavornik, president of the National Property Fund [FNM] Presidium, is calling for caution, warns against rash action, and talks about the need to assess the privatization plans from a broader perspective. He also questions, more or less, the practical preparedness of privatization projects. Characteristic of the situation is his statement that "coalition talks have not taken place and that the FNM Presidium has not discussed this issue, either."

Prime Minister Meciar spoke more resolutely. He evidently knows more about the whole issue than the president of the agency that is to decide on it. The privatization decisions are to be made by the end of the month. He explains Gavornik's lack of information by his [Gavornik's] illness. Next to political influenzas [allusion to Prime Minister Meciar's two-day flu during

EU Commissioner van den Broek's visit to Slovakia on 8 and 9 February], a new diagnosis has thus surfaced in our higher circles—the privatization disease, during which the patient, the president of the decisive privatization institution, is cut off from information and from coalition plans.

The confusion about privatization plans is not the greatest threat facing our banks, the national economy, and all citizens. A much bigger danger dwells in the reverse—absolute clarity. "Completion of the privatization process" (term of M. Rehak, chairman of the FNM Executive Committee) is, for all practical purposes, the sell-off of controlling stakes in banks to capital groups closely or loosely associated with the largest Slovak companies, companies that are themselves huge debtors of the banks they are to privatize. (This is unwittingly reminiscent of a frequent case from the Wild West—of having one's creditor killed.) The explanation [provided by Prime Minister Meciar] that these companies should see the banks through bad times is more than debatable—the structure of their assets and liabilities simply does not allow that. But that is just a detail. More important is the fact that, by holding a controlling stake of [the banks'] basic assets, these capital groups will seize control of approximately 10 times larger resources. And it is questionable whether mechanisms exist that will prevent them from using these resources for their own benefit, without regard for the interests of society and the bank's other shareholders, let alone depositors and payers of insurance premiums! It can be assumed that the new owners will simply look after their own company's business and enforce in the bank's management bodies their own intentions. The present coalition undoubtedly regards political influence, the mechanism of movement and parties, which is still working, as a braking element. However, the laws of big business are different from rules under the unsteady conditions of transformation, when decisions on the protagonists of privatization are political decisions made in boards and presidiums. The laws of big business are made of iron and they are rough.

Our future development is being decided these days. The concentration of incredible economic power in the hands of a handful of people is on the agenda. This concentration of economic power will determine everything else—the domestic political situation, the foreign policy orientation, and control over public opinion and society's cultural background. I am not suggesting that the generals of our industry are incompetent people without character. However, they are getting into the lines of force of economic and political power that will not allow them to play any other role than that assigned to them by the system. This is no cold-blooded Darwinism. It is just observed history—from the West and from the East.

Slovakia: Press: Tithes Demanded of Privatizers, Borrowers

AU2302120596

[FBIS Report] Slovak newspapers on 17 and 19 February publish items alleging that "tithes" are being exacted from privatizers of state-owned property and from recipients of bank loans. One of these items suggests that the beneficiary is the ruling Movement for a Democratic Slovakia (HZDS).

Bratislava PRAVDA in Slovak on 17 February on page 4 carries a 600-word commentary by Ivan Podstupka entitled "The Privatization Caravan Moves On...". The commentary deals with the exclusion of the privatization process from public control ever since the government transferred the authority to decide on direct sales to the National Property Fund [FNM]. Podstupka's commentary includes the following passage: "The FNM is not a state body, so its decisions cannot be subjected to control by the Supreme Inspection Office, to say nothing of control by individual citizens, groups of citizens, or the press. Mysterious privatization operations are being carried out. The new privatizers are mysterious, the terms of privatization and the methods of setting the purchase price are mysterious. One speaks almost publicly about 'tithes' being surrendered through banks and companies in a certain small West European country and on one sympathetic island in the Mediterranean. How is this being done? By issuing bills for nonexistent shipments, marketing studies, and so forth and so forth." Podstupka also alleges that domestic privatizers of state property are selling parts of this property "in no time to foreign buyers at a multiple price" and are then able to use the profit "to privatize large commercial banks, for example."

Bratislava NARODNA OBRODA in Slovak on 19 February on pages 1 and 2 carries a 600-word report by CTK on the 18 February "Kroky" [Steps] program, a regular roundtable discussion broadcast on STV [Slovak Television] 1 on Sundays. The report includes the following passage: "According to Ladislav Palko, a member of the Christian Democratic Movement [KDH] Presidium, current privatization is a 'plain, foul robbery,' which is borne out by the sale of Slovnaft shares worth 6 billion korunas [Sk] to 'one lot' for Sk100,000. 'The Turks looted only in the south of Slovakia, you are plundering the country as a whole,' he told coalition politicians.

"Peter Weiss, chairman of the Party of the Democratic Left [SDL], is also convinced that, after the coalition transferred the jurisdiction over privatization from the government to the FNM, the coalition's nine men in the FNM Presidium decided on the fate of state property without control. In his opinion, society is fraught with 'heavy corruption,' which is supposedly borne out by the fact that 'lads from the HZDS' are making the acquisition of a bank loan conditional on the transfer of one-third of the loan to a sponsorship fund of Meciar's movement. Should the largest Slovak banks be privatized by large companies [as announced by Prime Minister Meciar], this will 'bring about a gigantic and uncontrollable concentration of economic and political power. In that case, we will simply not be able to avert the tendency toward an authoritarian regime,' Peter Weiss warned."

Hungary: FM To Clarify NATO Expansion With Moscow

AU2202191696 Budapest MAGYAR HIRLAP in Hungarian 22 Feb 96 p 3

[Unattributed report on interview with Foreign Minister Laszlo Kovacs; place and date not given: "Kovacs: NATO Expansion Has Not Come to a Standstill"]

[FBIS Translated Text] "Obviously, the approaching presidential elections in the United States and Russia explain the limited publicity on the issue of NATO expansion, but this does not mean that the process has stopped or even slowed down"—Foreign Minister Laszlo Kovacs told MAGYAR HIRLAP in reacting to the statements made at the recent Kohl-Yeltsin meeting in Moscow.

According to Kovacs, the talks with the countries wishing to join NATO will end by the end of this year, and the first round of expansion could be decided by the beginning of 1997. Kovacs declared that one can only interpret the statements on NATO expansion made at the Yeltsin-Kohl meeting in a broader connection. It must be made clear that increasing stability and security in Central and East Europe is the goal and sense of NATO expansion. Hungary supports the NATO position that tries to avoid having unwanted tensions created in this expansion. We also understand Germany's efforts to make sure that its firm position regarding NATO expansion does not cause any damage in its relations with Moscow.

We have a common interest in making Russia understand that NATO expansion is not a step directed against it. On the contrary: it is also beneficial for Russia to have stability in its neighborhood. Therefore, there is a need for constant dialogue. In the course of this dialogue, however, it must be made clear that Russia cannot block the NATO expansion—Laszlo Kovacs pointed out. He added that it is in Hungary's interest that Moscow clearly understands the driving force behind our intention to join NATO. Answering a question, Kovacs told us that, so far, there has not been regular communication between Hungary and Russia on this issue in an organized form. "However, in the course of my planned visit to Moscow at the beginning of March, the issue of NATO expansion will be impossible to avoid when I meet with Russian Foreign Minister Primakov. I would find it useful to agree on a closer experts' meeting, one that naturally does not pertain to some kind of request for permission, but is suitable for detailing our positions"—Laszlo Kovacs said in conclusion.

Hungary: Call for 'Uniform' Strategy on Autonomy

AU2202175496 Budapest UJ MAGYARORSZAG in Hungarian 21 Feb 96 pp 1, 3

[Unattributed report: "Need for a Uniform National Strategy—Autonomy Affair"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Laszlo Tokes, presbyterian bishop of Nagyvarad [Oradea, Romania] and honorary chairman of the Democratic Union of Hungarians in Romania [RMDSZ—UDMR in Romanian], and Viktor Orban, chairman of the Federation of Young Democrats-Hungarian Civic Party [FIDESZ-MPP], recently proposed the coordination of a uniform ethnic minority autonomy concept with the participation of the political parties represented in the Hungarian parliament and the heads of the ethic Hungarians living beyond our borders. In connection with the symposium on the ethnic minority autonomy, a symposium that has been postponed, the question is whether it is worth organizing such a meeting in the near future. Asked by UJ MAGYARORSZAG, the people affected, the heads of the ethnic Hungarians living beyond Hungary's borders expressed their opinions about the autonomy efforts and the desired and desirable contacts of the Hungarian parliament.

"There are certain differences on the autonomy concept within the Hungarian Coalition in Slovakia"—Pal Csaky of the Hungarian Christian Democratic Movement told us. "Once these differences are clarified, I do not see any obstacle hindering a serious parliamentary debate on the issue. At the same time, we appreciate the fact that the Defense Committee also holds a meeting on the issue, and we have been invited to this meeting.

"We greatly appreciate the fact that serious political forces in Hungary find it worth discussing the autonomy drafts in parliament. At the same time, according to our Movement, this issue is a little unprepared. We would welcome a professional forum to precede such debates."

Speaking about Laszlo Tokes and Viktor Orban's proposals, Pal Csaky said: "We gladly participate in this coordination; at the same time, however, we also have doubts about the possibility of setting up a universal autonomy model for all the ethnic Hungarian communities abroad. There are sharp differences in the situation of ethnic Hungarians in various countries, and the community structure, demands, and legal background of ethnic Hungarians are also different. On this matter, the Hungarian Coalition has a clear position: we have worked out the basic principles of a constitutional bill, and we would gladly participate with it in the coordination talks. We would welcome the attempt to work out a general strategy where we could coordinate the several guidelines of the Hungarian policy and the policy of ethnic Hungarian communities abroad. However, it is doubtful whether it is possible to work out a coordinated concept in the current divided situation."

Arpad Dalmay, chairman of the Hungarian Cultural Alliance of Bereg Region, pointed out that, as is well known, a referendum on the autonomy was only held in Subcarpathia, and this referendum was initiated by the predecessor of this organization. "Therefore, we definitely regard it important that parliament deal with this issue, because this would also draw the West's attention to this problem. I must also say, however, that we would not benefit from this yet because our autonomy plan is rather unprepared.

"I think that the coordination of autonomy plans in the Carpathina Basin is a very good idea, and we already suggested such a coordination"—Dalmay said in connection with the attempts to work out a uniform concept. "We welcome this proposal because we do not have experts or well-paid legal experts here, and professional support would be extremely helpful for us."

Sandor Egeresi, deputy chairman of the Federation of Vojvodina Hungarians [VMSZ] pointed out that the VMSZ is clearly of the opinion that a debate in parliament could help in solving the problems of the ethnic Hungarians living beyond the borders. "However, our position is that, first, we will ask to be consulted separately in order to discuss the questions connected with the autonomy concept we adopted one month ago, and we informed the six parliamentary parties about this. They have already reacted to this, and the Alliance of Free Democrats [SZDSZ] will receive us at the beginning of March. We hope to receive similar answers from the other parties as well. After consulting with the parties and informing them about our concepts, we will support the idea of a parliamentary debate day"—Sandor Egeres pointed out and added that the Tokes-proposal could be useful, because the national minorities are living as secondary citizens in their homeland.

Jeno Matis, parliamentary deputy of Kolozsvar [Cluj] and political scientists, told us that Laszlo Tokes's proposals does not mean that the autonomy concept of the ethnic Hungarians abroad should be placed in a single pot, because different conditions require different rules.

"In my opinion, too, a consensus is needed on the autonomy issue among the Hungarian parties"—Jeno Matis pointed out. "A parliamentary debate would probably contribute to the emergence of such a consensus, but this is something for the Hungarian parliament to decide. Whether we examine the status of South Tirol or the autonomy of the Swedes in Finland, we see that both are the result of decades of work and constant modification"—Jeno Matis pointed out.

Hungary: Transition Period's Economic Elite Depicted

96CH0022A Budapest FIGYELO in Hungarian 23 Nov 95 pp 16-17

[Article by Attila Bartha and Jozsef Peter Martin: "Certificate of Social Origin"]

[FBIS Translated Text] *At Budapest University of Economic Sciences, a team of researchers under Gyorgy Lengyel conducted a comprehensive sociological survey of the economic elite following the political system's change. Facts and figures closer to reality are now able to replace conjectures and beliefs.*

The considerations for inclusion among the economic elite are different during transitional periods than under the conditions of earlier state socialism or of the hoped-for market economy. With unsurpassed ingenuity, public opinion ranks among the economic elite—or demotes from there, in accordance with the fickleness of luck in the market—rich people who are prominent or who escape into anonymity. The well-to-do or rich person is not necessarily a member of the elite; and we have not yet discussed how difficult it is to check all the criteria that set the elite apart.

Table 1. Economic Elite's Educational Background in 1993 (in Percent of the Individual Segments)

Education	State Enterprise	Private Enterprise	Bank	Ministry	Parliament
Other	13.5	23.9	14.5	15.2	41.0
Engineers	45.2	34.3	1.6	10.9	28.2
Economists	23.8	40.3	77.4	71.7	28.2
Engineer-economists	17.5	1.5	6.5	2.2	2.6

The economic elite, in our opinion, comprises persons who are the key players in the economy, by virtue of their positions of decisionmaking and influence. Enterprise managers within Hungary's economic elite were selected by industry, gross output, and number of employees. A complete survey was made [of the managers at] Hungary's big banks.

Managerial Careers

According to the surveys, enterprise managers were of mature age when they rose to the economic elite in the early 1990's—their average age was nearly 50. When the political system changed, the proportion of enterprise managers with engineering backgrounds was much higher than of the ones who were economists; and the proportion of "incongruent" managers, who were in higher positions than what their educational backgrounds warranted, was merely 5 percent. By 1993, the differences between chief executives in terms of educational level were not as great as immediately after the political system's change: 42 percent of the decisionmakers were engineers, and 30 percent were economists. At the same time, a new category based on educational qualifications, the engineer-economists, also appeared at the top levels of management.

The managers' social origin also reflects considerable social mobility: the parents of more than half of the managers in the group had completed only elementary school, and less than 10 percent of the managers came from families where one or both parents were university or college graduates. An interesting marginal note: less than a third of the top managers were Budapest-born. By 1993, the extent of social mobility was less than at the beginning the political system's change, but a typical shift had occurred in the managers' social composition. The proportion of managers from intellectual families had increased significantly, by nearly 20 percentage points. The only thing without any striking change was the age structure of Hungary's top managers. Their average age is 47.8 years, without any sign of significant rejuvenation.

From Where to Where?

Migration between sectors followed characteristic patterns. At the time of the surveys, the largest proportion (55 percent) of top managers was in the state sector. Of those who changed jobs, 22 percent headed from state enterprises to private or mixed enterprises, and only 10 percent migrated the other way. The turnover of managers between private enterprises was insignificant.

Far-reaching conclusions may be drawn from the fact that economists, and especially engineer-economists, have gained in importance within the economic elite (see Table 1).

As the primary factor indicating professional competence and know-how, education became one of the specific aspects of the technocracy's differentiation in the 1990's. A spectacular shift occurred in the positions of two professional career groups within the economic elite. Career opportunities for the engineers heading large industrial enterprises under state socialism had worsened already in the 1980's, and this trend further intensified in the 1990's. Meanwhile, economists gained dominant positions at private enterprises, as well as in banks, state administration and the political sphere. The sectoral rearrangement not only meant lower incomes for managers with engineering backgrounds, but was also accompanied by a decline of their influence and an erosion of their networking capital.

'System-Changer' Careers?

Economic conflicts and political skirmishes are keeping evergreen the question of the extent to which elite positions depend on the coming of new governments to power. Three years after the first free elections, this question was rephrased as follows: Have the careers of Hungary's new economic elite been continuous or launched by the political system's change?

According to the results of the survey, 63 percent of the enterprise managers have had continuous careers, and only 29 percent came to the helm of large state enterprises when the political system changed. The average

age of the latter, known as "system changers," reflects significant rejuvenation, for more than 70 percent of the enterprise managers in the 31 to 40 age interval became chief executives of state enterprises after 1990. But the careers of 88 percent of the enterprise managers between the ages of 51 and 60 can be said to be continuous, because they had belonged to the elite even before the political system changed.

Seats on boards of directors and supervisory boards, as well as consulting work for the various political parties and levels of governments, are important elements of the top managers' networking contacts. There is a strong correlation between board seats and the type of career: "system changers" have seats on such governing bodies more often than the top managers who have followed continuous careers. Of the top managers, 55 percent were members of some professional organization (GYOSZ [National Association of Manufacturers], VOSZ [National Alliance of Entrepreneurs], Iposz [National Federation of Trade Associations] or Kisosz [National Federation of Retailers]) and 51 percent were on the boards of directors or supervisory boards of enterprises during the investigated period. The individual links in the network of contacts are typically related to the distribution by educational background: the engineers, engineer-economists, and the managers with other educational backgrounds tended to belong to professional organizations, whereas the economists were mostly board members. Managers of the big banks occupy center place in the networks of contacts: 79 percent of them earn extra income as board members. Of course, there are also pluralists. The pollsters who conducted the surveys know of top managers who held office in six professional organizations, but there were also top managers with seats on eight boards of directors or supervisory boards.

Metamorphosed Attitudes

Already in 1990, more than 80 percent of the economic elite favored a market economy based on private ownership, and the establishment of a democracy founded on a multiparty system. Commitment to earlier state socialism was not typical of them.

Table 2. 1990 Opinion Poll of Hungarian Managers Regarding Multiparty System and Forms of Ownership (in Percent)

	Clearly favor multiparty system		
Desirable Form of Ownership	Yes	No	Jointly
State	4.5	11.0	15.5
Private	36.5	45.0	81.5
Uncertain	1.0	2.0	3.0
Total	42.0	58.0	100.0

It is still undecided what is taking place in Hungary in the 1990's—whether a conflict-ridden transformation at high social costs, or a consensual transition based on an agreement among the elite. Therefore, it is important to know the economic elite's opinion regarding the extent to which state assets ought to be preserved. The choice is not merely a question of appeal. It can be traced partially to the respondents' educational background, age, and social origin, but most of all to their assessment of the prospects of continuing to enjoy their elite status. While 11 percent of the enterprise managers [in 1993] continued to regard as desirable the preservation of state ownership's decisive role, 48 percent voted for the dominance of private ownership. Furthermore, 41 percent felt that the state ought to play merely a fiscal and monetary role.

Two methods offer themselves for enlarging the private sector. One is encouragement of founding new private enterprises. The other is the privatization of the state's business assets. Of the enterprise managers, 67 percent felt that privatization of state enterprises ought to be accelerated; 17 percent were of the opinion that the current rate of privatization ought to be maintained; 10 percent favored a slower rate; and 2 percent were in favor of halting privatization. (Four percent of the respondents did not express an opinion on this question.) Those enterprise managers whose social status was lower favored a slower rate of privatization.

Views differed not only on the rate of privatization, but also on the mode of its implementation. Since the second half of 1992, an ambiguous situation developed regarding the mode of privatization. Namely, for enterprise managers—whom mandatory conversion of state enterprises into corporations had reinforced in their positions as custodians of the assets—self-privatization meant greater opportunity for, and wider practice of, management buyouts, i.e., a form of decentralization. At the same time, self-privatization also meant the state centralization of the right to hire and fire. Half of the enterprise managers were of the opinion in 1993 that the state should direct privatization, while 44 percent felt that this should be entrusted to the enterprises (and six percent expressed no opinion on this question). The large number of votes favoring decentralized privatization indicates that enterprise managers are demanding greater independence for themselves in the privatization process.

Once again, social origin and—in this case—seats on boards of directors or supervisory boards played the decisive role in the shaping views regarding the mode of privatization. In the opinion of the managers whose fathers had been skilled workers, the government ought to "conduct" the process of privatization. Against them, the greatest advocates of decentralized privatization were the managers with seats on boards of directors or supervisory boards; presumably because they felt that, without the state's interposition, they would be better able to make use of the advantages stemming from their positions.

By now the economic elite have settled into the new power structure. But, so far as economic adaptation is concerned, the view is refutable that "clean-slate" capitalism will be built on socialism's ruins, after a brief period of transition. It seems more appropriate to speak of a system transformation, because both the transformation of institutions and the economic elite's attitudes had been heading in the direction of a market economy, already at the start of the political system's change. But the process is far from over. Also in the future, the top managers' value-orientation will not develop in accordance with the "laws" of an abstract economic order, but will adapt to new challenges.

[Box, p 16]

Roots

Advocates of the theory of interrupted embourgeoisement, which is attributed to Ivan Szelenyi, believe that the new economic elite are recruited from among families that lack positions among the elite but are more likely to have market culture, which they had been able to salvage from the precommunist period. Among the roots, Elemer Hankiss stresses the conversion of power. The political capital accumulated under state capitalism can be put to good use also in a market economy, especially through personal contacts. In the preservation of elite positions, Erzsebet Szalai's theory of technocratic continuity tends to attribute more importance to professional knowledge, and to the accumulated experience of decisionmaking and management.

The theory of structural compensation, due to the American economist Victor Nee, states that, on the one hand, the importance of meritocratic criteria—primarily of education and training—increases during the period of transition. And on the other hand, the gradual dominance of market-coordinating mechanisms offers alternative opportunities to bureaucratic advancement.

B-H: Izetbegovic Hospitalized With 'Heart Problems'

AU2202101496 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1000 GMT 22 Feb 96

[FBIS Translated Text] The cabinet of Alija Izetbegovic, president of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Presidency, issued the following statement conveyed by B-H PRESS:

Alija Izetbegovic, president of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Presidency, was taken to the clinic with sudden heart problems this morning to investigate and treat his complaints. The medical condition of President Izetbegovic requires that he be spared any strain.

A medical team has been formed to take over the care for the treatment and supervision of his recovery.

B-H: SDA Official: Izetbegovic's Life Not in Danger

AU2202145196 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1400 GMT 22 Feb 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Concerning the statement from the cabinet of the president of the Presidency, Edhem Bicakcic, deputy chairman of the Party of Democratic Action [SDA], addressed the public on behalf of the party:

[Begin Bicakcic recording] Following the statement from the cabinet of President Alija Izetbegovic of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina, and after a series of questions posed at today's SDA news conference, I would like to say the following on behalf of the SDA:

After the long and exhausting negotiations in Dayton and Rome, after a series of activities, our president needs rest. This rest, unfortunately, will this time be in the care of doctors. We expect all state bodies to continue to function in accordance with their programs and scheduled activities. The Presidency and Government of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina, the Government of the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina, and the SDA will continue all their activities in accordance with the schedule. The doctors will give an official statement on the president's health. His life is not in danger. There is no reason for any concern. Simply after four years of hard work our president has deserved a holiday. This time the holiday will be in the care of doctors. [end recording]

B-H: Muslim Presidency Begins Emergency Session

LD2202145996 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1420 GMT 22 Feb 96

["Pool" item]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Belgrade, Feb 22 (TANJUG) — The Bosnian Muslim Presidency on Thursday [22 February] opened an emergency session to decide who will act for Alija Izetbegovic while he is in hospital.

Bosnian Muslim leader Alija Izetbegovic, 70, suffered a heart attack on Thursday and is now undergoing a treatment in a Sarajevo hospital.

The emergency session is an indication that the health condition of the Bosnian Muslim leader may be grave.

Foreign news agencies quoted anonymous sources as saying that Izetbegovic had had heart problems for years.

Sources in the ruling Muslim Party of Democratic Action confirmed to news agencies that Izetbegovic had already had one heart attack during the four-year civil war in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

B-H: Izetbegovic's Condition 'Slightly Improved' 23 Feb

AU2302113696 Paris AFP in English 1113 GMT 23 Feb 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Sarajevo, Feb 23 (AFP) — The condition of Bosnian President Alija Izetbegovic, who was hospitalized with heart trouble, has slightly improved but he still requires treatment, his doctors said on Friday [23 February].

"The Bosnian president had a good night," a medical report carried by the BH news agency said. "His medical parameters show signs of slight improvement but he still requires permanent medical attention."

Izetbegovic, 70, was taken to hospital Thursday suffering from heart problems that have emerged after gruelling peace talks in Dayton and Rome.

The official news agency BH Press said Ejup Ganic, a member of Bosnia's collective presidency and vice-president of the Moslem-Croat federation, will serve as acting president while Izetbegovic is ill.

"Today (Friday) the presidency held its regular session chaired by Ejup Ganic who replaces the president of the presidency", BH Press said.

The doctors said that the next bulletin on Izetbegovic's condition will be released on Saturday.

B-H: Serb Military Announces Resumption of IFOR Ties

AU2202184996 Paris AFP in English 1836 GMT 22 Feb 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Belgrade, Feb 22 (AFP) — Bosnian Serb military leaders announced Thursday [22 February] that relations with the NATO-led peace

Implementation Force (IFOR) had returned to normal, two weeks after they had been broken off.

"Cooperation between the army of the Serb Republic and IFOR continues normally at all levels, in line with the spirit of the Dayton accord," a military communique cited by the Bosnian Serb news agency said.

B-H: NATO Announces Meeting With Pale Serb Military

AU2202200996 Paris AFP in English
1917 GMT 22 Feb 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Sarajevo, Feb 22 (AFP) — A Bosnian Serb general will meet a British commander of the NATO-led peace implementation force (IFOR) Friday [23 February] in the first such contact for two weeks, NATO announced here late Thursday.

The commander of one of the three IFOR divisions in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Major General Michael Jackson, will see General Momir Talic, head of the Bosnian Serb army's 1st Krajina Corps, in the northwestern town of Banja Luka, an IFOR statement said.

Meanwhile in Belgrade, Bosnian Serb military leaders announced that relations with IFOR had returned to normal.

"Cooperation between the army of the Serb Republic and IFOR continues normally at all levels, in line with the spirit of the Dayton accord," a military communique cited by the Bosnian Serb news agency said.

While the Bosnian Serb assembly, meeting in Pale, said Wednesday that it was resuming "full cooperation" with the international community, the Serbs' military commanders had, until now, held back on any such announcement.

Military commander General Ratko Mladic broke off relations with IFOR on February 8 in protest at the arrest of two of his senior officers on suspicion of war crimes.

General Djordje Djukic and Colonel Aleksa Krsmanovic, arrested by Bosnian government troops, were immediately transferred to The Hague at the request of the International War Crimes Tribunal.

B-H: SRNA Reports Military's Resumption of IFOR Ties

LD2302001096 Belgrade SRNA in Serbo-Croatian
2340 GMT 22 Feb 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Sarajevo, 22 February (SRNA) — At a session today, the supreme command of the [Bosnian] Serb Republic armed forces adopted a decision on continuing full military cooperation with IFOR [Implementation Force] at the level of implementation of the Dayton Agreement, it was announced this evening by the bureau for press contacts.

The decision was adopted with the aim of consolidating peace in the Union of the Serb Republic and the Bosnia-Herzegovina Federation.

B-H: Iran's Velayati Denies Muhajidin Operating in Bosnia

AU2202160696 Paris AFP in English
1514 GMT 22 Feb 96

[FBIS Transcribed Excerpt] Zagreb, Feb 22 (AFP) — The Iranian embassy said Thursday [22 February] that it has not heard from nine Iranians detained in the Croat-held part of Bosnia and accused of engaging in Islamic revolutionary propaganda. [passage omitted]

Meanwhile in Geneva, Iranian Foreign Minister Ali Akbar Velayati insisted that there were no mujahedeen fighters in Bosnia but only Iranians involved in humanitarian activities.

"No there are no fighters," he said when asked about three Iranians who were briefly detained by NATO forces in Bosnia last week. "There are some Iranians which are helping the Bosnian government on humanitarian issues."

The three had been suspected of training fighters to launch operations against NATO facilities in Bosnia, but Tehran denied its citizens were engaged in any military activities.

They returned home on Wednesday after being deported from Bosnia.

B-H: UN: 'Hardliners' Pressuring Serbs To Leave Sarajevo

AU2102200596 Paris AFP in English
1755 GMT 21 Feb 96

[FBIS Transcribed Excerpt] Sarajevo, Feb 21 (AFP) — NATO efforts to reunify Bosnia are being hampered by what officials described as an orchestrated campaign of disinformation by hardline Serb officials in Sarajevo and by Moslem fear of Croat aggression in the southern city of Mostar.

With international agencies desperate for the Serb residents of Sarajevo suburbs to stay and maintain the city's multi-ethnic nature, Serb leaders are "inciting fear ... and telling people to go," Kris Janowski, representative of the High Commissioner for Refugees, said.

Hardliners in the Bosnian Serb stronghold of Pale, 15 kilometres (10 miles) east of the capital, were pressuring officials in the suburbs to force confused and panic-stricken Serbs to leave, Alexander Ivanko, spokesman for the UN-run international police force said.

"Local Serb leaders are being threatened. A lot of them are under severe pressure. They are being told to organise an exodus," Ivanko said.

Ivanko said the police task force was trying to calm the atmosphere and counter the propaganda from Pale by targetting local media. [passage omitted]

Serb leaders have appeared divided over the issue, with "president" Radovan Karadzic and "parliamentary speaker" Momcilo Krajisnik ceaselessly purveying the message that Serbs can no longer live with Moslems or Croats and "prime minister" Rajko Kasagic arguing the contrary. [passage omitted]

B-H: RS Regime Accused of Forcing Sarajevo Serb Exodus

AU2202153396 Belgrade NASA BORBA in Serbo-Croatian 22 Feb 96 p 3

[Unattributed report: "Authorities Are Forcing Citizens To Leave"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Sarajevo, BETA — The chairman of the Serb Civil Council [SGV] of Bosnia-Herzegovina, Mirko Pejanovic, yesterday accused the Bosnian Serb authorities of forcing the Serb population to leave Sarajevo, and called the international community to prevent it. In a letter sent to High Representative Carl Bildt, IFOR [Implementation Force] commander General Leighton Smith, and ambassadors of the Contact Group member states to Sarajevo, he claims that the citizens who want to stay in their homes are being put under pressure and threatened by extremists to leave Sarajevo.

"If protection of rights of the citizens who want to stay in their homes is not regulated by measures of the international community and of the Federation, unforeseeable consequences for the multinational structure of Sarajevo and the political future of Bosnia-Herzegovina may follow," it is said in the letter.

Pejanovic suggests that citizens should be introduced to rights guaranteed by the Law on Amnesty, that a greater IFOR presence should be secured, and that the federal police and governing cadre should be nationally mixed. "I believe you will take these and other measures in order to prevent an exodus of the Serb populace from Sarajevo," it is said in the letter sent, among others, to the president of the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina, Kresimir Zubak, and Mayor of Sarajevo Tarik Kupusovic as well.

B-H: Muslims Stone Serb Refugees Leaving Sarajevo

LD2202173096 Belgrade SRNA in Serbo-Croatian 1625 GMT 22 Feb 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Sarajevo, 22 Feb (SRNA) — The Muslims today stoned a column of refugees from Serb Sarajevo along the Vraca-Kozja Cuprija [Sarajevo districts on the way to Pale] road before the eyes of IFOR [Implementation Force], just half an hour after the road was opened for the evacuation of the Serb people.

One truck driver was slightly injured in the incident and all the windows of his truck were smashed.

The road was subsequently closed to traffic and IFOR representatives escorting the column promised to take extra security measures for the evacuation of the people from Serb Sarajevo.

The closure of this road combined with heavier traffic on other roads caused by snow brought the traffic to a halt in some parts of the city.

A SRNA correspondent reported that in Ilidza Sarajevo Serbs were waiting to leave the town in three columns, above all hoping to use the aforementioned road.

B-H: Pale Claims '50,000 Serbs' Set To Leave Sarajevo

AU2202173396 Paris AFP in English 1720 GMT 22 Feb 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Pale, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Feb 23 (AFP) — As many as 50,000 Serbs could flee Sarajevo's Serb suburbs before a March 20 handover to Bosnian Government control, a Red Cross official said Thursday [22 February], citing Serb authorities.

"The authorities have put forward a figure of 50,000 people who will probably leave Sarajevo and who will want to go to different municipalities in eastern Bosnia," Sandro Barana, an International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) official, told AFP.

Barana said the exodus, before the suburbs' handover under the Dayton agreement to the Moslem-Croat Federation, was a "humanitarian drama." The ICRC is working to determine the humanitarian needs of the refugees, Barana said. The main problem facing the refugees was transport, he said. "There are few buses, the roads around Sarajevo are narrow, limiting the traffic ...and there have been heavy snowfalls this week in the Sarajevo region making the exodus even more difficult," Barana said.

Gojko Klickovic, the Serb official in charge of the evacuation, said some 3,500 Serbs had left on Wednesday and between 6,000 and 7,000 others were due to leave Thursday.

Humanitarian officials believe that overall, around 20,000 Serbs had left the city, and that a further 40,000 to 50,000 remained.

Meanwhile in Sarajevo, a UN refugee agency spokesman, Kris Janowski, accused the Bosnian Serbs of "cynical political manipulation."

"There is a propaganda hype in the Pale media," the UNHCR spokesman said. "Basically the showmasters of this operation want them to leave the Serb suburbs."

B-H: IFOR Appeals To Serbs To Ignore Pale's 'Lies'

AU2202173796 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1400 GMT 22 Feb 96

[Report by Fuad Cibukcic]

[FBIS Translated Text] Today's news conference by representatives of IFOR [Implementation force], UN, and UNHCR [UN High Commissioner for Refugees] was devoted to tomorrow's [word indistinct] of the Sarajevo suburbs that had been under Serb occupation for (?their third year). As of tomorrow at 0600, the Municipalities of Vogosca and parts of the Municipalities of Novi Grad and Centar will be reintegrated into the sovereign territory of the Federation.

IFOR spokesman Mark Reyner said that Admiral Leighton Smith, IFOR commander in Bosnia-Herzegovina, in accordance with NATO headquarters in Brussels, had delayed the lifting of the sanctions against the Serb entity by a further 48 hours, that is, until it was established whether the plan [word indistinct] was going to be respected.

Tomorrow's act of resuming control over Vogosca and parts of the Center and Novi Grad Municipalities will be [word indistinct] by the MUP [Ministry of Internal Affairs] of Bosnia-Herzegovina, international political forces, and IFOR.

Kris Janowski, senior representative for UNHCR for Bosnia-Herzegovina, has accused the Pale leadership of applying psychological pressure on the Serb population to leave these territories. He visited Vogosca last night and saw a veritable panic among the Serb population, who [word indistinct] seek any available means of transport. A column of vehicles several kilometers long was seen on the road to Pale. Janowski reiterated that neither IFOR or the UNHCR will offer any help to the Serb population in moving from there.

IFOR representatives are distributing to Serb population a leaflet issued by the office of the senior representative for the implementation of the civilian part of the Dayton peace agreement, Carl Bildt, which reads as follows:

Lies are short-lived. Do not trust various stories. [Word indistinct] the office of the senior representative you can stay in your houses. It is a lie that you must leave your homes before the federation police arrive. The truth is that the choice is yours. Before you leave your family land, wait and see what the situation will be like. Roads into and out of the Serb Republic will be open at any time. IFOR and the international police will be working to maintain the achieved freedom of movement.

It is a lie that the federation police will consist of Muslim fundamentalists. The truth is the federation police will consist of Serbs, Muslims, Croats, and others.

It is a lie that Muslim refugees will be settled in your houses. The truth is that nobody, including refugees, can be forced to leave his residence without an alternative being offered.

It is a lie that you will be arrested and detained if you have served in the army. The truth is that a general amnesty has been proclaimed. You cannot be accused merely for serving in the army.

It is a lie that the federation police will search your houses and apartments. The truth is that the federation police and other authorities may not enter your place of residence without a warrant from the international police. Any search of an apartment or house will be carried out in conformity with the law and with the presence of the international police.

It is a lie that Serb or Muslim criminals may tell you that you have to leave your houses. The truth is the you are free to stay or leave. Do not allow anybody to determine your destiny. Nobody can tell you what to do, be it the Federation or anybody else.

All roads into and out of Sarajevo will remain open, so you will have enough time to make up you minds.

It is a lie that the office of the senior representative and IFOR are leaving you to the federation police. The truth is that IFOR, the international police, and other organizations will be maintaining an (?increased) presence in your regions. So reads the appeal by the senior representative to the Serbs in Sarajevo's suburbs.

B-H: 'Rebel' Vogosca Serbs Vow To Leave by Midnight 22 Feb

AU2202174296 Paris AFP in English 1714 GMT 22 Feb 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Sarajevo, Feb 22 (AFP) — Rebel Serbs continued to flow out of suburbs around the

Bosnian capital Thursday, a day ahead of the scheduled first patrols by Bosnian police in areas due to revert to government authority.

Leaving in small numbers or alone, the few remaining people in the grimy Serb-held suburb of Vogosca to the north of Sarajevo loaded the last of their belongings onto sledges, into cars or onto their backs.

In the centre of Vogosca where 17,000 people once lived, a pair of shops burned slowly as several onlookers stood by. "We're all going, every single one of us," said one, standing next to a sledge with a few belongings strapped onto it.

Earlier, western reporters witnessed the kindergarten destroyed by fire. Further up the road, a handful of Bosnian Serb policemen milled around outside their station. One leaning against a tree outside the station said they would all leave by midnight Thursday.

At dawn Friday, 85 Bosnian federation police, mostly Moslems, will begin patrols of an area held by their former Bosnian Serb enemies. They will be under strict supervision of the UN International Police Task Force (IPTF) already drafted into the area to smooth transfer of the area to the government.

However, it is likely there will be few people left for the law enforcers to police.

"If somebody asked me to sum this situation up in one word, it would be confusion," said Irish IPTF officer Sargeant Peter Leahy.

B-H: Pale 'Playing Games' With Fleeing Serb Refugees

AU2202185796 Paris AFP in English
1826 GMT 22 Feb 96

[Report by Adrian Brown]

[FBIS Transcribed Excerpt] Sarajevo, Feb 22 (AFP) — Serbs continued to flow out of suburbs around the Bosnian capital Thursday, a day ahead of the scheduled first patrols by Bosnian police in areas due to revert to government authority. [passage omitted]

In the centre of Vogosca where 17,000 people once lived, a pair of shops burned slowly as several onlookers stood by. "We're all going, every single one of us," one of the people said, standing next to a sled with a few belongings strapped onto it.

A woman, asked where she was going, started to reply, then swore loudly. "That's where I am going to," she cursed. "They (Moslems) slit the throats of seven of us and now we should live with the Balije (derogatory term for Moslem)? Never." [passage omitted]

But it is likely there will be few people left for the law enforcers to police. "If somebody asked me to sum this situation up in one word, it would be confusion," said Irish IPTF officer Sergeant Peter Leahy.

Leahy said the Serb mayor of Vogosca told him there were 4,000 people in the area two days ago, "and this morning (Thursday) there's a lot less." A fellow Irish IPTF officer added: "If you had 2,000 you would be doing well."

Only some 100 people, however, had put their names on a list with the IPTF registering an interest in staying and requesting that the UN police force regularly visit their homes for protection.

Though the mainly Moslem police units will be free to patrol the area, "there will be two international police monitors looking over the shoulder of every federation policeman," IPTF spokesman Alexnder Ivanko said.

Leahy said that some Serb policemen had asked to stay in Vogosca so they could join the federation forces. However, peer pressure was stopping those people from stepping forward.

"Some of the police want to stay. Some of them were real police before the war and they want to stay," Leahy said. Under rules drawn up by the IPTF, Serb officers can be back on the streets in different uniforms within 48 hours. [passage omitted]

"Pale is playing games," Leahy said. "There's no panic. They're just leaving. That's it. They just don't trust anyone and the Pale people are confusing them."

"I don't care which side they are on," he added. "To see the people today, it's sad."

B-H: Karadzic: Serbs Wishing To Leave Can Do So Safely

LD2202174896 Belgrade SRNA in Serbo-Croatian
1615 GMT 22 Feb 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Sarajevo, 22 Feb (SRNA) — Dr. Radovan Karadzic, president of the [Bosnian] Serb Republic, expressed his belief today that all Serbs who have resolved to do so, despite additional difficulties owing to the weather, can be safely evacuated from Sarajevo.

"We are convinced that the international community will ensure the safety of all columns of refugees heading out of Sarajevo, and that it will guarantee the safety of [words indistinct] those who do not manage to get out before the entry of the Muslim police, until they are evacuated," President Karadzic said in a statement to SRNA. He added that this is the responsibility of the international community.

"If it cannot guarantee the safety of those who are leaving, how will it guarantee the safety of those who are remaining?" the Serb Republic president said.

"The international community is deceiving us by wrongly interpreting things and saying we wanted the Serb people to leave Sarajevo. This is not true. We wanted the people to stay in their city, but the people raised the clear question: Would they be under Muslim control or not?" Dr. Karadzic noted. He added:

"When it became clear that Serb Sarajevo would fall under Muslim control the vast majority of people decided to go."

The Serb Republic president expressed the belief that "the international community, realizing that it had made a mistake and wrongly evaluated the situation, would ensure the full security of all citizens of Serb Sarajevo, who will be able to emigrate even after 10 March."

The [Bosnian] Serb Republic authorities, according to their president, are exerting pressure on the international community to abide by its obligations, and at the same time they are trying to find temporary, and later permanent, accommodation for Sarajevo Serbs in other parts of the country.

Dr. Karadzic intimated that in the spring, in the area around Sarajevo, 20,000 plots of land will be distributed to evacuated Sarajevo Serbs so that they can build their own homes on them.

B-H: SGV Condemns Pressure on Serbs To Leave Sarajevo

AU2202205596 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1800 GMT 22 Feb 96

[FBIS Translated Text] The Serb Civic Council [SGV] of Bosnia-Herzegovina today sent letter to Senior UN Representative Carl Bildt, IFOR Commander Admiral Leighton Smith, Bosnia-Herzegovina Federation President Kresimir Zubak, Sarajevo Mayor Tarik Kupusovic, and the ambassadors of Contact Group countries to our country. Among other things, the letter says the following:

After the Pale authorities decided to organize a census among the Serb population in Grbavica, Ilidza, Vogosca, Hadzici, and Ilijas, as well as the mass emigration of people from these territories, a very unfavorable situation for Sarajevo reintegration ensued. Citizens who want to remain in their flats and houses in Sarajevo have been exposed to pressure and threats and are now ready to leave Sarajevo.

It is the responsibility of all democratic forces in Bosnia-Herzegovina to prevent the exodus of citizens from Sarajevo, but the greatest responsibility and power is borne by the international community.

So as to achieve a successful implementation of the peace solution for Sarajevo, we demand new measures from the international community and the Federation, so that the civilian population will remain in their homes and on their land.

We suggest that municipal councils in Ilidza, Vogosca, Hadzici, Ilijas, and the City Assembly are set up on the basis of the Rome agreement, after the presence and activity of the ombudsmen and the Organization of Security and Cooperation in Europe in the municipalities are reintegrated into the City of Sarajevo, the letter from the SGV reads.

B-H: UN Police Encourage Serbs To Stay in Vogosca

AU2302120096 Paris AFP in English 1124 GMT 23 Feb 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Vogosca, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Feb 23 (AFP) — The UN police force in Bosnia tried Friday [23 February] to encourage Serb citizens of this Sarajevo suburb to stay in the district despite a handover of police jurisdiction to the Moslem-Croat Federation.

Shortly after the first federation police arrived in Vogosca, situated north of the Bosnian capital, police chiefs from the UN's International Police Task Force (IPTF) urged locals to trust the new police.

"We will do our best to monitor all patrols in whatever area," the IPTF's chief of staff Detlef Buwitt told local Serbs who had gathered in front of the police station recently taken over by federation police.

"If there are any substantial complaints they can be made to the IPTF station," he added.

But Buwitt's words appeared to be having little effect on the crowd many of whom had already boarded two buses ready to take them off to Serb-controlled territory.

"We will have four or five buses and all of them will be full," one prospective passenger told AFP.

Friday's deadline for the handover of jurisdiction from Serb police to federation units had already triggered an exodus from Vogosca of thousands of Serbs, with IPTF personnel estimating that as few as 1,700 citizens of the suburbs former 17,000-strong population remained.

The exodus has raised alarms over the prospects of success for the Dayton peace accord, which is built on a cornerstone of multi-ethnic communities in Bosnia.

One erstwhile member of the Serb police force in Vogosca told Buwitt the mass departure was all due to mistrust.

"What if the (federation) police come and search me when there are none of you (IPTF monitors) around?" he asked.

"You could not be searched without our knowing," Detlef assured.

B-H: Krajisnik on Sarajevo, Muslim Police, POW's

LD2302140196 Pale Srpska Televizija in Serbo-Croatian 1930 GMT 22 Feb 96

[Interview with Momcilo Krajisnik, speaker of the People's Assembly of the Serb Republic, by unidentified correspondent in the studio for the "Dnevnik" program; interview interspersed throughout news bulletin — live]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] [Correspondent] Good evening and welcome.

[Krajisnik] Good evening.

[Correspondent] The 57th regular session of the Serb Republic People's Assembly ended late on 21 February. The deputies, among other things, gave their firm support to Serbs in Serb Sarajevo and their expression of free will to either move to the Serb Republic or remain in Sarajevo. Despite this decision of the Serb Republic Assembly, various speculations appeared, especially in the foreign media, that the Serb people were encouraged to move out and not to remain in their homes. The assembly adopted a stand on this last night.

[Krajisnik] There was a detailed explanation at the session about all that has been happening in Serb Sarajevo. In diplomatic words — the assembly gave its support to Serbs in Serb Sarajevo. In fact, the assembly voiced its protest because nothing was done to enable the Serbs to stay in Serb Sarajevo, to respect their will and basic right to protection in Serb Sarajevo.

Since we have found ourselves in this situation, and since the international community did nothing major or specific — on the contrary, conditions were created for the departure of Serbs from Serb Sarajevo and there was encouragement on the part of certain institutions of the international community, which changes its decisions so quickly — the assembly has instructed all state bodies to help the people in Serb Sarajevo in these difficult times, so they can freely express their will, i.e. to help those who did not feel safe to leave.

[Correspondent] Regardless of such behavior of the international community and its lack of interest, was there something else we could have done?

[Krajisnik] I have been saying since the beginning that the only real way out for the Serbs is to fight for our Sarajevo, but a large group of Serb people have left Sarajevo in spite of this. This has had a negative effect since it has made it impossible for those who want to stay behind and who want to keep their houses, roots, cemeteries, and land... [pauses] Those who were the first to leave in fact weakened the ones who stayed behind.

A number of political leaders since the beginning had little faith in staying. I would not like to say there were obstructions on purpose, but all this was a result of an unjust solution for Serb Sarajevo. We must not blame them, but we have always said — we can never take away with us the most valuable thing, and the struggle for Serb Sarajevo could have been successful, just like two peoples are waging a struggle in Mostar. [sentence as heard] But as to whether we could have done anything, I am sure we could have done something. I am convinced we could have preserved Serb Sarajevo had we stayed. But when the critical moment came, there was great pressure in a form of political propaganda aimed at reducing the number even further and thus reducing the Serbs to a minority number and thus resolving the problem of Sarajevo according to the wishes of our enemies.

[Correspondent] So it is too late today to say whether they should stay or leave?

[Krajisnik] You see, I attended a few meetings. In Ilijas I witnessed the will of the people who simply felt unsafe, had no trust in the international community and just wanted to leave. We knew very well that when a departure is organized, when the people make this decision, hundreds of difficulties arise. We will overcome all these problems; although, today we are faced with hundreds of unresolved issues concerning the departure of Serbs. In any case, the entire state has been mobilized and we will restore the situation as soon as weather conditions improve a bit.

[Correspondent] Mr. Speaker, can the international community be trusted, has it given any guarantees, and how did yesterday's meeting with High Representative of the international community Carl Bildt go? Did he give any new information?

[Krajisnik] We have asked to meet Mr. Bildt for several reasons, which were upsetting for our citizens. A pamphlet that has been forwarded to our people says, rather clumsily, that the Muslim police, that is, the Federation's police, could arrest people, that it will be setting up checkpoints, that 23 February, the day the federal police enter [Vogosca], will be doomsday.

We have sought explanations from Mr. Bildt. What I can repeat and what he said publicly and clearly today is that nothing new or upsetting will happen on 23 February. He said the propaganda about arresting Serbs was a plain fabrication.

However, should anyone be arrested, say for some criminal action, he said that even in such a case the international police would have to be present.

When we explained that the Muslim police would be setting up checkpoints, he decidedly said that there would be no checkpoints, no control.

The third thing we were interested in was the opening of the road through Muslim Sarajevo. They fulfilled this promise today. We can see the Muslims are trying to prevent this by staging various incidents. In effect, they wish to take vengeance on the Serbs as much as possible, so that Serbs stay [as heard], but today we received fresh assurances from IFOR that they would strongly... [pauses] They even sent a letter to Izetbegovic that they would firmly react to any incidents, because the principle of reciprocity will automatically come into force and the Serbs will block the Muslims' passage to Gorazde. It is their great desire to take vengeance on the Serbs, to make them suffer as much as possible.

I have to say that we have demanded the deadline be extended from 23 February to 1 March. Bildt explained that there was no reason for the delay, that nothing in particular would happen and that it was only a formal takeover of control. When we said that this idea was compromised and it was believed the Serbs would be surrounded, that they would all be killed, arrested, or harmed in any way, he said that for this very reason we must not extend the deadline. People would say then that all this was true. He said that 23 February would come and nothing would happen. Everyone who wanted to stay would be allowed to, everyone who wanted to leave would be able to do so.

Nevertheless, I tried to convince him that Serbs would not stay, not because someone wanted them to be a minority in Bosnia-Herzegovina and the Federation, but because someone wanted them to be a minority in Sarajevo, which is unacceptable. By adopting a hasty solution to Sarajevo, they wanted to deny the Serbs in Sarajevo all basic rights guaranteed to every people by the international community.

[Correspondent] Tomorrow is 23 February. The Muslim police will enter Vogosca. But there is information, or misinformation, that it will go into parts of Novi Grad and Dobrinja, which means Serbs will not be able to leave. Although the deadline for the takeover of Ilidza and Hadzici comes into effect later on, citizens of the above parts of Serb Sarajevo will not be able to leave because the Muslim police will be on the checkpoints.

[Krajisnik] This is the eve of 23 Febraury. The only thing we can say is that we are waiting for tomorrow. We must not lose our presence of mind. Propaganda is the greatest and most serious weapon against us. We have got strong assurances from Mr. Smith, from the international police force, Mr. Fitzgerald and Mr. Bildt, that nothing will happen. The police will not have any real power. For our people, naturally, this is the enemy police. They will be strictly, literally, under the supervision of the international police. A group of the policemen will be accompanied by the international police force. In effect, the federal police will not be able to do anything without the consent of the international police.

So the misinformation is only pouring oil on the fire. We are totally right to be mistrustful, but we have to pull our forces and win this battle as well. It is beyond comprehension that someone has changed the decision, that instead of 19 March we now have 23 February.

And why in Vogosca? Isn't it creating a psychological impression that someone wants to surround the whole of Sarajevo? Then they tried to justify themselves by saying that this was wrong, that they would sort it out, that it happened only by chance.

In fact this is only propaganda to make the Serbs leave as soon as possible. I have to say that the international community bears sole responsibility for this. It cannot justify any of its actions. It can blame us as much as it wants, but it only has itself to blame for what is happening today.

[Correspondent] President, the parliament or assembly requested of the international community last night that all imprisoned Serbs be released — those that are still in Muslim and Croatian prisons — and also that information be provided on missing persons. How is it possible that after Dayton, Paris, and Rome, where agreement was reached on the consistent respect for agreement, the Muslims and Croats are still holding Serb prisoners?

[Krajisnik] The essential point is that we cannot believe the Dayton agreement can be fulfilled, because the other side is well-known to behave like a spoiled child, and in fact like the protege of a powerful mentor. In the beginning, strong pressure was exerted on us to release our prisoners to pave the way for pressure to be exerted on the Muslims to release their prisoners. When we released our prisoners for the purpose of a same day exchange of prisoners, the Muslims simply failed to release a large number of Serbs and we got into a stalemate situation. The Muslim side did not want to exchange prisoners. It did not care whether one Muslim was released. At least that is the feeling I have, or at least some members of their commission took this view. We wanted to obtain the release of the largest possible number of Serbs and we got into a situation in which neither ourselves nor the Muslims released prisoners and we had an unresolved situation.

President Karadzic and in fact the whole leadership decided to release our prisoners, and today we are bringing pressure to bear so that our prisoners, too, are released from Muslim prisons. After this, a large number of Serbs were released. This was a great thing. But a number are still listed [words indistinct] and then IFOR entered the prisons, checked up on things, made reports and — we have to be thankful for this — took measures.

But what we realize now is that they wanted, at all costs, to bring up the issue of missing persons here — that is, the missing persons on the Muslim side — and they said we were holding 5,000- 6,000 missing Muslims or some such figure and we should release them before they would release our prisoners.

The international community capitulated in the face of Muslim arrogance regarding the prisoners, because the most inhuman thing is the holding of prisoners. Last night we proposed measures, and we are doing everything we can, and we have assurances from the ambassadors who come this way and from IFOR and the others that the prisoners will be released and we must persist in seeking their release in order to resolve this problem. [passage omitted]

[Correspondent] Despite this behavior of the international community and IFOR, last night we resumed contact with the international community and renewed our full cooperation.

[Krajisnik] Perhaps this has been misinterpreted. We did not freeze the implementation of the Dayton agreement. We did not freeze cooperation either with IFOR or with the representatives of the international community. We want to implement the agreement.

We only wanted to objectify [objektivizirati] certain things: IFOR should actively participate in the release of our officers. Secondly, we believe the international community must act more correctly. If we have fulfilled all the obligations for [lifting] sanctions, there is no justification for the further maintenance of sanctions.

So we were only drawing attention to the fact that the international community must treat us equally. It appeared that by not sending our people to Sarajevo for security reasons, in some way, we had frozen relations. In this way we gave assurances that we agreed to cooperation. This is our aim, but please treat us equally. [passage omitted]

B-H: SDA-HDZ Confrontation Over Sarajevo Status

96BA0152A Sarajevo SLOBODNA BOSNA in Serbo-Croatian 12 Jan 96 pp 10-11

[Article by Suzana Mijatovic: "Only the District Is Saving the Croats"]

[FBIS Translated Text] When, against all expectations and the most optimistic forecasts, Slobodan Milosevic, in Dayton, "magnanimously" turned over the capital of our state to the "federal" nationalities, and thus deleted from its name forever that famous epithet "Serb," most of its inhabitants had reason to celebrate. There was enough just in the fact that those who had mercilessly destroyed the city for three and a half years would not be rewarded for it, but the capital of the state would remain unified, and after a siege lasting for years it would finally be connected by roads and railroads to the other parts of the country.

However, what was not clearly and precisely defined in Washington a year earlier, nor even in the recent negotiations in Dayton, is the status and political system of Sarajevo, which, judging by recent events, has seriously threatened the reestablishment of good relations between the two federal partners and has once again raised the issue: "To whom does Sarajevo belong?" The simplest answer would certainly be: to its citizens. But when it comes to the division of power and all the privileges that come with it, experience teaches us that things are not that easy. Thus the question of the division of power in Sarajevo has already been on the agenda of a meeting of the City Assembly, and as matters now stand it is soon to be debated by the federal parliament. The views of the two incumbent parties, the SDA [Party of Democratic Action] and the HDZ [Croatian Democratic Community], are rather far apart at the moment. That is why we need to take things in order, starting with the proposals of representatives of the SDA and the HDZ.

Because at the time when the Washington agreement was signed no one hoped that Sarajevo as a whole would become part of the federation, its status was never precisely defined except in Article 10 of the federal constitution, which provides that Sarajevo shall have the status of a district in the transitional period.

What the SDA Is Proposing

After Dayton and its solution of the issue of Sarajevo, it became clear that we can no longer talk about a district. But if it is not a district, how is the city to be regulated? SDA representatives have their solution. According to them, Sarajevo, which before the war was a community of opcinas, cannot be anything other than one of the cantons in the federation. "The only possible dilemma in constitutional law which could arise in this connection is that article of the federal constitution which refers to a district. So, all that means is that if that article is deleted by the Constitutional Assembly, we will have a completely clear situation. For that reason, the Sarajevo City Committee of the SDA holds that there is no dilemma at all about Sarajevo and its status and government. Sarajevo cannot be treated other than as a canton. It is, at the same time, the capital of the republic and of the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina. Of course, a state like Bosnia-Herzegovina can protect its interests in the city, its property, institutions, and freedom of movement in specific laws. The federation can do likewise. Those who favor the concept of a district are trying to keep the city permanently in a kind of blockade. To establish parity, a bicameral assembly, in fact, to make Sarajevo a federation within the federation. There is one federation, the federation of cantons, and none of those cantons has a bicameral assembly," says Safet Halilovic, chairman of the Sarajevo City Committee of the SDA. Here is Halilovic's comment on the demands of representatives of the Sarajevo HDZ for greater participation in city government:

"In Sarajevo, where the share of the Croatian population is 6.7 percent, it would be an anachronism to provide 33-percent parity. Sarajevo can only be a canton, and, with that in mind, all actions have been taken to transform the city in accordance with the federal constitution. We first started with opcinas within the city, and proceedings are under way to transform the opcina assemblies into transitional opcina councils, which must be terminated no later than the 20th of this month. After that, Sarajevo will be a collection of those nine opcinas. It can be set up only as a canton in which ethnic, political, human, and cultural rights of all the people living in it will be guaranteed."

Incidentally, Prof. Safet Halilovic, together with Prof. Omer Ibrahimagic, Bakir Izetbegovic, and Jusuf Zahiragic, took an active part in preparing the Basic Premises for Establishing the Status and Organization of the City of Sarajevo, which in its basic principles contains a provision, whereby "as a unified and indivisible territorial and administrative entity, Sarajevo would have all the rights and powers established for a canton in the federal constitution." The City Assembly verified this document in a meeting held late last month, but its vice president Ante Zelic cast a vote against it.

Yet in spite of that meeting, HDZ representatives have announced their dissatisfaction with the entire position they have in Sarajevo as one of the equal constituent nationalities in the federation. First in a roundtable discussion on the topic "The Croats in Sarajevo," organized by the Croatian Society for Science and Art. All the participants in that discussion agreed that in no period of the city's recent history have the Croats had less political influence and less participation in the legislative, judicial, and executive branches. Along with a number of other objections addressed on that occasion to the "other partner in the government," the Croats of Sarajevo again issued a demand for the establishment of new opcinas on the territory of the city, in order to organize local government and self-government, the reestablishment of the King Tvrtko Brigade of the HVO [Croatian Defense Council], they protested the editorial policy of Radio-TV Bosnia-Herzegovina and encouragement of religious greetings in joint public institutions, and they also called for the encouragement of the return of Croats to Sarajevo under the same conditions that the return of others is being encouraged and promoted.

What the HDZ Is Calling For

"As to the division of power in the city, we called for authority to reflect the principle of parity at the highest level, so that there is no majority rule of one nationality by the other, which the SDA has accepted in principle, but in practice everything has come down to the usual behavior," says Ivan Vidovic, chairman of the Sarajevo City Committee of the HDZ. "It is a situation in which they say they will talk nice, they will reach nice agreements about cultural plurality, ethnic plurality, but in the end everything comes down to simple management and belittlement of the HDZ. We therefore think it necessary for a government to be set up in the city of Sarajevo which will not allow subjugation to any constituent nationality. We must also bear in mind that the Serbs must also participate in government here, because they also live here, and a solution must be found for them." In the course of last year, we in the HDZ City Committee had several meetings with representatives of the SDA, but also with the Sarajevo City Council, precisely on this topic of the division of power and establishment of good relations. One of those discussions was even attended by its chairman Mirko Pejanovic. But the Croats of Sarajevo do not intend to back off from their demands, as is clearly indicated by the fact that after the meeting of the HDZ the central headquarters of the party in Mostar, more precisely Ivan Bender, chairman of the caucus of Croatian deputies in the Constitutional Assembly, was sent a demand to put this issue on the agenda of the next meeting. According to Vidovic, the bulk of the Croatian demands in Sarajevo come down to the fact that the Croats of Sarajevo will not allow the city to be set up as a canton, because the number of cantons has already been fixed by the Washington agreement and cannot be changed. "If the capital is transformed into a canton, we would have domination of one nationality by another. We are also calling for the Croats to have a share of at least 33 percent in the government, because today they have a representation of only 1 to 2 percent in government bodies and agencies. According to the figures we have, and they are rather reliable, there are about 25,000 Croats living in the city of Sarajevo at the moment. In the future, we will strive for them to act in a united way," Vidovic says.

Ante Zelic, vice president of the City Assembly and representative of the Sarajevo Croats in that institution, specifically proposes: "Now we first need to propose an organization of the city which would then have to be the subject of an agreement between the two parties, and then there would have to be a vote; after a favorable vote it would go to the Constitutional Assembly. That is the route which we Croats favor and which we will insist upon. However, it seems that the City Assembly, on the insistence of Prime Minister Silajdzic, has raised the issue of the organization of the city and has formed a commission for that purpose. Our representatives also took part in the work of that commission, we also had some proposals of our own for organizing the city; however, that was not taken into account at all. Their proposal is for Sarajevo to be nothing other than a canton, with participation in government being in proportion to the population living here. A proposal to that effect was also taken up in the Presidency, where I also was present, and I said that they could not operate that way if they want to keep the Croats here. However, majority rule was exercised even here. And a proposal to that effect went to a session of the City Assembly, where the Croatian representatives were outvoted. After that, I received the revised text of that proposal, which is still worse for the Croats and Serbs than the original one. If we go on this way, then we Croats have nothing to hope for here."

After Zelic was outvoted in that meeting, the following members withdrew from the work of the commission, which was supposed to complete the proposal for the organization of the city: Nikola Selak, Luka Brailo, and Tvrtko Nevjestic. There is no doubt that Sarajevo Croats, that is, those of them who participate actively in the bodies of government, fear most the possibility of being put in a situation as a minority nationality in the city where they cannot decide about any issues that are vital to them concerning survival in Sarajevo, and in that sense they will not back off from the demand that this issue be settled at the highest level. Dr. Tarik Kupusovic, mayor of Sarajevo, also agrees with the observation that these problems cannot be settled at the level of the city. "There are differences and discussions in approach and about the organization of power in Sarajevo. If someone says canton, the HDZ immediately comes out against it, because it assumes that a canton signifies proportional composition of the government. I think the essential thing here is that the city be organized so that ethnic, civil, and all other rights are satisfied. That is, a mechanism which will guarantee that in more than declarative terms. For me, the city of Sarajevo must be a city. On this, the representatives of the HDZ at the highest level agree that Sarajevo should be defined as a city with the regime of a canton. Our commission for proposing the organization of the city has, to some extent, already completed its job. However, the essential thing is for Sarajevo to be decided on by the people of Sarajevo themselves, for representatives of the parties to reach an agreement, and, of course, the Assembly of the federation and the republic must verify that decision after the fact," Kupusovic says.

B-H: Commentary Criticizes Idea of Sarajevo Canton

AU2302131696 Sarajevo VECERNJE NOVINE in Serbo-Croatian 23 Feb 96 p 2

[Commentary by Eldin Karic: "Sarajevo on the Periphery"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The clamor preceding the Rome conference has turned into a weird silence after it. No sooner was the ink on the document dry than Mostar confirmed that its western part abides only by a signature dividing the city. Hidden underneath, like a mouse under wheat, the news has leaked out — of Sarajevo as a canton. To put it freely, which is the only possibility left to us behind an iron curtain of silence, the conclusion is drawn that it is a definitive blow to Sarajevo as the center and metropolis of the Federation and Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina. On the other hand, it is a certain price paid for a privilege that the canton belongs to the party whose people make up a majority there. Knowing that the district of Mostar has been extensively diminished, whereas any story about the Sarajevo district is left to nostalgists, it is obvious that Mostar is paying the price for Sarajevo.

In the case of districts, decisions would be made in a bipartite manner that would not suit either the HDZ [Croatian Democratic Community] in Mostar or the SDA [Party of Democratic Action] in Sarajevo. A compromise has been made, while dreams about multiethnicity of Bosnia-Herzegovina have been left to children to play with.

Now, as Sarajevo has become, instead of the capital, just a peer among the cantons, the question remains of what we shall have eventually; a canton, a city, or municipalities. If the city is abolished, then Sarajevo will no longer exist; and if the municipalities are abolished, then what will happen with the parts that do not belong to the so-called city's core? The silence on the part of the ruling circles after the Rome meeting leaves enough room for a foreboding that Bascarsija [Sarajevo district] will be a periphery and border of the Sarajevo canton. This sounds so repulsive, as if you said "apple burek" [traditional pie]. Apparently, both things have come out of one and the same head.

B-H: Muslim Mostar Officials Resign in Protest

LD2202150496 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1426 GMT 22 Feb 96

["Pool" item]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Belgrade, Feb 22 (TANJUG) — Muslim municipal officials in the eastern part of Mostar have handed in a collective resignation in protest against the pace of the implementation of the Rome agreement and changes in the arbitration of EU administrator Hans Koschnick, the Muslim radio in Mostar reported Thursday [22 February].

Muslim Mayor Safet Orucevic resigned a few days ago and now Deputy Mayor Hamdija Jahic and police commander Sefkija Dziho followed suit.

Tension in Muslim-Croat relations in that divided city erupted in early February when Croats rejected the ruling of the EU administrator on the future territorial organization of Mostar.

Koschnik decided that Mostar should be divided into three Muslim, three Croat and one jointly-administered central zone.

His proposal was modified at the meeting of the enlarged contact group in Rome at the weekend. The participants in the Rome talks also agreed on a full freedom of movement in Mostar.

The Rome agreement on Mostar has failed at the very beginning, the commentator of the Muslim radio said, adding that full freedom of movement had not been implemented because same procedures of identification were used at the check-point as before the Rome agreement.

The radio said that 11 Muslims, who were arrested and beaten on Tuesday, were still detained in Croat prisons. The joint police force is patroling only in a small part of the central city zone, Interior Minister in the Muslim-Croat Federation Abdo Hebib said.

He said that it was absurd to form a large joint police force for such a small city area.

The Croat side has not honoured a pledge given on Tuesday on the removal of barricades from the streets, the source said.

Mostar Croats are mocking the world, the Muslim radio in Mostar said.

B-H: Zubak Views Future Authorities, Mostar

AU2202135896 Sarajevo LJILJAN in Serbo-Croatian 7-14 Feb 96 pp 6-7

[Interview with Kresimir Zubak, president of the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina, by Mirsad Sinanovic and Zehrudin Isakovic; place and date not given: "Herzeg-Bosnia Will Be Abolished, but the Republic Must Also Withdraw From the Territory of the Federation"]

[FBIS Translated Text] [LJILJAN] You have just come from the first session of the federal government. What are your impressions? Can you discern possible political problems that could block its work?

[Zubak] The most important thing is that some of the problems have been solved by the decision that the competences of the republic and the federal governments are to be separated — both institutionally and personnel-wise. Their competences are defined, and that has been a source of numerous misunderstandings. That is why, at the assembly session, I said that, earlier, we were more busy with the issue of the government itself than with the subjects of its work, some significant issues. The former government did not manage to solve the question of the method of the work organization, just like, up to now, it has not managed to make a precise division of competences. However, after the Dayton agreement we passed two laws which, finally, defined everything precisely. Personally I believe that the focus is on the federal government and that all the problems of the federation will lie on it, such as possible social disorder and political dissatisfaction, which are to be expected in the post-war period. Therefore the federal government should be given full authority.

[LJILJAN] What problems do you expect in the functioning of the federal government regarding the evaluation of President Izetbegovic, which he expressed in his letter to Turkish President Suleyman Demirel, that, so far, the Federation has not fulfilled some essential demands?

[Zubak] That is not the evaluation of Mr. Izetbegovic only; it is almost a general evaluation, mine as well. It is a fact that the Federation has not started functioning fully. I believe that the uncertainty regarding the outcome of the war was the biggest blockade in the development of the federation and of the entire republic.

[LJILJAN] How do you see this overall government, the republic one? In that context, could you comment on the resignation of Mr. Silajdzic?

[Zubak] This republican government, the way it has now been constituted, should also be the basis for the constitution of the new Government of Bosnia-Herzegovina, i.e. the Council of Ministers when the Serb representatives will also be included in its political organs. The period until the next elections should be used, not only to maintain the political continuity, but also for the government to warm up in a way. So, the republican government has a two-fold role in this transitory period: To represent Bosnia-Herzegovina until the elections, and to warm up, to create the method and the organization of work that should start to function in the full sense after the elections. That is where it came to a dispute with Mr. Silajdzic. The number of ministries is by no means a crucial issue, the stability of one country has never depended on the number of its ministries. I believe that Mr. Silajdzic brought up that issue for some other reasons.

[LJILJAN] At the assembly session, you said that there were two processes that will start in parallel: The abolishing of "Herzeg-Bosnia" and the withdrawal of some competences of the republic! How should that look in practice on the ground? In what order will the moves be made?

[Zubak] In three years, we have created something that resembles a state out of Herzeg-Bosnia....

[LJILJAN] A puupet state!

[Zubak] It was not made in the way it is presented here. One has to know how to make a state out of nothing. We will fulfill everything that has been anticipated by the Dayton Agreement. That is not disputable. Concretely, that means that Herzeg-Bosnia will be deprived of all the attributes of a state organization. When that will be fulfilled — that depends on several factors, not only on us. I can illustrate that with a concrete example. We cannot suddenly say that there are no customs authorities before regulations and laws are enacted, before organization is established, in a most banal sense — for example, what the uniform will be like! Therefore, the sooner those questions are solved, the sooner everything that the federation implies will be realized. So, the political decision is clear, and how that will be carried out technically — that is mostly for the government to solve — those are expert questions.

[LJILJAN] Yet, how will the project of the abolishing of Herzeg-Bosnia go, concretely? What will be abolished first?

[Zubak] Looking at it like this, in an office, it looks simple. However, every single question is complex. The competences of cantons will be transferred to their authorities. Those are very complex questions, far more complex than the public believes. For example, the budget of the federation will not be passed before it is ascertain precisely what will be financed by the federation, what by the cantons, and what by municipalities. Also, we have to know precisely what taxes the municipalities and cantons will have, and which the federation. For the time being, only one thing is certain, and that is that the direct source for financing the federal budget is the customs revenue. The issue of the distribution of tax income remains open, and I believe that foreign experts will help us in that. Tax income will, for example, go directly to the prepared accounts in the federation and the republic.

[LJILJAN] Do you think that Mr. Prlic, regarding to his complete — we dare say, from the Bosnian point of view — sometimes disputable engagement during the war, is an adequate person to represent the interests of the entire Bosnia-Herzegovina?

[Zubak] I know Mr. Prlic very well personally, and I believe that people also know him in Sarajevo. He is a very capable and educated man. How successful he will be in performing his duties — that I cannot say at this moment, because this is the first time he has had such a task, but he has all the references to do it properly.

[LJILJAN] So you believe that he will really represent the interests of the entire Bosnia-Herzegovina, and not exclusively the Croat interests within the state?

[Zubak] You see, he will certainly represent the interests of Bosnia-Herzegovina. Our primary goal is the federation, that is not disputable, but it is also indisputable that we will implement the Dayton Agreement, which we have accepted. Jadranko Prlic represents Bosnia-Herzegovina, and that is the way he has to act.

[LJILJAN] Let us go back to the federal government. What are its priority tasks?

[Zubak] I have told the new ministers that they are brave people and that I wish to thank them for having accepted their posts, because there are no areas in which there are no burning issues. It will be very hard. I would like to use this opportunity to appeal to the public to have patience with this government, because it has to create a system that has not existed anywhere else up to now. What is worse — the problem of the demobilized troops, the problem of invalids, of the reactivation of economy, the restoration of the infrastructure.... all that is so important that an enormous quantity of wisdom and brilliance is needed to make the moves that will bring progress. In that sense, the urgent issue is the education of certain experts, which we need most.

[LJILJAN] How much does the distribution of help from the World Bank or the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development depend on Bosnian factors, on one side, and how much on the donors, on the other?

[Zubak] That depends on how serious the projects we offer will be. If they are elaborate and profitable, then their realization will certainly be materially possible. So, it is up to international institutions to evaluate the quality of the offered programs, and our offers have to be as good as possible.

[LJILJAN] You tendered your resignation some time ago, but it has since been withdrawn. Why? Did something change in the meantime?

[Zubak] Posavina was the immediate reason. I had preferred the Washington solution, which means that the territories where the Croats and Bosniaks are a majority should belong to the federation. That was approximately the Contact Group plan, where some minor corrections would be allowed. That was my approach. That was given up, and — because of my emotional connection with Posavina, but also because of my principles — I could not agree with that in that moment. That is when I said that I was resigning. I explained my attitude to the people of Posavina, to the house of representatives of Herzeg-Bosnia, and at the constitutional assembly. I do not know to what extent that was conveyed to the public here. There were fierce reactions regarding that issue.... They convinced me then — and I accepted — that, despite the solution that was unacceptable for me, I should stay on in my post, because I believed that, through an agreement like this one, I would still be able, in a political way and with political means, to make some things better in the future. I concluded that my resignation could bring about divisions in the political body of the Croat people, which would not be good in times like these. That would have been irresponsible of me, and people from Posavina convinced to remain on my post. That is the way it happened.

[LJILJAN] How would you comment on the situation in Mostar?

[Zubak] I believe that, both in the country and in the world public, the problem of Mostar has been overstated, although it is big. That is one thing. Another thing — and I believe that you will publish this — is that the political demands of Croats from Mostar have been quite misrepresented by the media. Nobody has ever questioned the integral Mostar just like nobody has ever questioned the integral Bosnia-Herzegovina, but what was questioned was the internal organization of Mostar.

[LJILJAN] Why?

[Zubak] Well, you see, first, because the same reorganization will also take place in other bigger places. You cannot implement local self-rule in such huge municipalities as those we inherited from the previous system. Another thing: Why be a slave to the solutions from the former system? Administrative borders of municipalities also changed in the former system several times. Mostar itself went through such changes. I do not know if the public is acquainted with the fact that, precisely through that administrative changing of borders, the demographic structure of Mostar was changed when the western parts of this municipality were given to western Herzegovina — the municipalities of Citluk, Siroki Brijeg, whereas the eastern, mostly Bosniak part remained, which changed the demographic picture. We believe that, in a thoroughly new political and legal system, we cannot retain the former administrative division of municipalities. The map itself shows that, because parts of some municipalities have remained in the "Serb Republic." That means that a whole number of new municipalities should be established in order to secure local rule and self-rule, and the basic principle should be, like elsewhere in the world, that a municipality is able to finance itself. If people in an area need a municipality, they should be allowed to have one; that is their constitutional right. But then they should be told: You have a municipality, as you have demanded, but do not expect the canton or the federation to give money for municipal functions. We believe that this should not be the case only with Mostar, but should be this way on the entire territory.

Krajisnik believes that only the Hague tribunal can conduct proceedings for war crimes. He is partly right there, only that this is not feasible in practice. He is right when he says that misuse is possible. In the same way ithat misuse is possible on the territory of the federation, it is possible on the territory of the Serb Republic. Which means that everything should be considered, and not rejected in advance or viewed with prejudice. I did not approve of anything, but I accepted the talk and the possibility of thinking about it. In practice, I have never behaved like a man who makes definite decisions in my own name or in the name of the Federation.

[LJILJAN] Why does everybody think: "If they do not extradite theirs, we will not extradite ours." Is it not in the interest of every people that the criminals are extradited?

[Zubak] I agree with you. Only, I believe that the media in Sarajevo have been triumphant about some things. I do not think that is good. I do not know if you are aware, but there will certainly be proceedings against some officials in the military and civil structures who are from the Bosniak people. Let the Hague tribunal decide, on the basis of evidence, against whom they will initiate trials. But, there will certainly be some trials against Bosniak officials as well.

[LJILJAN] How would you comment the fact that the Hague tribunal decided to indite some high officials of the so-called Herzeg-Bosnia and officers of the HVO [Croatian Defense Council], like Dario Kordic and Tihomil Blaskic?

[Zubak] I really do not know the cases of Blaskic and Kordic, how great their influence was, and particularly not that of Mr. Santic, who was a minister here and was, at that time, only the president of the municipal council in Vitez. I do not think they had any direct influence on what happened in individual situations where crimes were committed. I could be wrong, I do not want to claim otherwise, but I believe that it will be hard to prove any direct connection.

[LJILJAN] The sore point for the Bosniaks is the return to Stolac, Capljina. On the other hand, some Croats have returned to Travnik.

[Zubak] I received some information about Travnik, I was not there personally, but I received several letters in which people claim that other people are staying in their houses, and that they are accommodated in cellars. I do not know what is true. But, for example, around 100 families have returned to Jajce. There were problems in Stolac, that is not disputable. But, we have accepted the responsibility to fulfill our obligations from Dayton, which means that 100 families from Stolac will return to Stolac.

[LJILJAN] What would be your political attitude if Bosniaks from Stolac asked for a municipality?

[Zubak] There is a criterion, a procedure. Let them initiate a procedure. In all that, a legal and political procedure must be carried out, and one should ascertain if there are any political misunderstandings. Everything can be solved.

B-H: War Crime Arrests: IFOR, Police Role Discussed

AU2302104996 Split SLOBODNA DALMACIJA in Serbo-Croatian 18 Feb 96 p 6

[Article by Bruno Lopandic: "Who Is Seizing Criminals?"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The IFOR [Implementation Force] will not actively participate, but the international police forces in Bosnia-Herzegovina should deal more seriously with this issue. This conclusion is the result of numerous meetings at the summit between the representatives of IFOR, the International War Crimes Tribunal in The Hague, and NATO. The direct reason for such thinking was Karadzic's recent "strolling" on the ground, when a couple of days ago without much trouble he drove elegantly through three IFOR checkpoints. The U.S. Senate has immediately expressed its dissatisfaction, and spirits have obviously been stirred at the Pentagon, too. How is this possible — many have asked themselves.

IFOR, in its defense, has issued official statements saying that their task was not to stop civilian traffic, but only military, so, following that, no civilian vehicle had ever been stopped. The limited possibilities have also been based upon the relevant Security Council resolution, which clearly says that IFOR will arrest war criminals only if they notice them, that is, if they bump into them accidentally. Precisely by this resolution, contrary to expectations, IFOR's authorities regarding the apprehending of war criminals were drastically reduced in December 1995. The situation is similar with the detection of mass graves.

The Hague List

We have no intention of running like rabbits up and down on the ground and looking for mass graves — the British commander of the IFOR ground forces, Michael Walker, said not so long ago. IFOR soldiers on the ground, beside these limiting factors, have complained about something else, too: "We lack relevant information, and most of all we lack the photos of those suspected of war crimes. Therefore we cannot recognize them at all, even if they are moving in this area" — one American soldier said. A couple of days earlier, the detaining of two Serb officers by the Government of Bosnia-Herzegovina raised a lot of dust.

IFOR has protested because, according to them, Djukic and Krsmanovic had been arrested as they were on their way to negotiations. It turned out in the end that Karadzic's two officers had made a "deal." They only needed good liaison in order to, on their own initiative, surrender first to the Bosnian authorities, and later on to the Hague Tribunal. This particularly applies to Djukic, for whom it was very dangerous to stay in the "RSK" [Republic of Serb Krajina]. Djukic, as chief logistics officer, knows precisely how many soldiers, equipment, weapons, and money has crossed the river Drina, who ordered offensives on certain towns the Serbs had not succeeded in conquering, and who is responsible for the murders of thousands of people. Djukic also knows all the connections with the general headquarters in Belgrade. Further, according to the Hague Tribunal conventions, his organizing of his own surrender will be taken into account as an extenuating circumstance.

This case, almost certainly organized, is the only example of a war criminal's arrest, apart from Tadic, who came to The Hague a long time ago. After the incident, as many called the arrest of Djukic and Krsmanovic, the Clinton administration became anxious, and Holbrooke rushed to Sarajevo. The result of that diplomatic initiative is a document Warren Christopher has called "Rules of the Road," with which the Bosnia-Herzegovina Government agreed.

In simple words, according to this document Bosnia-Herzegovina cannot arrest whomever it wishes. It has to send a list of the war crime suspects to The Hague, and the experts there have to compare the data with what they have, and send the list back. This Hague list, in line with the agreement between Holbrooke and the Bosnia-Herzegovina Government, is the only valid one, and Sarajevo has to behave according to that list. Principally, the International War Crimes Tribunal in The Hague had detected, as officially stated by the Tribunal spokesman, Christian Chartier, 52 persons, of which 45 were Serbs and 7 Croats. So far only data has been gathered on the Muslims, among whom there are allegedly more criminals than there are among the Croats. However, Chartier admits that almost all the information is incomplete and "sketchy," and so far they have gathered only 16 photos.

To Work on Balance

Since IFOR is neither authorized nor has any intention to look after war criminals, and the hands of the Sarajevo Government have been significantly tied down by the recent "Rules of the Road," at the moment there are ongoing negotiations about giving a more important role to the international police forces in arresting the perpetrators of the atrocities. Their main task is to organize local police forces, equip and train them, but not to arrest war criminals. However, under the mask of cooperation with the local police, the circles close to the Hague Tribunal, the role of the international police forces should be precisely to look for the war crime suspects. The chief judge of the Hague Tribunal, Richard Goldstone, talked in Brussels in early February to CIA director Deutch. At the talks, Goldstone asked for better cooperation, that is, access to the information that the CIA doubtless possesses. One diplomat at NATO told us: The international police forces must simply be the forces that are intensively involved with apprehending war criminals, because unfortunately there is nobody who will do that; our hands are effectively tied.

To what extent and range this initiative will be carried out remains to be seen, but the reasons for suspicion should perhaps be sought in a sentence uttered of the commander on the ground, Michael Walker: "Too much digging and searching could jeopardize peace." Appeasement of the situation if Djukic and Krsmanovic are apprehended, and letting Karadzic keep freely trundling to and fro, only tells us that the strategy of the political forces is — to avoid any additional stirring and only to work for a balance.

B-H: U.S. Attempts To Arrest Karadzic, Mladic Viewed

AU2202145496 Belgrade TELEGRAF in Serbo-Croatian 21 Feb 96 p 9

[Report by Hans Svarckopf: "CIA and DIA Are Intensifying Search for Mladic and Karadzic"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Activities regarding the secret CIA plan to arrest Serb leaders and officers in Bosnia, which is supposed to be carried out by a special police force and which TELEGRAF reported recently, have particularly intensified recently, after the peace meeting in Rome. According to TELEGRAF's sources, the key parts of the plan refer to the arrest of the president of the Serb Republic, Radovan Karadzic, and the commander of the Army of the Serb Republic, Ratko Mladic, who are supposed to be extradited to the Tribunal in The Hague, together with other officers suspected of committing war crimes.

The secret CIA police unit is cooperating closely with IFOR [Implementation Force] members to locate suspects' hideouts. CIA police are already deployed at all positions controlled by NATO troops and are also in possession of detailed plans of actions to be taken in case the persons indicted by the Tribunal appear there.

Members of the secret police force are also added to the commissions authorized to enter certain areas believed to hide the mass graves of allegedly executed Muslims. As their duties require, these police are equipped with modern communication devices, and they record all suspicious places and locate spots where they have perceived the existence of depots or shelters of any kind. Their assignment is to inform their superior commands of all such discoveries, while relevant commands make decisions on what is to be done in such cases. In these secret groups, a particular role is played by guides, that is, moles, usually natives of Sandzak, who are trained in Turkey and, since they are familiar with the terrain, lead police groups to already specified areas, where they collect data of particular importance under NATO's protection.

Members of the secret police unit are also added to special police mine-disposal squads, whose task is to clear roads and zones that are of particular interest to NATO, as well as to locate military depots in those areas, make detailed searches, and submit reports on that to their superior commands. These mine-disposal squads, in addition to necessary mine-detecting instruments, are also equipped with special sonar for the detection of sounds coming from deep under the ground, which is aimed at discovering underground shelters.

An anonymous NATO officer stated recently in THE WASHINGTON POST that the data collected hitherto showed that much better results could be expected soon in finding and locating suspects' hideouts. In addition, it is pointed out that such hideouts are safeguarded by strong Serb forces, so it will not be easy to carry out arrests. The NATO officer particularly points out the popularity that some officers enjoy among people and in the army, which particularly applies to Gen. Mladic, whom this officer considers to be a living legend of the Serb Republic. "All these facts must be taken into account by those who are supposed to carry out arrests," the officer says.

The recent meeting in Rome was also meant to remind the signatories of the Dayton accord of the commitment they took on to arrest people designated as suspects by the Hague Tribunal. In Rome, what was particularly eye-catching was the presence of a great number of Pentagon and U.S. State Department officials, when the Balkan negotiators were again urged to intensify their cooperation with the Hague Tribunal.

Among the participants at the Rome conference was the commander of NATO for Europe, Gen. George Joulwan, who, immediately after the conference, met with the commander of NATO force in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Admiral Leighton Smith and the director of the DIA, Air Force Gen. Kenneth Moynihan. At that meeting, according to some reliable sources, the realization of the demand made by the Tribunal for the arrest of suspected war criminals was particularly discussed. That the meeting was extremely important is indicated by the fact that General Moynihan is visiting Bosnia at present, accompanied by Admiral Smith. It is presumed that his arrival in Bosnia indicates direct supervision of the work performed by DIA agents, that is, that Gen. Moynihan will directly command actions that are supposed to result in the arrest of suspected war criminals.

B-H: Lawyers: Detained Serb Officers Choose Silence

AU2302083396 Paris AFP in English
0016 GMT 23 Feb 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Belgrade, Feb 22 (AFP) — Two Bosnian Serb officers detained in The Netherlands on suspicion of being war criminals, will answer no questions until they are told what they are being accused of, one of their lawyers said here Thursday [22 February].

"We have decided, the Dutch lawyer Jan Sjoecrona and myself, in agreement with General Djordje Djukic and Colonel Aleksa Krsmanovic that there can be no question of interrogation until we know what charges are being considered against our clients," said Toma Fila.

Attorneys for the two officers said it was clear that there was no legal justification for having arrested the two officers or for flying them to The Netherlands to be questioned by the International Criminal Tribunal [ICT] tracking down war criminals in the former Yugoslavia.

Fila said he was "very displeased" by his contacts with ICT investigators, adding that it had taken four days of "tough talking" to obtain documents from his client's case file.

Fila said he suspected "these might well have been written the same day they were given to me." He said his Dutch colleague shared the same view.

"It was only after four days of discussion that I learned that General Djukic had not been arrested but was detained as a suspect or potential witness," Tila said.

ICT spokesman Christian Chartier said on February 13 — the day after the two officers were flown from Sarajevo to The Netherlands — that the two were not charged "but only suspects."

Fila is close to ultra-nationalist Serbs who continue to support the Bosnian Serb political and military chiefs, Radovan Karadzic and General Ratko Mladic, both of whom are accused by the ICT of involvement in genocide and war crimes.

According to Fila, the two Serb officers have so far been shown only one document; namely a list of charges against Karadzic and Mladic and that the Tribunal wanted their opinion on the charges.

"When I noticed that the names of Djukic and Krsmanovic were not mentioned in the document, I was told that if it transpired that that they had taken part in the events concerned, they would be charged. If they had only indirect knowledge of the events, they would be required to testify," Fila said.

He said the ICT had threatened to turn over the two officers to the mainly Moslem Bosnian authorities if the case had made no progress by March 17.

The two Serb officers were seized by the Bosnians on January 30 in a sector of Sarajevo controlled by the NATO-led peace Implementation Force (IFOR). Their detention infuriated the Bosnian Serbs and triggered a major crisis in the peace process.

B-H: Martic Vows To Respond to Any Arrest Attempt

AU2202145596 Banja Luka Srpska Televizija in Serbo-Croatian 1930 GMT 21 Feb 96

[FBIS Translated Text] In reaction to the announcement from The Hague that charges will be brought against Milan Martic, president of the Republic of Serb Krajina [RSK], Martic's information service issued a statement quoting the president's statement which, among other things, says the following:

It is utterly cynical to bring charges against a desperate attempt to save convoys of children and women refugees exposed to lethal projectiles fired by the Croatian Air Force and artillery, and not to bring charges against those who ordered the killing of those innocent people. I am allegedly charged with the bombardment of Zagreb, while frenzied and random bombing of Knin and Benkovac and mass murders of our refugees who — to make cynicism even worse — were protected by UNPROFOR [UN Protection Force] were under way, is probably considered normal. I do not recognize the legitimacy of that tribunal and will not let them arrest or put me on trial. Every such attempt will be considered an act of terrorism and we are prepared to respond adequately, stated RSK President Milan Martic.

B-H: Serb Leader on Information Exchange With Hague

LD2102183896 Belgrade SRNA in Serbo-Croatian 1754 GMT 21 Feb 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Sarajevo, 21 Feb (SRNA) — [Bosnian] Serb Republic Prime Minister Rajko Kasagic announced after talks today with Carl Bildt, high representative of the international community, the "possibility of certain activities" between the Serb Republic and the Hague tribunal in connection with the exchange of information on war criminals on [Bosnian] Croat and Muslim territory.

"We have a lot of information on crimes committed against Serbs by Muslims and Croats," said Kasagic at a news conference, adding that the Serb side "has an interest in submitting to the Hague tribunal certain information which could be of benefit in the cases of the Serbs who were killed and thrown into mass graves."

"Posavina is full of mass graves containing Serb bodies, but only the Serbs have been accused of war crimes," said Kasagic, adding:

"In keeping with our constitution, we cannot extradite people from the Serb Republic to other courts."

B-H: Krajina Serbs Condemn Hague Indictments

AU2202201096 Banja Luka Srpska Televizija in Serbo-Croatian 1930 GMT 21 Feb 96

[FBIS Translated Text] The executive committee of the union of RSK [Republic of Serb Krajina — former self-declared Serb state in Croatia] refugees in Banja Luka believes that the Hague tribunal arrest warrant of 19 February, which allegedly declares 50 Serbs war criminals, actually brings charges against the entire Serb nation west of the Drina River. Members of the union protecting the interests of more than 60,000 refugees from Croatia at present living in the Banja Luka region are embittered at the fact that the warrant includes Serb Republic Radovan Karadzic, Lieutenant General Ratko Mladic, and RSK president Milan Martic, and leaders of the Serb nation in the war against the Croat-Muslim aggressor. The union believes that, if the Hague tribunal really wants to mete out justice, it must first of all bring charges against those who are responsible for the most horrible crimes of genocide against the Serb nation. They are: Tomislav Mercep, responsible for the mass killing of Serbs in Gospic and Marijino Selo in western Slavonia; Croatian Defense Minister Gojko Susak, responsible for five ethnic cleansings from 1992 to 1995, during the attacks on the Miljevac Plateau, Maslenica, Medacki Dzep, and the aggression against western Slavonia. Gen. Ante Roso is directly responsible for the Maslenica operation and Gen. Janko Bobetko for Medacki Dzep. In addition to Bobetko and Gen. Djuro Decak, Mladen Markac and Zvonimir Cervenko are responsible for western Slavonia, while Lt. Gen. Ante Gotovina, commander of the 4th Split Guards Brigade, as well as Gens. Pavle Miljevac, Ivan Basarac, Imre Agotic, headed by Supreme Commander Franjo Tudjman, are among those responsible for the aggression of 4 August, 1995. The union offers evidence to the Hague Tribunal of Ustasha mass killing of Serbs from the Korana River Bridge in Karlovac of

21 September 1991 to the mass killing of Kordun inhabitants when they were leaving Glina on 8 August 1995. Apart from those criminals, Gen. Atif Dudakovic, commander of the Bosnia-Herzegovina 5th Corps, must also be brought to justice. When all of them are tried before the Hague Tribunal, then all members of the Banja Luka union headed by their leaders will gladly go to the Hague to be tried for being Serbs and for defending themselves, ends today's statement of the executive committee of the union of RSK refugees in Banja Luka.

B-H: Djukic Counsel Condemns Actions by Hague Tribunal

LD2302010296 Belgrade TANJUG in English 2316 GMT 22 Feb 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Belgrade, Feb 22 (TANJUG) — Counsel of Bosnian Serb General Djordje Djukic said Thursday that the Hague war crimes tribunal was treating his client as a 'person on remand'.

Belgrade's renowned attorney at law Toma Fila said that Djukic, who was extradited to the Hague tribunal earlier in February, had not been arrested and charged, but was yet not free and was 'a suspect and a witness.'

General Djordje Djukic and Colonel Aleksa Krsmanovic of the army of the (Bosian Serb State) Republika Srpska were arrested by Muslim police on Jan. 30, while on their way to a meeting with officials of the NATO-led peace Implementation Force (IFOR) in Sarajevo.

IFOR subsequently transferred them to The Hague.

On his return to Belgrade from The Hague, Fila told reporters that the tribunal had issued no document pertaining to the arrest of the two Bosnian Serb officers, who he said had in fact been kidnaped.

Fila said that The Hague international tribunal for war crimes in the former Yugoslavia had offered as a possible solution that the officers be returned to the place of arrest where, Fila said, they would be killed by the Muslims.

Fila said that the hands of the defence counsel were tied and that the Hague tribunal was fast showing its true colours, viz., becoming the place for squaring accounts with Serb leaders.

B-H: Army Removes Senior Non-Bosniak Officers

AU2202211996 Sarajevo SVIJET (Bosnian) in Serbo-Croatian 8 Feb 96 pp 31-32

[Article by Djuro Kozar: "Non-Bosniaks (Un)suitable"]

[FBIS Translated Text] In June 1992, Sefer Halilovic, the commander of the Supreme Command of the Territorial Defense of Bosnia-Herzegovina, informed the public that in the Territorial Defense Croats accounted for 18 percent, Serbs 12 percent, whereas 70 percent consisted of Bosniaks. He explained that this proportion did not correspond the 1991 census, but that one had to keep in mind that a large number of Serbs were in the Serb Republic, that the majority of Croats had decided to join the units of the Croatian Defense Council [HVO], and that a lot of people were refugees all around the world.

At the beginning of the war, it meant a lot, in the political and military sense, to have 12 percent Serbs in the Territorial Defense of Bosnia-Herzegovina, which was the predecessor of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army. That was a certain sign that a part of the Serb people did not wish to follow the policy of Radovan Karadzic, and that the nationalists' thesis "All Serbs in one state" was well shaken. The Pale company tried to play down this percentage, but they did not succeed.

In 1992, the Serb lobby, through their connections, managed to persuade one British journalist to pose a provocative question to a soldier of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army, Serb Radoslav Zoranovic, about the participation of Serbs in "Alija's [Izetbegovic] army," at a press conference in Geneva. The question was: "Are you really a soldier there, or only a statistical indicator?" This did not confuse Zoranovic, who calmly answered:

"Of course we fight, and Karadzic's Serbs could feel best that we are there, and what we are like."

Afterwards there were changes — instead of the Territorial Defense, the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army was formed, and, instead of Sefer Halilovic, Rasim Delic was appointed commander. The army was organized fast, corps were formed, ranks introduced, and those units and individuals who did not fit into the system of command were released. In that process, which was accompanied by significant successes on the front, what happened was not only that the percentage of non-Bosniaks in the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army was not increased, it was drastically reduced. According to some data, at the end of 1995 Delic's army consisted 5 percent of Serbs and Croats at most!

Merciless Personnel Managers

Despite the official attitude of the state organs of Bosnia-Herzegovina that all patriots should be in the army, it seems that there is an unofficial opinion that Serbs and Croats are not desirable and that it is better not to have them in the army. This discrimination goes all the way to the deputy commander of the General Staff of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army, Brigade General Jovan Divjak [a Serb], who is now in charge of "parades."

Far-reaching personnel changes and reorganization in the Bosnia- Herzegovina Army started in the fall of 1993, when Brigade General Stjepan Siber, until that time deputy commander of the General Staff, was removed from that post, which for the public came suddenly, and sent off as military attache in Switzerland. It sounded strange that a country at war would give up a general who, had proved to be very capable, and put him in the diplomatic service. It seems that at that time it was somebody's goal to remove Siber from Bosnia-Herzegovina, and to leave the army without one extremely Bosnian-orientated Croat. After that there were rumors that, instead of Siber, the state presidency, as the commander in chief of the Armed Forces of Bosnia-Herzegovina, would appoint another Croat as the second officer of Croat nationality, but nothing came of that. Many thought that Siber's place would be taken by Brigadier Andjelko Makar, also a Croat, since he fulfilled all the conditions. But not only did Makar not get that post, he was even moved from Tuzla, from operational duty, and sent to the Military Academy in Zenica, to be an instructor. That happened in the first half of 1993, when the war was raging, and the military knowledge and experience of Brigadier Makar was very much needed in the zone of responsibility of the Tuzla Corps.

The moving of Andjelko Makar was explained by the fact that the post of the deputy commander of the corps had been eliminated, so that there was "no adequate duty" for him, and he had to go to Zenica.

The Mihajlovic Case

The case of Colonel Rajko Mihajlovic of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army is particularly indicative. Born in Serbia, as an officer of the JNA [Yugoslav People's Army] he lived and worked in Bosnia-Herzegovina for a long time, did not flee to the so-called Yugoslavia or join Karadzic when Bosnia-Herzegovina was attacked, as some of his colleagues did, but instead he voluntarily joined the Territorial Defense of Bosnia-Herzegovina. In the course of 1992 he was deputy commander of the 1st Corps of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army for issues of morals and religion. After one year he was removed, and sent to a lower post — that of the chief of the section for social problems of the soldiers. He accepted that post like a soldier, although he was aware that he had been degraded.

And then the personnel managers did not like Mihajlovic there either, so at the end of last year they removed him and sent him off to wait! That is when everything became clear to him. He felt cheated because when in the spring of 1992 he joined the Territorial Defense of Bosnia-Herzegovina nobody told him that three and a half years later he would be unsuitable because of his nationality. Something similar happened to officer Nikola Ivancevic. He came out of the former JNA with the rank of captain 1st class, and joined the defenders of Bosnia-Herzegovina. He made it to the duty of the deputy commander for morals of the Educational Recruitment Center in Sarajevo. And then, as a Montenegrin, he became superfluous. Since the personnel managers could not find anything that could put blame on him, he was not thrown out of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army, but instead was given a place in a logistics base. Considering the offered post to be a degradation, he did not accept it, because he had not "graduated from the Military Academy in order to work as a clerk in a store room."

He submitted an appeal to the Command of the 1st Corps concerning that appointment, but has never received an answer. What is his status now? Formally, he is still in the army, he gets his fee and the cigarettes, while actually he has not gone to work and has not done anything for over a year and a half now. It seems that for some people in the army the only important thing is that there were no non-Bosniaks in any important positions. And Ivancevic could by all means be useful in the army, but, he is of an unsuitable nationality.

Gen. Divjak has been reduced to the civil sector. He represents the army at meetings, he opens exhibitions, promotes books, talks to children, and does everything except that which he knows best — command troops. In the former army Divjak finished the highest schools, he worked for a long time in the military education, he was even the head of the tactics department, but what is the use of all that if he is not ethnically suitable. There was some talk that he could go into diplomacy or retirement, but Divjak denied that, and said: "If anybody sent me into retirement, I would stay in the army as an ordinary soldier."

Officer Zlatko Petrovic is longer in the Command of the 1st Corps of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army, where for a while he was the head of the legal department. He is the child of a mixed marriage — his father is a Serb and his mother Bosniak, but as his last name is Petrovic he was "enabled" to formally be in the army, and actually work as a lawyer. Through his and Mihajlovic's departure the Command of the 1st Corps became ethnically clean — namely Bosniak, like the commands of other corps, except the 5th.

The Exception of Bihac

It is only in Bihac that the national "purge" has not been carried out. Since the beginning of the war everything has been "multi" there. Most officers of all nations from the former JNA came to the command and the units of the 5th Corps. The most important thing for its commanders, Hajrudin Osmanagic, Ramiz Drekovic, and Atif Dudakovic, has been — what people can do, which is more important than what they are called. Soon the 5th Corps became the best organized, and the best in the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army.

So that now the third man in the hierarchy of the 5th Corps is a Serb, Colonel Aleksandar Mrenica. There is another Serb in the command — Drago Ilic. There is a considerable number of soldiers of Serb nationality in the brigades of this corps. There are some Croats. Two officers of Croat nationality — Ivan Prsa and Franjo Grgic — were in the command of the 5th Corps, and then, at the request of the HVO, they were transferred to the Command of the corps district Bihac. That is the reason for the good cooperation of the army and the HVO on Bihac territory. Division General Dudakovic, beside being a capable commander, is a very wise man. In his staff there are no brigade commanders who have not graduated from the military academy. He simply wishes to command professionals. And that is why he said on one occasion: "In the long time it takes to explain a tactical idea to a layman, I can lose a battle."

The situation does not have to remain like this in the future. According to some unofficial information, it seems that General Delic has ordered that Colonel Mihajlovic be given a new post, and that each case of removing non-Bosniaks from commands should be investigated, and he be informed. That is an encouraging move.

B-H: Article Views Demobilization's Social Problems

AU1502091396 Sarajevo OSLOBODJENJE (Bosnian) in Serbo-Croatian 5 Feb 96 p 2

[Article by Hajdar Arifagic: "Labor Drama"]

[FBIS Translated Text] From several places from where official policy has been conducted, the state has recently announced that it will deal with the destiny of the demobilized soldiers. That was the reason for many large meetings in Tuzla, Zenica, and Sarajevo, and the government of Dr. Haris Silajdzic, at its last but one session, presented its views on this problem and the possibility of solving it, in 16 items. On that occasion, the government was very wise and passed that hot potato, which has been rolling across Bosnia since the end of last year, over to the companies and also suggested that, if they cannot find a solution, they should leave it to the municipalities.

On the same day, the theses of the election program of the ruling Party of Democratic Action [SDA] were presented. There was not one word about the return to work of those who have defended this country or about employing those who had earlier been unemployed. In the part of the program dedicated to economic questions, they mostly mentioned "taking" (privatization, housing reform), but they did not talk about opening up perspectives by which one will be able to make a living through work. In the 25 SDA items, everything was more important than that.

To be fair, at the last SDA news conference, Dr. Ejup Ganic made a little correction, announcing that this party has committed itself not to social economy, but to productive employment, which it will express in the final version of its election program. That is but small comfort for all those who are prone to believe that the politics and politicians will solve the newly created drama.

Social Drama

Dr. Hasan Muratovic, prime minister of the Government of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina, and Dr. Izudin Kapetanovic, prime minister of the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina, have been a bit more precise in their basic indications of the future work of the two new governments. Both of them are aware that they will face a social drama, unless they will create the conditions for solving the existing existential questions of the soldiers.

"Without employing people, we cannot reach any objective, including complete peace in this country," Dr. Muratovic stated resolutely. Prime Minister Dr. Kapetanovic sees the guarantee for the social security of the population in the creation of a healthy market system, reconstruction, and in giving jobs to the demobilized troops.

When, some 20 days ago, we discussed this subject with Dr. Zlatko Lagumdzija, this university professor from Sarajevo told OLOBODJENJE that the state and the Army had made a premature decision to demobilize a large number of soldiers. It is obvious that he was right, because nowadays neither companies nor municipalities are capable of "processing" every individual case, let alone of offering a job and salary. In Lagumdzija's opinion, demobilization can be efficient only if it is used to reach full combat readiness and to build a modern army.

Dr. Zlatko Lagumdzija particularly emphasizes that demobilization is being also used in the promotion of cheap demagogy.

"It is fashionable to say today: 'You will all be demobilized and given shares,'" our collocutor says, and adds: "Anyone who expects to be given 15,000 or

20,000 German marks [DM] is being cheated." He says the state does not have that much money ("My estimate is that we are talking about something like DM3 billion to DM4 billion"), and those who have been launching such lies will, sooner or later, have these lies turn against them!

The disentanglement, in Dr. Lagumdzija's opinion, is possible if the demobilization is immediately accompanied by two programs: economic and social ones. However, there are also dangerous extremes. "And, it seems, we have fallen into one of them," he says. Jobs are promised, one after another, to invalids, to the unhealed wounded, to the members of the sehids' [those who died for Islam] families. His appraisal is that such people cannot be the driving force of our economy. He suggests that, on the basis of realistic social programs and in line with their social problems and possibilities, the conditions for a decent and respectable life should be created. "To employ such people in a large-scale way, means to close the door on the capable people who could do much better work in the same job." That is as dangerous as employing people when there will be nothing for them to do in the near future.

Some successful companies employing some 100 workers could collapse very quickly if they were forced to take on 50 or 100 additional workers. It is much better to leave such companies to continue to work the way as they are at present and to channel the surplus of their profit into social security funds for the unemployed. A special analysis of the likely reaction of the people from the trenches who want to work would be required.

Economic Response

If people are left on the streets and with social assistance — which would, according to the conclusions of Silajdzic's government, be provided by the municipalities — then the labor drama could have a fierce epilogue. The street is a good training area for crime, prostitution, narcotic abuse, juvenile delinquency, alcoholism, and other socially harmful phenomena.

"It could result in peacetime curfews being longer than those we had during the war," Dr. Lagumdzija suggests.

Asked how to reduce the negative consequences of the large-scale demobilization and the possible dissatisfaction of those who will be dismissed from employment, Dr. Lagumdzija says:

"If he was not a laborer before, he should be given a text book to learn from, of course."

An electrician, house painter, technician, or engineer who, has had no contact with his profession, the literature, and the market economy in the last four years is ignorant of his job today and he must have further training or be retrained for something that he is capable of doing today. Regarding the young, he says it is bad that good students who were within a year or two of university graduation have not yet been demobilized from the Army, leaving them to grow older under arms. "It seems that, once again, those with good connections have benefitted."

In any case, the young should be given the opportunity, not only to finish their studies, but also to learn foreign languages, because in that way they will be given the chance to find a job quickly and earn a living. Learning is good therapy for the resocialization of the people after so much time spent in trenches and carrying weapons.

If the young demobilized soldiers are offered nothing but the street, the end of the drama could turn into a definite collapse of both politics and the economy.

B-H: Communications Minister on Restoration Work

AU1402161196 Sarajevo VECERNJE NOVINE in Serbo-Croatian 31 Jan 96 p 6

[Interview with Ibrahim Koluder, minister of traffic and communications in the Government of Bosnia-Herzegovina, by Mladen Blagojevic; place and date not given: "There Are No Magic Tricks"]

[FBIS Translated Text] One of the basic preconditions for the reactivation of the economy and the reintegration of all Bosnia-Herzegovina is the restoration of communications, which have to a great extent been destroyed during the war.

[Koluder] The biggest problem in the restoration of travel communications is of course the funds. The small amount of funds from the budget that we have at our disposal could not be of much help. Thanks to the civil defense and in general to people and to the UNHCR [UN High Commissioner for Refugees], it was possible to do some things. Some new travel routes have been made, and the old ones maintained, at least to a certain extent. Before the war Bosnia-Herzegovina spent around $150 million for the maintenance and the construction of roads, and in the war, instead of that, we have had around $350 million in damage. That is why in our talks with the World Bank we insist that the first resources we get be spent on the repairs of roads. In that sense many projects have been made, and our domestic building enterprises are ready to be actively included in the reconstruction. The most important and the most critical travel route for Bosnia-Herzegovina is the M17 road from Ploce, Mostar to Zenica, and further to Doboj and Tuzla. Then there is also the communication between [Bosanska] Krajina and Prnjavor. Nothing can be done by magic, but I believe that the World Bank will give us funds for these works, since they are aware of the significance of the reconstruction of road communications for the reintegration of Bosnia-Herzegovina altogether.

Deadlines for the Ploce-Sarajevo Railway

[Blagojevic] What is the situation with the railway like? The main railway knot is in Doboj, and Doboj belonged to the Serb entity?

[Koluder] The construction of new routes is not good, and I would say it is not necessary either. Our country is too small for us to build some new routes, and the world is not going to give us money for that. Even those from whom we expect help, in order to be economical, have the strategy for more countries to plan and realize such projects together. Technically it is possible to carry out a separation, but I believe that to be nonsense, and it seems to me that in the Serb entity they are also becoming aware of that. The railway from Ploce via Doboj to Hungary, Banja Luka, and Tuzla is a common interest of all entities since it connects us with the world. The existing situation is a dead-end street for everybody. We have formed a commission for the reintegration of Bosnia-Herzegovina, and in this way also the inclusion of Bosnia-Herzegovina in international communication developments.

[Blagojevic] Still, didn't the deadline for the finalization of the Sarajevo-Ploce railway expire a long time ago?

[Koluder] The latest information is that the latest deadline for the finalization will be April-May of this year, and I believe that this time it is definite. We asked the German Embassy (since Germany took over the responsibility for this) for an explanation, and we were given the answer that they were not satisfied with the engagement of the present company from Split, and that they have engaged another company from Slavonski Brod to finish the remaining work by May.

[Blagojevic] There are rumors that the depot in Rajlovac, which is the heart of railway traffic, has been destroyed and plundered?

[Koluder] There are such rumors, but I have to admit that we still have no precise data about that.

Civil Aviation Will Start From Scratch

[Blagojevic] What is the situation concerning the port of Ploce and Neum like?

[Koluder] The basic agreement with Croats about this was achieved two years ago in Washington. I see no reason for anything to be essentially changed. Croatia will have a wide comfortable passage through Neum, and we will have the Ploce port for long-term use. Bosnia-Herzegovina built the Ploce port, and it has a lot of invested capital there. Our strategic interest is to use that port. Croatia does not have such an interest. In this war it was proved that without the connection with Bosnia-Herzegovina this port dies. But we wish to have long-term guarantees there, and not to be in the situation that in three or five years some commercial demands change, which would make some investments of ours worthless. If we are not given guarantees for that, there are alternative solutions like the ports of Capljina, Neum, or Bar.

[Blagojevic] Recently it could be heard several times, among others from some officials as well, that air traffic should already have started functioning.

[Koluder] Those who claim that should know that everything that has to do with aviation was concentrated in Belgrade before the war. There are also big problems concerning the training of appropriate staff, because the training of flight controllers is very expensive, and it costs millions of dollars. Besides, until recently flights over Bosnia were not allowed. That problem has now been removed, and Bosnia-Herzegovina has finally become the owner of its own sky. As for the staff, there is expedited work on their training. The airports in Sarajevo, Tuzla, and Mostar will first be used for landing cargo planes, because that is the least dangerous, and after that, around May, we can expect the first civilian flights. For the time being that is still too dangerous, and all the important conditions for safe flights have still not been fulfilled. Much has been done, and one wrong and hurried move could set us back a year. None of the responsible people can or want to take over such a big risk.

Pljesevica Is a Subject of Discussion

[Blagojevic] Systems for transmitting television signals are also in your domain. When will it be possible to watch a program of Bosnia-Herzegovina Television throughout the state?

[Koluder] That will happen soon. It is necessary to solve the problem of transmitters, which represents the resources of Bosnia-Herzegovina, which is their owner [sentence as published]. In the course of the war, the transmitters have been usurped from all sides, and I believe that the process of putting things in order will be painful for many. Of course I mean for those who in the past two or three years have used the frequencies of others, and who will have to free them now. The frequencies are limited by the international union in Geneva, and the state net will have priority. When those needs are satisfied, there remains a little space for new subjects to be included. There are bigger possibilities when it comes to local stations, and there will be no problems there.

[Blagojevic] As far as we know, there are also some problems concerning the Pljesevica relay. Has that been given over to Croatia?

[Koluder] The Pljesevica relay is situated in the border area and it has still not been determined whether it belongs to us or to Croatia. That is why it does not function at the moment.

[Box, p 6]

Same Treatment for Telephone as Gun

[Blagojevic] What is the situation concerning the establishment of telephone lines with eastern Mostar? In the public there have been some calculations that it is all a matter of some political games and tricks of ours.

[Koluder] If Bjelasnica and Velez functioned, everything would have looked different for a long time. Without Bjelasnica and Velez, some new facilities had to be made, and that is the reason for the problems with telephone lines with eastern Mostar. Rumors of political causes are ridiculous, because in that case there are many places in Mostar which have no communication systems. At this moment we have completed negotiations for a modern "Siemens" exchange, which is the latest technical achievement, and is of a sufficient capacity. Second, to solve the problem of Bukovala, we will start establishing 'mini-links' that have already been provided, and in designing a large system of 1920 channels this problem will be qualitatively solved in the future. Means of telecommunication have been damaged a great deal in this war, and new equipment managed to reach us only very seldom. It has been treated as strategic material, just like military equipment. In this aspect too we will soon see better times.

Croatia: Gains, Losses Seen for All at Rome Summit

AU2202152396 Split SLOBODNA DALMACIJA in Serbo-Croatian 21 Feb 96 p 5

[Commentary by Danko Plevnik: "All Wars Lead to Bosnia"]

[FBIS Translated Text] A diplomatic meeting took place in Rome 77 years ago between Carlo Sforza, Italian diplomat and politician, and British Ambassador Sir James Rennell Rodd which also touched the faith of the Balkan peoples. Sforza told Rodd that they might pretend to accept the principles of the League of Nations for their own goals, but they believe in force rather than ideal solutions because they still maintain the condotierre [mercenary] mentality of the 14th and 15th century. This is the stance with which Tudjman, Milosevic, and Izetbegovic set out on their calvary to Rome, taking with them a few recent mutual wars and a supposed commitment to UN principles. Their European-American hosts made sure that each of the presidents had a compromising incident in his luggage. Izetbegovic's incident is the fundamentalist terrorist training camp in Fojnica, which has prompted the West to call for the extradition of its hosts to The Hague; Tudjman's incident is the attack on Koschnick's car, while Milosevic's incident involved the sniper attack on the bus traveling through Ilidza and the breakdown of relations with IFOR [Implementation Force].

The Game

Such balanced out complaints should restore in the said leaders the lost faith in the ideal Dayton solutions. Was it Dayton or its implementation that went in for an overhaul in Rome? Namely, can one call the division of three peoples into two entities an ideal solution? It seems that the crucial difficulty is implementation of the Dayton Agreement. The Serbs understood this double entity as a chance for secession; Radovan Karadzic said that the most important goal was to resist everything that would lead to an integrated Bosnia, the Bosniaks saw it as a platform for gradually overcoming the division into entities through cantonization and ultimately reintegration, while the Croats decided to announce their favorite game — the struggle for legalization of a third entity in Bosnia. Is this what the troika signed in Dayton, Ohio? Richard Holbrooke made a great effort to explain to them that their Dayton signatures mean something quite different. Dayton is not just an agreement between Milosevic, Tudjman, and Izetbegovic, although the United States is grateful to Milosevic for initiating the war, to Tudjman for initiating peace, and to Izetbegovic for agreeing to the idea of multiculturalism. Thus, on one level these are thoughts about reality. But on another level, Dayton is an agreement between Germany, France, and Britain. On a third level, it is an agreement between the European Union [EU] and the United States, and an agreement between the United States and Russia. Finally, it an agreement between the EU, the United States, and Russia....

Therefore, just as on the first level Milosevic and Tudjman either cooperated or fought, allowing each other for the sake of their political goals alternately to attack Karadzic (Bosansko Grahovo, Glamoc) or Izetbegovic (Zepa, Srebrenica), so the West European politicians traded with the ideal parts of Croatian freedom, unreal parts of Serbian encroachment, and the Bosnians' unrealistic expectations. [sentence as published] The Bosnian domino has been arranged in such a way that it reflects not only today's but also tomorrow's situation in Europe. The EU believes that tectonic changes occurred at the first level, within the Zagreb-Mostar relation, while President Tudjman believes that the causes are at the second, European level.

The Order

Is Bosnia some separate or exemplary Eurocentrist issue within all this? Holbrooke sees Bosnia as a 'case study' of European security and proscribes any event that might ensue from a wrong approach to solving the Bosnian issue as a threat to comprehensive European balance and thus as a threat to the United States' direct and essential national security interests. That is why the U.S.'s Bosnian policy must succeed. If it succeeds, there will be a greater chance of success in the testing of the Romanian-Ukranian issue, the Romanian-Hungarian issue, the Hungarian-Slovak issue, and several other interstate and ethnic issues whose historical potential is hindering the establishment of balance in Europe on post-nationalistic bases. The post-Dayton problems of the Balkan leaders are occurring because they are trying to implement the agreement according to ante-nationalistic or supposedly crypto-nationalistic concepts, which would allow them to install the new world order in the Balkans to their advantage. However, this is also a Central European disease because all the Central European states are hoping that NATO will help them in a struggle against their neighbors when they attempt to annex regions containing their ethnic minorities, and not only in collective "resistance to the Russians."

Until Milosevic, Tudjman, and Izetbegovic relinquish their obviously inadequate perception of the Dayton Agreement — the implementation has been approached in a haphazard and improvised manner with a lot of stalling — the Dayton process will have to progress in an institutionalized manner which will force the leaders to engage in frequent cross examinations and confrontations. Then they will again have to be told that Bosnia is not falling apart because of gangrenous multiculturalism but because of the non-existence of political multiculturalism.

Life

Yes, the Croats, Serbs, and Bosniaks must continue their historical existence as Croats, Serbs, or Bosniaks, and not start a synthetic, artificial, or imposed existence of Croats, Serbs, and Bosniaks. All three presidents are completely right on this initial ethnical point. However, they are mistaken if and when they forget that the historical existence of Croats, Serbs, and Bosniaks is their existence as Bosnians and Herzegovians, and not as greater Croats, Serbs, or Muslims. That is why we can calmly agree with British Catholic liberal Lord Acton, who, true, did not manage to complete his monumental work "The History of Freedom," but he did manage to finish one unforgettable sentence: "Truth is the only value that lends dignity and reputation to history."

In the course of these war years we have heard so many appropriate truths that all of Bosnia-Herzegovina blushed with shame from all the lies about its history and the historical links of the three peoples, each of which now falsely maintains that the other two are a fabrication and improvisation. Dayton was supposed to affirm that these peoples are indigenous to, and not transcendent in Bosnia, and that they have to stay in it. After the revival of these theoretical Dayton relations, Rome started with the revival of practical Dayton relations so the three presidents were "convicted" and "sentenced" to rare but regular normalization meetings. Each one is going back home with certain gains and certain losses.

Izetbegovic got a "rap on the knuckles" because of his idea of a "mixed society," which took the form of concessions to Serbs and Croats in Sarajevo and Mostar, but he was rewarded with the promise of a single customs system for the Bosnia-Herzegovina Federation. Tudjman had to sacrifice the Croats' customs monopoly for more of Croatian Mostar. By influencing Pale, Milosevic achieved the lifting of sanctions for the Serb Republic. It was expected that Rome would mean beatings, but instead well balanced prizes were handed out. However, the important thing is that all safety catches have been removed from the Dayton rifle, which means that in the future it will be easier to target all the elements obstructing this exclusively take it, rather than take it or leave it, peace. [sentence as published] In keeping with time-honored tradition, the three presidents will soon realize that they have accidentally left their Filofaxes in Rome. But if all wars lead to Bosnia, it is worth remembering that all roads lead to Rome, and that if they fail to honor their obligations, Milosevic, Tudjman, and Izetbegovic will again have to go and confess to either God or the Devil.

Croatia: Daily Sees 'Spirit of Dayton' at Rome Talks

AU2302085696 Zagreb VJESNIK in Serbo-Croatian 20 Feb 96 p 5

[Commentary by Aleksandar Milosevic: "Spirit of Dayton in Rome"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Those were the 23 hours that strengthened the tired Dayton peace machine. The Rome meeting of Presidents Tudjman, Izetbegovic, and Milosevic with the representatives of the Contact Group and the OSCE [Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe] showed that the spirit and atmosphere of the Dayton negotiations can be transferred across the ocean to the center of Europe with the same results. The second question is whether all the participants arrived with sincere intentions to strengthen the Dayton agreement and continue to implement it. However, regardless of the possible bad intentions of some of the participants, the final result is good. So, the Dayton agreement and all its provisions remain, as well as the prospects for lasting peace in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

Observers conclude that the Rome meeting was one more victory for U.S. diplomacy. Although the Italians were the official hosts and the head of Italian diplomacy, Susanna Agnelli, was trying to maintain the illusion of the first personality of the meeting, the real moving spirit was, and remained, Richard Holbrooke. Once again, it was shown that the Dayton agreement and the present peace agreement in Bosnia are the result of U.S. efforts and skill in spite of European inertia and lack of resourcefulness. To justify the rather pale impression that was left by the head of Italian diplomacy during the course of the meeting, we can use the current internal political crisis in Italy. Perhaps that, to a degree, helped Holbrooke to emerge as the center of attention.

Croatia can be satisfied with the results of the Rome negotiations. They proved that Croatia was still an inevitable factor in all the political processes in the whole region and that, without its constructive approach to the solving of the problem, long-term solutions will not be found. When the Croats in Bosnia-Herzegovina — that is, in Mostar — are the point in question, they, too, have a reason for satisfaction. The solution agreed in Rome is on the track of the Dayton agreement but also on the track of Mostar Croats' demands to Koschnick that he reduce his decision on the megadistrict as the seventh municipal unit to a reasonable and acceptable measure. In short, in six municipalities (three of them mostly Croatian and three of them mostly Muslim), the seventh part of the town will be a district with few inhabitants but with all the institutions necessary for the normal life of a town.

At first sight, the bilateral meetings of the delegation chiefs have brought nothing spectacular. True, President Tudjman and the president of the Presidency of Bosnia-Herzegovina, Alija Izetbegovic, have met rather frequently of late, so no spectacular news could be expected. However, the meeting of the Croatian and Serbian presidents, despite the meager information, has given a hint that the moment of mutual recognition of the two states is approaching. Slobodan Milosevic will certainly use the common announcement to prepare his political public at home for the mutual recognition of Zagreb and Belgrade, which will certainly not be greeted with approval by part of the Serbian political public. However, mythomaniacal frustrations are one thing and political realities are something else.

After all, the mutual recognition of the two states within their internationally recognized borders is also one of the obligations from the Dayton agreement.

If the Italian minister of foreign affairs was pushed into the background due to domestic political events, then the representative of the European Union, Carl Bildt, proved his impersonal style without anyone's assistance. From very well-informed circles, one could discover that a very serious conflict had occurred between him and Holbrooke, the result of which was the defeat of the European representative. It has also been shown that his decision on prolonging the stay of the Serb police in parts of Sarajevo (contrary to the Dayton agreement) is yielding the expected bad results. The free movement of traffic in all parts of Sarajevo is still not possible, Serb snipers have been shooting at the city buses, and, from time to time, IFOR [Implementation Force] soldiers or vehicles find themselves targeted by assassins. In short, Carl Bildt has proved that the present task surpasses his political skill, which was also confirmed in Rome.

Although short in duration, the Croatian president used his visit to Rome to meet with Italian President Scalfaro as agreed earlier. Without doubt, that will be a small but significant step in the development of relations between the two states. The renewed invitation to the Italian president to visit Croatia, which the Italian side accepted with pleasure, will certainly affirm the future international position of Croatia, above all as an important political and military factor in the region.

Will meetings like this one in Rome become a rule? According to the announcements of U.S. sources, it may happen because the Americans see some kind of guarantee in it that everything that was agreed in Dayton will be implemented. That also includes the extradition of the indicted war criminals to the International Criminal Tribunal in The Hague, which is one of the crucial points that the Americans have a number of complaints about regarding Belgrade. However, going by the scarce announcements from the Rome meeting, Milosevic will no longer be able to put off that obligation forever. The economic sanctions' Sword of Damocles will continue to descend as long as the procrastination over the surrender of Mladic and Karadzic to The Hague Tribunal continues.

Croatia has, regarding cooperation with the Tribunal in The Hague, made significant steps, so no additional requests have been made of Croatia. On the question of Mostar, the prediction of Minister Granic after the unpleasant events in Mostar that everything would be settled and that the Croats had nothing to worry about has proved to be correct. After all, the spirit of Dayton showed its vitality in Rome.

Croatia: B-H Situation After Rome Talks Viewed

AU2202153896 Zagreb VECERNJI LIST in Serbo-Croatian 21 Feb 96 p 4

[Commentary by Visnja Staresina: "It Is Easier To Sign"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The Dayton paper agreement looks quite different on the ground in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Has the Rome meeting managed to bring the agreement closer to implementation or was it just the beginning of a series of top-level meetings meant to rescue the Dayton agreement, which appears impossible to implement in practice until it is adjusted to suit reality? The politicians, of course, all expressed their support for the agreement, which is their duty and which is why they had been invited. The analysts have been far more critical about its possible success, repeating in stronger terms what they were saying when the agreement was announced. The fact is that the clarity and precision were sacrificed for deadlines, signatures, and the preservation of an illusion of principle.

Just as Holbrooke read the declaration in front of correspondents in Rome, George Kenney, one of the greatest critics of the U.S. policy on Bosnia-Herzegovina and a former State department employee who resigned in 1993 in protest at the passive U.S. policy on Bosnia, gave CNN his assessment of the Rome conclusions. Kenney, once an avid advocate of the preservation of a Bosnia-Herzegovina state and international military intervention, today claims that the Dayton agreement cannot be implemented and that the best solution is to accept that the country has been divided and to allow each entity to govern itself. He believes that the federation is only an interim stage in the division into Muslim and Croat parts and that the West needs the federation to preserve the illusion of the integrity of Bosnia-Herzegovina. Kenney believes that the federation will be the source of Muslim-Croat conflict in the coming period. He does not see the possibility of integrating the Serb entity into a common state, no matter how decentralized it might be, and he criticizes Holbrooke and the official U.S. policy for deliberately ignoring the Islamic fighters and training centers during the talks for pragmatic reasons only to express concern at "discovering" them now. Unlike the usual political views, which put all the blame for implementation failures on the Serbs (for not handing over war criminals) and the Croats (Mostar), Kenney is warning that Izetbegovic, too, has not shown too much concern for the confidence measures in the Serb parts of Sarajevo or for the Croats' equality in central Bosnia-Herzegovina. The message, in short, is—to work, the agreement has to be adjusted to suit reality.

One can perhaps debate some of Kenney's points, but the final conclusion — that the job was not completed in Dayton — remains without any doubt. Even Holbrooke admitted as much recently, albeit indirectly, when he said in Davos that Bosnia-Herzegovina was de facto partitioned, but that there was an agreement that was signed by all sides safeguarding the statehood of Bosnia-Herzegovina, that it was up to the politicians in Sarajevo, Belgrade, and Zagreb to discuss its implementation, and that it was also up to them to see whether Bosnia-Herzegovina would again be reintegrated as a state. The responsibility has thus already been shifted to "the sides." The EU and Carl Bildt are mostly in charge of the implementation of the civilian aspects. Because of the blockade in the U.S. Congress, and (so far) the lack of interest by Japan and the Islamic countries, the Europeans would have to bear the largest burden of the reconstruction, while Bildt has been given a special treat—to implement the most contradictory part of the agreement, the civilian part, in coordination with "the sides" all of which will try and protect and impose their political option every step of the way.

The United States, which has brought about the agreement and is the main bearer of the implementation of its military part — which has proven to be the simpler part of the job with the chance of turning into a lasting cease-fire — has come out of the Dayton process as the winner and the only respectable power. Holbrooke is quitting the state administration as the most successful peace mediator so far while the agreement is still fresh. Lacking more effective means, Europe will probably organize more talks like those in Rome as soon as the implementation gets into trouble to get confirmed support for the signed agreement. Those who remain involved in the implementation will realize that it is so much easier to sign.

Croatia: U.S. Backs Belgian Mission in Srem-Baranja

LD2202175896 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1714 GMT 22 Feb 96

["Pool" item]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Brussels, Feb. 22 (TANJUG) — The United States has given its full support to the Belgian command mission over the U.N. Transitional Administration for Eastern Slavonia (UNTAES) [word indistinct] forces in the Srem-Baranja region.

The Srem-Baranja region is part of The Republic of Serb Krajina, a state proclaimed by Serbs in 1991 following Croatia's armed secession from the former Yugoslav Federation. The Croatian Army has not occupied this part of Krajina.

In offensives launched in May and August last year, the Croatian army overran northern and western parts of Serb Krajina, killing 4,000 Serbs and expelling 250,000 others.

Sources at the Belgian Foreign Ministry told TANJUG that Belgian Foreign Minister Erik de Rycke was given this support during his two-day official visit to Washington.

Under a U.N. Security Council decision, Belgium has been entrusted with command over the UNTAES peace force, which should secure transitional administration until the best solution for the area is found.

Croatian authorities and representatives of local Serbs signed an agreement in late November last year on placing the region under a one-year U.N. administration, with a possible extension for another 12 months if any of the sides should so request.

The Security Council appointed Retired U.S. General Jacques Klein administrator for the region.

The UNTAES mission comprises 5,000 troops, and Belgian's contingent of 1,000 men will be the largest. The UNTAES force will be under the command of Belgian General Joze Schoups.

In mid-March, de Rycke will visit the Srem-Baranja region to attend Belgium's takeover of the UNTAES peace force command, the Belgian Foreign Ministry said.

Croatia: Martic Defends Shelling of Zagreb

AU2202192996 Belgrade VECERNJE NOVOSTI in Serbo-Croatian 22 Feb 96 p 5

[Unattributed report: "Utmost Cynicism of The Hague"]

[FBIS Translated Text] "The Croatian artillery and air force showered deadly shells on columns of refugees who were fleeing western Slavonia, fearing death from Ustashi [Croatian World War II fascists] knives. The shelling of the Croatian capital was just a desperate attempt to prevent a massacre of refugees," former president of the Republic of Serbian Krajina Milan Martic stated yesterday, following the news that the Hague Tribunal will start public presentation of evidence against him.

"It is an utmost cynicism to try me rather than those who ordered the raid on Krajina, during which Knin and Benkovac were indiscriminately bombed. In the course of the Croatian aggression, thousands of Serbs were killed and more than 3,000 fled, fearing death from Ustashi knives," Martic says.

In a special statement Martic says he does not recognize the Tribunal in The Hague as legitimate and points out he would consider any attempt to arrest him a terrorist act.

Croatia: Commentary Calls Report on RSK Crimes Farce

AU1602143196 Beli Manastir Srpski Radio in Serbo-Croatian 1700 GMT 14 Feb 96

[Unattributed commentary]

[FBIS Translated Text] Now that the entire world has seen the footage showing the extent of destruction and ghostly wasteland Operation "Storm" left in Krajina, to insist on the figure of 757 destroyed houses is nothing but mocking the UN Security Council, and Croatia can afford to do that because of its powerful sponsors, most likely. Even more absurd is the fact that in the reintegrated area, as they call Krajina in their report — 41 cases of robbery were reported, 26 of which were solved by the police. Some Croatian media revealed pictures and wrote about mass robberies, convoys of cars, trucks, even trains packed with stolen property. Every Serb town and village was plundered to the maximum, but in spite of that, the UN Security Council was informed of only about 41 cases. The report cynically concludes that punitive action efficiently prevented the looting of abandoned houses.

A separate chapter of the Croatian report is reserved for the so-called acts of robbery and the Croatian state says that 1,151 out of 1,600 reported cases were solved. They do not elaborate on the details of those cases, but it is common knowledge that all the remaining Serbs, mostly old men and women, were maltreated, their belongings stolen. We do not know the outcome of those cases either, but we do know that none of the Serbs got any of it back. Even (Susan Manuel), UN spokesperson in Belgrade, last fall often talked about that, noting that even the front door was taken from an old woman's home.

The Croatian report also talks about murder of civilians mentioned in the report of the UN secretary general. Talking about 404 dead Serb soldiers and 462 civilians, as well as 45 persons of undeterminable status, in spite of evidence to the contrary, Croatian officials claim that the Croatian Army did not take any action against civilian targets, but acted solely against military targets. The number of civilian casualties was accounted for by a statement that enemy units used the civilians as live shields, which is a lie that is easily proven by all members of UN peace forces who happened to be in Krajina on 4 August.

Expressing regret about isolated incidents, the Croatian state talks about 27 murders in the wake of military operations, for which they charged and allegedly arrested 25 persons. Their names, as well as the names of all 1,005 persons arraigned by military and civilian tribunals for crimes committed during and after Operation "Storm," are not known to the public, as usual.

And while the names of arraigned Croats are not revealed, names and even nicknames of the Serbs arrested and sentenced for armed rebellion are filling the columns of the Croatian press, which declares them criminals. The pardoned Serbs who were detained in prisons throughout Croatia do not remember hearing or seeing that a Croat charged with crimes against the Serbs has ever been arrested or sentenced. The report of the Croatian government claims that the investigation into the two most drastic cases of killing civilians — nine persons killed on 28 September in the village of Varivode, near Knin and seven persons killed a couple of days later in the nearby village of Gosic — is drawing to a close and that the pretrial investigation is under way. It is not hard to imagine the outcome of the trial, providing it is held at all, because this is not the first time Croatia — to fool the international community — staged a farcical trial and acquitted criminals. The murderers of the Zec family of Zagreb, bodyguards of the Croatian defense minister are a case in point. They were acquitted though all of them pleaded guilty. Furthermore, an investigation into the case of Tomislav Mercep and his men, who even boasted about their crimes, has never been completed. There are numbers of such cases and official Zagreb, regardless of the presented evidence, has always disassociated itself, just as it did in its latest report about the crimes committed in Krajina. Unfortunately, just as many before, this Croatian report will most probably become an official document of the UN Security Council and be treated as truthful, allowing Croatia to go on with ethnic cleansing, especially considering the latest statement of its officials that Serb refugees absolutely cannot return.

Croatia: PM Claims Strike Designed To Destabilize

LD2202163596 Zagreb Radio Croatia Network in Serbo-Croatian 1400 GMT 22 Feb 96

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] The Croatian Government is open to social dialogue with the trade unions but will not accept any kind of pressure. This was said by Prime Minister Zlatko Matesa at a Croatian government session at which reports were also submitted on the negotiations with the trade unions and the railway strike. The government also endorsed a number of important draft laws and the draft plan of this year's spring sowing. [passage omitted] Matesa told the government that he had received a letter containing support for the union of independent trade unions sent by the Nezavisnost trade union of Belgrade.

[Begin Matesa recording] This should be viewed in the context of wider efforts to destabilize the Croatian state, but I pledge, on behalf of the government, that we shall not allow ourselves to be provoked regardless of all the difficulties and pressures. I repeat again, Messrs ministers, you have the duty, as part of you portfolios and in conjunction with other members of the government, to bring to completion both the collective negotiations and social dialogue and ensure that the Croatian railways operate so that as little damage is done to the Croatian economy as possible. [end recording]

Croatia: Radio, TV Networks in E. Slavonia Viewed

AU2202090196 Belgrade VECERNJE NOVOSTI in Serbo-Croatian 16 Feb 96 p 8

[Article by Jovanka Simic: "Waves Disturbed by Scarcity"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] The Erdut-Zagreb peace agreement made the weapons amassed on both sides of the Srem and Baranja front fall silent three months ago, but this was seemingly a sign for the beginning of another kind of battle that is very important in modern warfare, the battle between the media.

Numerous Croatian and recently also Muslim radio and television channels have spread a spider web over each of 3,000 square kilometers of Srem and Baranja. Apart from the three channels of the Croatian state television, anti-Serbian information reaches the area from Osijek Television and two Vinkovci television stations, which are equipped with modern studio equipment.

An Old Illness

The Sarajevo Muslim television joined them in the same manner recently, since it has extended its range considerably. Apart from that, there is also the considerable influence of Hungarian television. The number of radio signals that reach the area of Srem and Baranja is at least three times higher than the number of television signals.

Although they have considerable technical problems and semi-professional equipment, the Serb media in the area are trying to compete, with two television studios — Beli Manastir and Vukovar — and four radio stations — Srpski Radio Borovo, Radio Vukovar, Radio Beli Manastir, and Radio Mirkovci. (It must be mentioned that programs of the Radio-Television of Serbia are being watched with special interest by the 200,000 people who live here).

The picture of Television of Srem and Baranja was lost 10 days ago, however. The communication lines are broken, so it is not possible to broadcast from the studio in Beli Manastir, which means that there cannot be broadcasts from Vukovar either. So far, these two television stations have broadcast alternately, since reporters from Vukovar — waiting for their studio — record their programs on a cassette and send it to Beli Manastir. That is why the broken lines have put both television stations out of operation.

"This is the greatest damage that has occurred in the last four years," Mr. Radislav Mutavdzic, the acting director of the radio and television center in Beli Manastir says.

"We have a modern transmitter with a range of up to 300 kilometers, but our equipment is semi-professional and worn out, so that it is very sensitive to drastically different electricity waves. Apart from that, we have been working without technical services and engineers all the time. We are sparing no effort to remove these problems, and we hope to be able to resume broadcasts soon."

Mutavdzic mentions that the information flow in Srem and Baranja is affected by the same illness as the information system in the (former) Republic of Serb Krajina: neglect at the political level. When the Knin Krajina fell last summer, the remaining part of Srem and Baranja was left (among other things) without an information minister. This means that the radio and television studios are working on their own, and their integration into the unique system of the Belgrade Radio-Television has only been a matter for debate so far.

Ljubinko Stojanovic, the manager of Vukovar Radio-Television, confirms that the information system in Srem and Baranja is not being paid the necessary attention.

"Radio Vukovar was out of service for 29 days recently because of damage, not to mention the nonpayment of reporters' salaries. After a long time, I distributed $200 equally among our employees yesterday — the driver receiving as much as the director," Stojanovic says. There are similar problems at the "Serbian Radio of Borovo." [quotation marks as published] This is the legendary radio station that broadcast its programs during the most fierce clashes in 1991. Radio Osijek considerably amplified its range some time ago, so the Borovo Radio program can only be heard only in Borovo and the immediate vicinity.

"Therefore we have decided to take the 102.3 Megahertz frequency," Milomir Dafinic, the director of the Borovo radio station says, adding that the solution to the problem is a unique information system. [passage omitted]

FYROM: PDP, Others Greet PM's Proposed Cabinet

AU2202214096 Skopje MIC in English 22 Feb 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] In yesterday's discussion, the PDP [Party for Democratic Prosperity] MPs said they would vote in favor of Prime Minister Branko Crvenkovski's new cabinet. As it is known, this party will have five ministerial positions in the new cabinet. In the discussion, the MPs emphasized that this party did not see any other partner among the Macedonian political parties with whom it could cooperate, however, they said it was high time the Albanians were taken seriously, and that without them, Macedonia [The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia—FYROM] could not survive as a modern, democratic, multinational state. Furthermore, they stressed that now Macedonia is a member of nearly all international political and financial organizations and that it will have to take into account the European democratic standards. In this sense, the PDP feels it is necessary to make radical reforms, foremost, in the field of high education, meaning the final legalization of the Tetovo University in Albanian language. They expect the new Government to finally improve the status of the Albanians in Macedonia and to resolve the citizenship of some 100,000, predominantly Albanians, in the country.

The Social Democratic Party of Macedonia, PCERM [Party for Full Emancipation of Romanies], and Democratic Alliance—Liberal Party—expressed confidence in Crvenkovski's new reconstructed Government yesterday, explaining this with the thesis that the platform of the Alliance for Macedonia has not been abandoned and that its basic principles are absolutely acceptable to these parties. They explained that the platform is extensive and that it has enough room for other political subjects as well. Moreover, they were pleased that now there would be a constructive opposition in Parliament, which will be able to control the Government and to contribute, with its remarks, to the adoption of better and more applicable laws in the state.

Liberals Want New Elections

The parliamentary group of the Liberal Party announced at yesterday's session that it has made a list of signatures for an initiative for new elections in Macedonia. The coordinator of the LP parliamentary group Ace Kocevski explained that his party will not support Premier Crvenkovski's proposal. He explained that the new list of ministers also has such who are strongly opposed to the platform of the Alliance for Macedonia. Therefore, the Liberal Party feels that the Alliance for Macedonia no longer exists. Kocevski also emphasized that the reconstruction of the Government does not exist as a category in the Macedonian Constitution and that the President should appoint a new mandator. Kocevski strongly criticized the to-date work of this Government, mainly in the field of efficiency of the state administration, which, instead of reducing its numbers, employed 4,000 new people. Furthermore, according to Kocevski, he could not see what the program of the reconstructed Government would be like from Prime Minister Crvenkovski's address, and strongly remarked against the absence of analysis of the to-date work of Crvenkovski's cabinet.

It is unclear to the Liberals how some ministers merely rotate to new positions (here, they mentioned Interior Minister Frckovski, who was made Foreign Minister, which is unimaginable in modern democracies). Kocevski reminded that so far, there has been no information as to the identity of the people responsible for the assassination attempt on President Gligorov on October 3, last year. In addition, the Liberals held it against Crvenkovski that the former ministerial set up included Ilijaz Sabriu from PDP, who was one of the people that signed the initiative for the formation of the Tetovo University.

FYROM: Opening of Secret Police Dossiers Considered

96BA0118A Skopje NOVA MAKEDONIJA in Macedonian 12 Jan 96 pp 1, 3

[Article by Z. Petrov: "Fourteen Thousand Dossiers Will Be Opened"]

[FBIS Translated Text] *Most of these dossiers were created before 1952; they "weigh" in excess of 55,000 sheets, most of which are denunciations of extremely questionable accuracy. This is a complex and sensitive project demanding complete attention.*

The second governmental initiative on organizing a special Assembly commission to open the dossiers of the former State Security Service, dealing with various individuals under Communist Party rule, was announced at the press conference called by the Government of the Republic of Macedonia [The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia—FYROM] the day before yesterday. Spokesman Djuner Ismail explained that this is considered necessary at present, for Macedonia remains the last of the former socialist countries to undertake this kind of project. This meant practically a new start of a governmental initiative, which was considered exactly three years ago, before the first parliamentary Assembly.

As early as March 1993, the Ministry of Internal Affairs announced its initiative and suggestion to the government to set up a parliamentary commission to assess the scientific, and, in general, the usefulness of police files (also known as "dossiers of individuals"), and to determine which of them should be destroyed. It is a question concerning almost 14,000 files, most of which were opened before 1952. It must be pointed out that, to this day, the SDB [State Security Service] microfilmed the dossiers, in the course of which most of them were preserved. The proposal that the government submitted on setting up a suitable parliamentary commission called for three representatives, two scientific workers, and two members of the SDB, whose task, based on an already established procedure, was to review the dossiers and determine what should be removed and why, and, naturally, whose. Let us also point out that this extensive material, exceeding 55,000 sheets, so far had been left to the historians working on archival data for the 1941-45 period.

The fate of this governmental proposal was set by the Assembly. The most interesting aspect to remember is that the main objections were those of the then existing parliamentary opposition. A number of problems and remarks were voiced, starting with the fact that this was not an ordinary action for the authorities to call for the opening of police dossiers in the fear that such a process would also mean the reopening of old wounds, followed by a number of shocks as well as political and personal traumas. Briefly stated, the governmental suggestion became stuck in the various Assembly bodies and was never included in the current parliamentary agenda.

At present, this initiative, now about three years old, has been updated, and we may expect the revival of the old dilemmas and hesitations. It is obvious that this tremendous "wealth," which was collected by the SDB in the course of half a century, could simply leave the police as a significant political step that would abolish all past debts and become a step aimed at the final depiction of the previous system's legacy. It may be emphasized that it is a question of exceptionally sensitive data, for it involves extensive denunciations, the nature of which is of extremely questionable veracity. Hence, it is of exceptional importance to carry out such a delicate operation competently and skillfully, eliminating all subjective and petty political aspects of the matter.

The problem of opening the dossiers, we are being told, is very complex and sensitive. On the one hand, it would constitute a moral break with the past and, to a certain extent, a cleansing of conscience; on the other, the new data that will come to light would cast a shadow on the reputation of some current personalities who had worked for the State Security Service in the past. Actually, the experience of a number of countries cautions us about such a possibility, such as, for example, the resignation of some opposition leaders in Bulgaria after they became compromised as former Communist agents. Still remembered are the scandals in the former Czechoslovakia after the Federal Assembly called upon all representatives to voluntarily resign from the parliament if they been involved with the security services in the past. In the former East Germany, for example, a number of dirty activities and affairs involving the notorious Stasi, along with similar scandals, appeared after the dossiers were opened in Poland, Slovenia, and Croatia.

In any case, in discussing the opening of police dossiers, we must bear in mind that the Assembly commission that will eventually be established for this purpose cannot and would not dare, whatever the case, to assume the role of a judicial authority. The experience of most post-socialist states involves the principal task of blocking or avoiding the danger of manipulating and discrediting, which implies that the commission must destroy a large number of files. This applies to all materials that have no practical use, other than for historical value, and these would be offered to scientific institutions.

Poland: Kwasniewski To Visit Moscow in Apr

WS2302144896 Warsaw ZYCIE WARSZAWY in Polish 23 Feb 96 p 3

[Article by "RAS": "The President Will Soon Visit Moscow"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Officers from the Presidential Chancellery announced yesterday that President Kwasniewski will not submit his own draft law liberalizing the current antiabortion legislation. They also said that a nationwide campaign of feeding children from impoverished families is to be launched, President Kwasniewski is to visit Moscow soon, and an amendment to the presidential election law will be presented.

Krzysztof Janik, responsible for self-government issues, said the president will shortly issue a draft law providing that heads of gminas and city mayors are to be chosen in direct elections. The Chancellery also wants to amend the current election law, which will introduce harsher criteria for presidential candidates and provide that parliamentary elections always be held in June.

Barbara Labuda, in charge of social issues at the Chancellery, wants to launch "a huge nationwide campaign to feed children from poor families" in cooperation with the government plenipotentiary for family issues and the president's wife. Labuda also announced a campaign protecting the safety of children on roads and establishing a fellowship for talented youth.

"The Chancellery will not present its own draft antiabortion law because the Union of Labor has already submitted a proper draft amendment, and the Parliamentary Group of Women is working on this as well," added Danuta Waniek.

The president will visit Moscow in April. Andrzej Majkowski, who is responsible for international relations, does not exclude the possibility that the president will visit the Vatican, although "no specific date is known yet." He is skeptical, however, of the president's U.S. visit "because of the election campaign that is under way over there."

Poland: Walesa Aide Refuses Dismissal From Chancellery

LD2202203896 Warsaw Polskie Radio First Program Network in Polish 1105 GMT 22 Feb 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Danuta Waniek, the head of the Presidential Chancellery, has reported that Mieczyslaw Wachowski is neither collecting documents terminating his contract of employment nor admitting representatives of the Chancellery into his home, nor is he collecting his correspondence. In an interview for Polish Radio, Waniek said that, despite this, the employment contract with Wachowski will be dissolved as of the end of March this year.

[Begin Waniek recording] Employees of the Chancellery went to his home on two occasions and they were not admitted to the house. In light of above, we decided to send the things by post—the documents were not collected. Well, nothing else remains for us but to end this game, and I am informing everyone who is interested in this that 31 March will be the final day of employment of Mieczyslaw Wachowski in the Chancellery. I, of course, say employment in inverted commas because Minister Wachowski is not, of course, at work.

Poland: Allegations of Russian Cooperation Against Left

LD2202224796 Warsaw TVP Television Second Program Network in Polish 2000 GMT 22 Feb 96

[From the "Panorama" newscast with Krystyna Czubowna; relayed via satellite by TV Polonia Network]

[FBIS Translated Text] Leszek Miller [chairman of the Council of Ministers] has upheld his allegations from 1993 according to which the State Protection Office [UOP] suggested to the Russian special services that they cooperate against the Polish left. The minister was replying to questions from members of the Extraordinary Commission examining the legality of the activities of the Ministry of Internal Affairs in the case of the alleged contacts of [former Prime Minister] Jozef Oleksy with a foreign intelligence service.

[Begin unidentified correspondent recording] Leszek Miller recalled that in May 1993 he informed the Sejm of a visit by UOP functionaries to Moscow.

[Miller] There were many other strands. This group suggested to the Russian special services the undertaking of joint activities against the Polish left.

[Jerzy Konieczny, former head of UOP, former minister of internal affairs] No, no, no. No, no.

[Correspondent] Yes. Minister Miller has said so.

[Konieczny] No, no, no. Against the left? Well, that is, that is, well.

[Correspondent] That this kind of thing...

[Konieczny, interrupting] No, no. Insofar as I remember, there took place a certain series of meetings that had, rather, the character of legal assistance. And then UOP was examining, was examining a certain, a certain issue associated with unclear details regarding, well, the [CPSU] loan [to the Social Democracy of the Polish

Republic Party]. And this case found its termination in a trial.

[Correspondent] Leszek Miller did not wish to reveal the name of his informant because his life would be seriously threatened.

[Miller] I received this information from the Ministry of Internal Affairs, from a man who condemned the fact that the Polish special services were being used for political struggle and did not agree with this. I regard this as being very responsible behavior.

[Correspondent] The head of the Military Intelligence Services has informed the commission about 12 categories of Russian civilian and military intelligence agents. [end recording]

Poland: Potential Unification Moves on Political Right

LD2302001796 Warsaw TVP Television Second Program Network in Polish 2000 GMT 22 Feb 96

[Relayed on Warsaw TV Polonia in Polish]

[FBIS Translated Text] The Political Coordinating Council of the Patriotic Camp [OP] has suggested to the Movement for the Reconstruction of Poland [ROP], the Christian-National Union, the Bloc for Poland, and the Peasant-Independence Coalition the running of a joint electoral list in the next parliamentary elections. The OP leaders stress the fact that there are almost 10 million people inclined to vote for a right-wing grouping. The results of the last elections and the ownership enfranchisement referenda are cited by way of proof. We are not interested in getting a dozen or so deputies into the Sejm, we want to take power and responsibility for the affairs of the country, said Romuald Szeremietiew.

ROP leader Jan Olszewski felt that joining into the unification of right-wing parties it was necessary to first know the standpoint of Solidarity. Olszewski judged positively the proposal of OP that is directed toward the running of a joint list in the next parliamentary elections. He noted, however, that this proposal had only a verbal character. Jan Olszewski recalled that the right-wing parties have already many times sought accord in various formulas and that so far these efforts have come to nothing.

Poland: SLD Being Blamed for Slow Pace of Commission

WS2302104796 Warsaw GAZETA WYBORCZA in Polish 22 Feb 96 p 3

[Report by "AN": "The Sluggishness of the Constitutional Commission; A Temporary Lack of Quorum"]

[FBIS Translated Text] *The Constitutional Commission is working at a very slow pace. The opposition is accusing the Polish Peasant Party and the Democratic Left Alliance [SLD] for this state of affairs. The coalition, they claim, is too busy in the government and in the Presidential Chancellery to attend commission meetings.*

Yesterday the parliament members managed to pass amendments to the chapter on self-governments (the vote was put off several times due to a lack of a quorum) yet failed to pass provisions on states of emergency. Once again the reason was the lack of a majority (the presence of at least half of the 56 commission members is required).

Meanwhile, on Tuesday, all SLD ministers who are members of the commission appeared (Prime Minister Cimoszewicz only for a short time because he was in a hurry to get to a cabinet session). Among those present were Danuta Waniek, head of the Presidential Chancellery; Krzysztof Janik, the Chancellery's under secretary of state; Education Minister Jerzy Wiatr; and Interior Minister Zbigniew Siemiatkowski (all from the SLD). Their four votes led Marek Mazurkiewicz to be elected the new chairman.

After the vote, the representatives of the coalition disappeared. The session was adjourned because the room was empty. "The coalition is very well organized when it comes to taking offices," Hanna Suchocka of the Freedom Union told reporters yesterday. She said that the absence of SLD parliament members did not make a good impression, considering Mazurkiewicz's statement on the special responsibility the coalition has for the new constitution. "The opposition dominates in the assembly hall," said Suchocka.

"The SLD ministers should choose whether they want to work on the Constitution or in the cabinet and the Presidential Chancellery," claims Wojciech Borowik from the Union of Labor.

It unexpectedly turned out that SLD shares that opinion. Wit Majewski (SLD) said: "The problems with attendance are a result of the recent changes at the Presidential Palace and in the government. We have to delegate new members to the commission and we will do it soon."

Mazurkiewicz wants to persuade those commission members who do not attend the sessions to resign. He plans to talk about improving the work of the commission with chairmen of the parliamentary clubs.

"I feel very sorry about leaving the commission. I work 10 or 11 hours at the Chancellery each day, and I am unable to put in enough work on the Constitution to make my colleagues happy," Danuta Waniek, head of the Presidential Chancellery, told GAZETA WYBORCZA. The new education minister, Jerzy Wiatr, also intends to resign from the commission.

Poland: Trade Offices May Spark SdRP-PSL Controversy

WS2302123096 Warsaw ZYCIE WARSZAWY in Polish 22 Feb 96 p 3

[Article by Cezary Gmyz: "Rosati Versus Buchacz. The Foreign Ministry Chief Demands That Offices of the Trade Counsel That Are Subordinated to the PSL's Chief of the Ministry of Foreign Economic Cooperation Be Liquidated"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Foreign Minister Dariusz Rosati yesterday announced setting up strong economic departments in embassies and Polish promotion centers. They are to replace Trade Counsel Offices [BRH] operating under the aegis of the Ministry of Foreign Economic Cooperation [MWGZ].

The minister attended yesterday's meeting of the Senate Foreign Affairs Commission. A few days earlier, he voiced the idea of liquidating BRH's during talks with Sejm commission members. At that time, he assured the deputies that he had obtained preliminary consent from MWGZ Minister Jacek Buchacz (Polish Peasant Party [PSL]). "In the past, MWGZ chiefs agreed to liquidate BRH's, but 24 hours later it would become clear that they could not live without a network of their own diplomatic missions," Piotr Nowina-Konopka warned Rosati at that time, recalling that all foreign ministers had been attempting to liquidate BRH's since 1989. The deputy's prediction has probably come true. "It seems that Mr. Buchacz has a different opinion of BRH's," Rosati told ZYCIE WARSZAWY after the meeting with senators.

During the commission meeting, the foreign minister censured the structure of BRH's. He primarily criticized their diplomatic status. "I understand that BRH employees are satisfied with their diplomatic status. However, a man who helps a company from Krotoszyn establish trade contacts with a company from Vienna cannot act as a diplomat," Rosati stated. He also stated that BRH's are actually "missions of several firms belonging to an adviser's acquaintances." He said that the structure of BRH's is not clear for our partners, primarily West European, and they do not like the diplomatic status of BRH employees.

The minister suggested replacing BRH's with economic departments at embassies. A trade counsel would be subordinated to the Foreign Ministry and would act as a deputy ambassador.

In the opinion of Rosati, the promotion of the Polish economy should be taken care of by special promotion centers that would be set up under the auspices of the government and representatives of economic self-governments. These missions and their employees would have no diplomatic status, however.

The argument over BRH's may become a controversial issue between the Social Democracy of the Polish Republic and the PSL, to which the MWGZ belongs, according to the coalition agreement. PSL activists and people affiliated with the party have become accustomed to the fact that BRH's are usually more friendly to them than embassies. In the past (particularly under [former Prime Minister] Waldemar Pawlak), BRH's were sometimes used by the PSL to conduct its own separate foreign policy and by party leaders to do business.

Federal

FRY: French Ambassador Promises Reintegration Aid

AU2202212496 Belgrade RTB Television Network in Serbo-Croatian 1830 GMT 22 Feb 96

[Statement by Gabriel Keller, newly appointed French ambassador to Belgrade, "especially" for the Dnevnik program; place and date not given — recorded]

[FBIS Translated Text] As the first country to reestablish diplomatic relations with the FRY at ambassadorial level, France is showing that it remains loyal to the tradition of friendship with the Serbian and Montenegrin peoples. We are happy that the recent diplomatic moves in Dayton, Paris, and the most recent ones in Rome, with the active participation of the FRY, have contributed to this important and symbolic step.

France will continue to work with the FRY toward reconciliation among all the countries of the former Yugoslavia. Their mutual recognition, which we would like to happen as soon as possible, will significantly contribute to this reconciliation.

Generally speaking, we want to cooperate closely with the FRY so that peace and stability can return to the Balkan region as a whole. France will help the FRY to return to its place in the international community, the United Nations, and other international organizations, including the financial ones, and, of course, in the European organizations.

This reintegration will be easier and quicker with the efforts that the FRY will invest to develop a modern country according to the existing European norms concerning both human rights and the treatment of minorities, and the modernization and liberalization of the economy. In all these spheres, there is a lot of scope for successful and friendly cooperation between our two countries.

I am happy to be able, as part of my new job that was entrusted to me, to contribute to such an important task.

FRY: Envoy Says France Values Friendship With FRY

LD2302002896 Belgrade TANJUG in English 2200 GMT 22 Feb 96

["Pool" item]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Belgrade, Feb 22 (TANJUG) — France's new ambassador in Belgrade said on Thursday that France, as the first E.U. state to establish ambassador-level ties with the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, proved its lasting devotion to traditional friendship with its peoples.

Ambassador Gabriel Keller [name as received] told Serbian Radio and Television that France was happy that headway made recently in the diplomatic efforts at Dayton, Paris and Rome, with Yugoslavia's active participation, had helped make this important and symbolic step possible.

Keller, former charge d'affaires of the French embassy in Belgrade, said that France would continue to cooperate with the Yugoslav Federation of Serbia and Montenegro on reconciliation among former Yugoslav republics and their mutual recognition.

He said that France would help Yugoslavia resume its place in the international community — in the United Nations, financial and other international organizations, and especially European organizations.

The reintegration will be made easier and quicker through Yugoslavia's efforts to build a modern state in line with European norms on human and minority rights, and to modernize and liberalize the economy, Keller said.

The Yugoslav Foreign Ministry announced on Thursday that the governments of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and France had upgraded diplomatic relations to the level of ambassadors extraordinary and plenipotentiary.

FRY: No Open Questions in Relations With Romania

LD2302005796 Belgrade TANJUG in English 2208 GMT 22 Feb 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Belgrade, Feb 22 (TANJUG) — Yugoslav and Romanian officials agreed on Thursday that there were no questions outstanding in bilateral relations.

Yugoslav Minister Without Portfolio Margit Savovic and Charge d'Affaires of the Romanian Embassy in Belgrade Panait Lefter were discussing the position of either country's minority in the other country, a Yugoslav government statement said.

Lefter conveyed to Savovic an invitation from the Romanian Government's Secretavy General in Charge of Minority Affairs Viorel Hrebenchuka to visit Romania.

Such a visit would reaffirm the two countries' respect for the international standards and principles pertaining to human and minority rights in mutual dealings, the statement quoted Lefter as saying.

Lefter had a separate meeting on Thursday with Yugoslav Minister for Development, Science and the Environment Janko Radulovic to discuss bilateral cooperation in the economy, science and environmental protection.

The two sides saw a chance of opening a free trade zone in bilateral trade.

In the field of environmental protection, they laid special stress on protecting the waters of the River Danube from pollution.

Lefter met also with Oliver Potezica of Serbia's ruling socialist party, a party statement said.

Potezica informed Lefter about preparations for the party's congress in March, emphasizing that it would be attended by delegates of some 60 foreign parties and demonstrate Serbia's openness to the world.

FRY: 23 Million Dinars Earmarked for Refugees

LD2202164196 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1553 GMT 22 Feb 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Belgrade, Feb 22 (TANJUG) — The Government of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) earmarked on Thursday 23 million [mln] dinars (3.3 dinars to the German mark) in aid to refugees in the FRY during the first quarter of this year.

The bulk of 11.5 mln dinars would be spent for health and medical care, the FRY information secretariat said.

Four mln dinars would go to the Yugoslav Red Cross for food, clothing, footwear, bed linen, medicine, personal care items, and for the charges of forwarding the aid to refugees.

In the FRY now, there are around 700,000 refugees from the war-stricken areas of the former Yugoslavia. Of them, 85 per cent are at private or relatives' homes while others are accommodated in 850 collective centres.

Serbia

Serbia: Dutch Embassy Rejects Seselj's Visa Request

AU2202152596 Bad Vilbel VESTI in Serbo-Croatian 22 Feb 96 p 32

[Unattributed report: "Seselj Is Not Going to The Hague"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The Netherlands Embassy in Belgrade rejected the application for an entry visa of Vojislav Seselj, leader of the Serbian Radical Party, who had voluntarily offered to testify at the War Crimes Tribunal in The Hague about war crimes committed in former Yugoslavia.

Seselj was informed that he was not eligible for an entry visa since he had not received an invitation from the Tribunal. The leader of the Radicals applied for visa at the Netherlands Embassy, where he received the explanation from Embassy Senior Secretary Meno Lensta that invitations from three Serb associations in the Netherlands are not enough for the trip in The Hague, and he also needs a direct invitation from the Tribunal itself.

After this meeting, Seselj stated he will not apply for a visa to visit the Netherlands again.

Serbia: Ethnic Hungarian's Attitude Criticized

LD2202153196 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1009 GMT 22 Feb 96

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Subotica, 22 Feb (TANJUG) — Since the beginning of the exodus of Krajina Serbs [from Croatia] and their resettlement in the northern Backa region [of Vojvodina], two Hungarian parties — the Union of Vojvodina Hungarians and the Democratic Community of Vojvodina Hungarians — have been saying that people in trouble should be helped but that these refugees should be permanently settled exclusively in eastern, central, and southern Serbia.

To explain and justify their attitude, the two parties invoke UN documents which ban any forced change in the ethnic structure of the population, and cite the concern of the people of Hungarian and Croat nationality that the Krajina homeless will attempt to move by force in to the abandoned homes of Hungarians and Croats. [passage omitted]

Jozef Kasa, chairman of the Subotica municipal assembly, steadfastly promotes his party's views in municipal politics and that is why he reacted vehemently to inquiries last week by the Ministry of Urban Planning and Housing about free plots of land and vacated houses.

"The municipality of Subotica will give no information about arable land, the possibilities for purchase, the number of empty homes, or on the structure and level of development of industry in Subotica, because all of this indicates that Serbia wants to reintegrate refugees in Vojvodina," he told the press.

Kasa said that instead of sending information to the ministry, the municipality will demand that the refugees be returned to their homes, and if that is not possible, that they be sent somewhere outside of Vojvodina where they will not disrupt the ethnic structure.

Local media gave considerable publicity to the chairman's views, despite the fact that Kasa's comments to the Hungarian media were out of place and even brutal. [passage omitted]

Stane Zitnik, deputy chairman of the Federal Party of Yugoslavs, also protested publicly, saying that "in addition to a series of political failures, the mayor also failed the humanity test." Bora Drakulovic, secretary of the municipal committee of the [ruling] Socialist Party of Serbia said that, unlike the municipal leadership, the citizens of Subotica were generous in their help for Krajina Serbs.

"Jozef Kasa's views and his insistence are the best evidence of the ethical and political nature of the Subotica municipal chairman and the coexistence that he and his party advocate. For the umpteenth time the nature of his loyalty to the Serbian state has become obvious but personally I am not too worried because such views are contradicted by life itself."

"No force has been used to enter a single empty house or abandoned plot of land and there have been no recorded incidents between the local population and the refugees since the end of August [1995]. On the contrary, there are many examples of humanity and solidarity with these people. Dozens of Hungarians offered their houses to accommodate the refugees", Drakulovic told TANJUG.

Kosovo

Kosovo: Dayton Said To Wreck Kosovo Autonomy

BR2202153396 Amsterdam DE VOLKSKRANT in Dutch 21 Feb 96 p 5

[Report by Bart Rijs: "Kosovo Regarding 'Dayton' As Treason — Oppressed Albanian Majority Hoping For Serb Reversal"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Pristina — For the Albanians in Kosovo the Dayton Peace Agreement is disillusioning. They feel like they have been abandoned by the West. The international mediators have left the situation in the province for what it was. The Serb minority can continue to oppress the Albanian population undisturbed.

Even worse, the international community has in fact recognized the borders of the new Yugoslavia, thus shattering the Albanian dream of an independent Republic of Kosovo. "Dayton was a shock," Mahmut Bakalli says. He used to be the highest communist official in the autonomous province; today, he is a member of the underground movement like all other Albanian leaders in Kosovo. "We renounced violence and hoped that the world would appreciate our attitude. But unless the position of the Albanians improves, we will have to look for another solution."

The Albanians, who account for 90 percent of Kosovo's two million inhabitants, have behaved in an exemplary way for six years. Since Milosevic sent his tanks into the streets of the provincial capital of Pristina in 1989 and put an end to the autonomy, they only offered passive resistance, thus sparing the world a second serious crisis in the Balkans. The Albanians attended to their own semi-legal health care, social assistance, education and political institutions. In the meantime they stoically endured discrimination and daily violence by the Serb police.

During the 1991 referendum, which was declared illegal by the Serb authorities, the Albanians massively voted in favor of an "Independent Republic of Kosovo", and elected Ibrahim Rugova, a literary critic and leader of the Kosovo Democratic League [LDK], as their first "president." Rugova calmed people's feelings in the province, for fear that the Serbs might start a war. In the meantime, he asked the international community to prompt the Serbs to recognize Kosovo's independence.

Growing Criticism on Passive Resistance Policy

The sign "No dogs and Albanians allowed" may have disappeared from the door of the Grand Hotel — the Serb bastion in Pristina — and the heavily armed Serb militias may no longer be patrolling the streets, the oppression has hardly disappeared. Albanians are still not entitled to education in their native language, cannot find any jobs, are arrested and beaten up by the police for no reason, and can hardly get a passport.

Although the United States and the countries of the European Union are sympathetic toward the Albanian cause, they made it clear that they will not support the struggle for independence. For most countries it would be sufficient for Serbia to restore Kosovo's autonomy. Only the United States has made the diplomatic recognition of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) dependent on the respect of human rights in Kosovo. The EU countries disagree on the criteria which must be met by Serbia.

Although Rugova is still highly regarded by the Albanians from Kosovo, criticism of his policy is growing. Says Shkelzen Maliqi, a prominent Albanian intellectual: "There is total apathy. Rugova was perfect for the period when it was impossible for us to take action, but he failed to organize the Albanian movement and surrounded himself with amateurs."

Under the leadership of human rights activist Adem Demaci — also referred to as Kosovo's Mandela because he was a political prisoner for 27 years — more and more Albanians are calling for resistance against what they call "the Serb occupation." So far there are no demonstrations or signs of protests or rebellious graffiti. Now that the risk of a new war has somewhat diminished Demaci wants the Albanians to close schools, companies, and the university to show that they are claiming their rights. "Maybe this will result in casualties, maybe 10,000 or 20,000 people will die, but this is the only way to show that we are serious," he said to the Albanian magazine ZERI lately.

Up to now the LDK is sticking to the old strategy. The LDK leaders believe that the Serbs have no choice but to make concessions. "Serbia is exhausted and has no more money to finance the oppression in Kosovo," Fehmi Agani says. He is the LDK's vice-chairman and architect of the passive resistance strategy. "There are reasons to believe that Belgrade will soon accept international mediation. It would not be Milosevic's first U-turn."

There are indeed signs that the Serb president is making preparations for talks. The last few months several right-wing Serb nationalists in Kosovo were ousted or even disappeared in prisons on charges of corruption. The federal minister for minorities agreed to re-admit Albanian children to schools; the years in the illegal Albanian classes would even be taken into account for their certificates.

The talks about Kosovo's status might take several years, political expert Maliqi believes. In the meantime some Albanian leaders are willing to accept a "Federal Republic of Kosovo" within Yugoslavia, which is still miles away from the Serb standpoint. "There are two important issues in the Balkans," Maliqi says. "The Serb and the Albanian issues. Dayton has come up with a provisional solution to the Serb issue. The Albanian issue may be put off for a while, but eventually a solution must be found. Otherwise there will be war in five or ten years."

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